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Abstract
Although examples of the prohibition of torture in domestic 
law can be found as early as the seventeenth century, it was 
not until the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights of 1948 that the prohibition found expression at an 
international level.
Article 5 of the Declaration states : "No-one shall be
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment". This phrase has been reproduced 
almost verbatim in subsequent human rights instruments at the 
United Nations, in regional human rights treaties, and in many 
states' constitutions which guarantee civil liberties and 
human rights.
It Is remarkable that despite its ubiquity, the prohibition of 
torture and ill-treatment as first articulated in the 
Declaration remains largely undefined. This observation is 
reinforced when it is noted that, if it is possible to talk of 
a "hierarchy of rights", the right to be free from torture and 
ill-treatment must be considered one of the most important. 
Unlike other human rights documented in international 
treaties, it is a right from which a State is not permitted to 
derogate and to which, it is said, it is not possible to 
compromise.
In less than half a century the prohibition of torture and 
ill-treatment has undergone a complete metamorphosis. Created 
with the horrors of the Nazi concentration camps in mind, it 
must now be considered to amount to a standard against which 
all conduct leading to a suffering of a certain severity may 
be tested. Despite this change in the raison d'etre of the 
norm, its interpretation has remained unaltered.
This thesis seeks to challenge the present understanding of 
the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment and to propose a 
definition of the phrase "torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment" which would provide a more 
satisfactory application of this fundamental right.
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Definitions
In keeping with the practice developed by the European 
Commission in the Greek case, reference to "torture and ill- 
treatment" is made as a synonym for the more lengthy "torture 
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment". The word 
"international" is used to refer to procedures of the U.N, or 
the International Court of Justice in distinction to 
procedures available to those countries in a certain 
geographically area only. These are referred to as regional 
human rights procedures. The European Commission of Human 
Rights is referred to for brevity as the "European Commission" 
or simply the "Commission". Similarly the European Court of 
Human Rights is referred to as the "European Court" or more 
usually the "Court". The European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is 
shortened to "European Convention" or "Convention".
Gender neutral language has been employed throughout this 
thesis whenever possible. On occasion, however, when writing 
in the third person plural form would lead to inaccuracy and 
use of "he/she" would prove awkward the male generic is used 
being the sex of the writer.
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1- EARLY EFFORTS TO PROHIBIT TORTURE IN INTERNATIONALLAW.
Introduction to Chapter
This Chapter seeks to trace the prohibition of torture 
and ill-treatment, firstly in domestic law and then 
internationally.
It notes that initial efforts to outlaw torture and ill- 
treatment in domestic law were a reaction to practices 
intended to secure evidence or a confession, but that by 
the time the prohibition had also found expression in 
International Law it was intended to protect the 
individual from all forms of torture and ill-treatment.
The atrocities in Nazi Germany and occupied territories 
demonstrated that prohibition of "torture" as the 
practice had traditionally been understood would not 
suffice. Many of the practices prevalent in Nazi 
concentration camps would clearly have been outlawed by a 
provision accommodating only the word "torture". However, 
some forms of conduct would not, although in representing 
an affront to human dignity it was clearly desirable that 
they too should be prohibited.
After some debate, the phrase chosen to provide this 
extended form of protection at the United Nations, and 
thereafter in most other international and regional 
instruments,^ was:
"No-one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment".^
This Chapter concludes that, bearing in mind the extended 
purpose of this provision, the prohibition of torture and 
ill-treatment was inadequately debated at the 
international level. It is clear that the consequences of 
extending the prohibition of torture to include ill-
 ^Infra Chapt.2, pp. 76-77, 
2 U.N.Doc. A/811 (1948).
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treatment were not properly considered. More detailed 
study of the prohibition would have revealed that it 
would have been advisable to separate the provision into 
two parts or f alternatively, to have two distinct 
provisions. The first would prohibit torture providing a 
freedom from such treatment or punishment which would be 
absolute. It would ensure that under no circumstances 
could an individual be subjected to conduct considered 
tantamount to torture. The second provision would 
accommodate a prohibition against invasion of the 
individual's physical integrity which would be considered 
in relation to all relevant circumstances, including the 
proven social value, if any, of the conduct in question.
1.1 Early Attitudes Towards Torture.
A survey of modern states demonstrates that the capacity 
to torture is a characteristic common to all individuals. 
The belief in its use has penetrated a diverse range of 
cultures, philosophical and political backgrounds.^ 
Amnesty International in its survey of torture in 1984 
concluded that over one third of the world’s population 
lived under political regimes which either practiced or 
condoned torture.^ Although this report was published 
prior to the political changes in the former Eastern bloc 
and the many single-party regimes in African which have 
since been replaced by more accountable forms of 
government. Amnesty International's annual survey of 1992^ 
reports practices of torture in many countries throughout 
the world, suggesting that it remains one of the most 
serious problems to which the international law of human 
rights must concentrate its efforts.
The first recorded reference of torture is probably that 
of an Egyptian poet who described how Ramses II obtained 
information regarding his enemies by torturing some
 ^See generally Bassiouni, (1978).
J AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL TORTURE IN THE EIGHTIES, at 2, (1984). 
 ^AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL ANNUAL REPORT, (1992).
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Hittite p r i s o n e r s . G Although it is clear that torture was 
prevalent when early travellers from the West first 
visited non-Western, classical civilizations,? it is to 
Ancient Greece and Rome, which influenced the philosophy 
and legal heritage of the West, that it is necessary to 
turn to examine initial official attitudes toward the 
practice of torture.
Although both states forbade torture, its practice was
not uncommon in either. There is evidence that prisoners 
of war were sometimes tortured in Ancient Greece.® 
Thucydides notes that during the Peloponnesian war the 
Corinthians and Syracusans put the captured Athenian 
commander Demosthenes to death, fearing that he might 
disclose under torture to their Spartan allies their
treasonable dealings with the Athenians.^ in peace time, 
however, torture was reserved for slaves and foreigners, 
who represented the two classes with no legal status in 
Greek society. The testimony of a slave was only legally 
admissible if it had been given under torture, even 
though the evidential value given to such testimony was 
slight. As Ruthven points out, the torture of slaves was 
very often a tactical device for calling the opponent's 
bluff in court.^
A citizen of the Roman Empire was subjected to torture 
for a number of reasons. It was used not only to extract 
confessions and ascertain the reliability of testimony, 
but also to secure the retraction of allegiance to the
Christian faith. Unlike the Ancient Greeks, the Romans 
seem to have had a second purpose for torture. In
addition to its investigative role, it also developed a 
punitive function. Sometimes torture would supplement the
 ^The battle against the Hittites took place around 1285 B.C. See generally VANDENBERG, (1979), 
g See for example, in respect of the Far East STAUNTON, (1810), and MURDOCK, (1903).® RUTHVEN, at 23, (1978) .
9 Thucydides, History, VII,id.
Supra note 8, at 25.
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death penalty,^ which by the second century was applied 
to humlliorBs^^ as well as slaves and aliens.
Torture experienced the first of its periods of relative 
disuse in the West with the predominance of the Christian 
Church, following the collapse of the Roman Empire,^® It 
was to resurface towards the end of the eleventh century, 
its full renassiance coming two centuries later. Torture 
was considered necessary because it produced Probation 
prohat issimif "the proof of all proofs". Its practice was 
institutionalised, becoming thoroughly documented and 
codified throughout most of Western Europe, The Roman 
Catholic Church, fearing increasing heresy, was forced to 
condone the practice of torture with the infamous 
Inquisito or "power of investigation". It did so on the 
basis of a somewhat curious justification. Mob rule was 
threatening. The burning and torture of heretics was 
prevalent. The Church maintained that only if it managed 
to oversee the practice of torture, would its use not be 
abused.^
An examination of the purge against witchcraft in the 
Middle Ages also requires study of the role of the 
Church. The bull Summis desiderantes affectibus issued by 
Pope Innocent VIII and published in 1486 condoning the 
conduct of the Inquisitors in flushing out those 
"unmindful of their own salvation and straying from the 
Catholic faith, [that] have abandoned themselves to 
devils... [and] do not shrink from committing and 
perpretrating the foulest abominations and filthiest 
excesses to the deadly peril of their own souls... had 
been followed by the torture and execution of many 
thousands of people.^
jj Ibid, at 33.
"Humiliores" were those people considered to be "low life", or insignificant.
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT ON TORTURE, (1975 ed).Ruthven, 54, (1978).
Text in "Malleus Maleficarui", tr.M.Summers, (1948), p.xix quoted from RUTHVEN, at 118, (1978).
Estimates vary as to how many fell victim to the great witch hunt from 200,000 to over two 
million in two centuries. N.Cohn, at 12, (Ed DOUGLAS, 1970).
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It was only when the judicial procedures that led so many 
people to the stake were challenged by Friedrich von 
Spee's Cautio Criminalis in 1631 that the purge against 
withchcraft began to lose its momentum.^ It was his 
opinion that the majority of those condemed to burn were 
innocent and that the judicial process made it almost 
impossible for them to prove their innocence. His attack 
focused on the abstraction of evidence through torture:
"What is to be thought of torture? Does it frequent moril peril to the 
innocent? In revolving what I have seen, read and heard I can only conclude 
that it fills our Germany with witches and unheard-of wickness, and not only 
Germany but any nation that tries it. The agony is so intense that to esape it 
we do not fear to incur death. The danger therefore is that many to avoid it 
will falsely confess whatever the examiner suggests or what they have 
excogitated in advance. The most robust who have thus suffered have affirmed to 
me that no crime can be imagined which they would not at once confess to if it 
would bring ever so little relief, and they would welcome ten deaths to escape 
a repetition...".!®
Although his attack on torture contributed to the decline 
in reported cases of such conduct and execution of those 
suspected of sorcery, it was not until the Enlightenment 
that the movement to abolish the practice of torture 
itself gained momentum. Beccaria’s work Dei delitti e 
delle pene -"On crimes and punishments",^ was to prove 
the classic denunciation of torture which was to 
seriously question its continued use.
Beccaria discussed the motives for judicial torture as
RUTHVEN, at 137, (1978)
19!® LEA, H.C 705 (1939) RUTHVEN, ibid, at 138..A., THE COLUMN OF INFAMY. Prefaced by Cesare Beccaria's "Of Crimes and Punishments", 
Translated by Kenelm Foster and Jane Grigson, (1954).
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follows :
"...The torture of an accused man while the case against him is being prepared 
is a cruelty consecrated by long usage among the majority of nations, its 
purpose being to make him confess to the crime, or clarify his contradictory 
statements, or discover his accomplices, or purge him in some metaphysical and 
incomprehensible way of infamy, or finally bring to light other crimes which he 
may have committed but of which he is not accused".
Although Beccaria believed torture to be cruel and 
barbaric, he concentrated his attack on the practice by 
arguing that it was inherently unjust. His concern was 
that torture leads to disequilibrium in punishment, with 
the innocent always standing to lose more than the 
guilty :
"Both are tortured, but the [innocent man] has every chance stacked against 
him:if he confesses to the crime, he is condemned; if he is declared innocent, 
he has suffered an undeserved punishment. But the guilty man's situation is in 
his favour. If he stands up firmly to torture, he is acquitted as if he were 
innocent, and he will have undergone a lesser punishment instead of a greater 
one. So the innocent man always loses by torture, while the guilty man stands 
to gain".2!
In contending that torture was both irrational and cruel, 
Beccaria had stated nothing that was entirely original, 
but his work succeeded because of the "sustained passion 
of its polemical vigour and the systematic way he 
attacked, in a short space, the ancient citadel of the 
Roman law"
Moreover, as Ruthven also points out, his arguments 
"conformed to the expectations of an influential body of 
public opinion",^® a body of opinion which Beccaria was by 
no means alone in influencing- Montesquieu stated with
Beccarria, ibid, at 31,
Ibid, at 34.
H  RUTHVEN, at 13, (1978).
Id.
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regard to torture:
"So many men of learning and genius have written against the custom of 
torturing criminals, that after them I dare not presume to meddle with the 
subject. I was going to say that it might be suitable for despotic states, 
where whatever inspires fear is the fittest motor of government. I was going to 
say that among the Greeks and Romans, slaves...-but I hear the voice of nature 
crying out and asserting her rights".
Voltaire's campaign against torture was also influential. 
By 1740 his friend Frederick the Great had abolished
ordinary torture in Prussia- He himself wrote a 
dissertation condemning torture as "a custom shameful to 
Christians and civilised peoples and, I dare say, as
cruel as it is useless".^
It was this thinking, which had influenced the great
leaders of the eighteenth century, which began to find
expression in the laws of modern states.
1.2 The Prohibition of Torture in Domestic Law.
Although the English Bill of Rights 1689^ ® abolished all 
forms or "cruel and unusual" punishment, it was the
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the
Citizen 1789,^  ^ which by influencing many other national 
constitutions, was responsible for promoting major legal 
protection from torture in domestic law. As Lester notes:
"The conquests of Napoleon's armies spread not only the Code civil but also the 
public philosophy and public law of the American and French revolutionaries 
throughout the European continent. Those legal ideas and systems were also 
spread, through imperial rule, to other continents".^®
A study of the constitutions of the former French
colonies of the Gabon, the Ivory Coast, Senegal and Upper
2'^ ESPIRIT DES LOIS VII,7, RUTHVEN, id. 
MAESTRO, at 28, quoted from RUTHVEN, id.
C.l (2 Will. & Mar. Sess.2).
GODECHOT, (1789), 2® Lester, 537 (1988)
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Volta provides an indication of the extent to which the 
French Declaration penetrated the African continent- All 
of these instruments expressly refer to the Declaration 
and some have chosen to incorporate its provisions with 
little alteration.29 The French Declaration was itself 
strongly influenced by the American Bill of Rights. A 
French scholar at the time of the adoption of the 
Declaration commented in respect of the relationship 
between the two instruments :
"cette noble idee, concue dans im autre hemisphere, devait se transplanter 
parmi nous. Nous avons concouru aux evenements qui ont rendu a l'amerique 
septentrionale la liberté: elle nous montre sur quels principes nous devons la 
conservation de la notre".®®
The prohibition of "cruel and unusual" punishment in the 
United States, which took place in the same year as the 
French Declaration, found expression in the following 
form:
"Excessive bail shall not be required nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted".®!
This provision was taken verbatim from the English Bill 
of Rights 1589-®2 Although in its formative years it was 
unclear as to whether the Eighth Amendment could be 
invoked by individuals against both state and federal 
governments, it was eventually decided in the case of 
Robinson v. California®® through the application of the 
14th Amendment to the U.S Constitution that it would be 
available in both cases. The individual’s protection 
against all forms of "cruel and unusual" punishment 
following this decision was complete.
These early examples of the prohibition of "cruel and 
unusual punishment" in domestic law in England, the
29 See here BIAUSTEIN & FLANZ.
®9 IMBERT, 12, (1985).
®! See generally Mulligan, (1979). ®2 Granucci, (1969).
®® 370 US 660 (1962).
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United States, and France were followed by many other 
countries. As new states were created or gained 
independence from colonial powers, constitutions 
safeguarding the rights of citizens with respect to their 
governments became common place, as did the citizens' 
constitutional right not to be tortured by the state. 
Norway outlawed torture in 1819;®^  Greece in the 1820s 
developed constitutional provisions prohibiting torture,®^ 
as did Portugual in 1826®® Germany in its constitution of 
1849®2 and Ireland in 1937.®® By the 1920s encouraged by 
these legal prohibitions, perhaps misled by them too, a 
European scholar could declare that "torture was a 
distant relic of the past, a practice forever left behind 
on man's journey to progress".®®
The premature nature of this view was graphically 
illustrated during the Second World War in Nazi Germany 
and occupied territories. It was the atrocities of 
torture, human experimentation and inhumane treatment 
which took place on an enormous scale which were to 
demonstrate that the war on torture and ill-treatment was 
not yet over. More importantly, it was German National 
Socialist legislation which permitted and, to a point, 
promoted these human rights violations which convinced 
the international community of the need for supra­
national legislation to safeguard minimum fundamental 
rights. It was in this spirit of " never again" that 
efforts began to make it the function of International 
Law to protect the rights of individuals.
®^  PETERS, 91, (1985). For a list of some 108 constitutions in the world in 1975 prohibiting torture see Ackerman, (1978).
See generally HUCKO, (1987).
BLAUSTEIN & FLANZ VIII at 66. The Irish Constitution of 1937 included for the first time a 
number of unspecified personal rights which were later considered to include freedom 
from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. See judgment of 
O'Dollaigh C.J. in Ryan v. The Att-G [1965] 1.R.294. See generally O'REILLY 
(IWO).
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT ON TORTURE, at 29,(1975).
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1.3 The Prohibition of Torture in International Law.
In order to determine the manner in which the prohibition 
of torture found expression in International Law, a brief 
excursion into the development of the recognition of the 
individual as a subject of International Law is 
necessary.
1.3.1 The Development of Concern for Human Rights in International Law.
Oppenheim comments in his work on International Law in 
1905:
"Several writers maintain that the Law of Nations guarantees to every 
individual at home and abroad the so-called rights of mankind without regarding 
whether he be a subject of a member State of the Family of Nations, or 
not— But such rights do not in fact enjoy any guarantee whatever from the Law 
of Nations, and they cannot enjoy such guarantee, since the Law of Nations is a 
law between States, and since individuals can not be subjects of this law
This view of the individual in International Law looked 
increasingly open to challenge as first bilateral and 
later multilateral treaties were created documenting 
specific rights of individuals.
The first international treaty containing provisions 
expressly concerning individual rights is considered to 
be the Treaty of Paris 1814 !^ in which the British and
French governments agreed to co operate in the 
suppression of the slave trade. Further bi-lateral 
treaties concerning slavery preceded the International 
Convention on the Abolition of Slavery and the Slave 
Trade,^  providing for "the complete suppression of
slavery in all its forms and of the slave trade by land 
and by sea".'^ ® Further pre-1945 international concern for
the rights of individuals can be seen in the areas of
OPPENHEIM, (1905), vol.I. Peace, at 346.
State Papers, Vol II, (1814-15); 63 CIS 171). 
f  LNTS, 60, 253; UKTS 15 (1927).®^ Art. 1, id.
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humanitarian law and the rights of minorities. The Geneva 
Convention 1864^^ compelled its twelve signatory States to 
respect the immunity of military hospitals and their 
personnel, to care for the sick and wounded irrespective 
of nationality, and to respect the Red Cross emblem. The 
treaty was first updated in 1929^ ® and its provisions were 
applied to maritime warfare by the Hague Convention 
No.Ill 1899.^® and the Hague Convention No.X of 1907.4? 
Minority rights were first documented in an international 
treaty in the Treaty of Berlin 1878.48 which Bulgaria, 
Montenegro, Serbia, Romania and Turkey all agreed to
grant religious freedom to their nationals. Minority 
rights' treaties after the First World War were of three 
kinds. First, there were treaties with the allied or
newly formed states of Poland,^ Czechoslovakia, 
Yugoslavia,®® Romania®! and Greece.®® Secondly, there were 
minority rights treaties with the ex-enemy states of 
Austria,®! Bulgaria,®^ Hungary,®® and Turkey.®® Thirdly, a
number of states were required to make declarations 
regarding the rights of minorities as a condition of 
entry into the League of Nations. These states included 
Albania,®^ Lithuania,®® Latvia,®® and Iraq.®®
Despite the above examples of the rights of individuals 
being recognised in International Law, the theory of
legal positivism prevailed in juridical thinking®! up to
State Papers, 55:43; 129 CIS 361.
®^ UKTS 36 (1931).
J® State Papers, 91:963; UKTS 11 (1901)..
205 CTS 359.
®^ 153 CTS 171.
®^ (Versailles, 28 June 1919), (1919); UKTS 4 (1919).
®® (St Germain-en-Laye, 10 September 1919), UKTS 11 (1919).
®! (Trianon, 4 June 1920), UKTS 10 (1920)..
®2 (Sevres,ID August 1920), 28 LNTS 225.
®! (The Germain-en-Laye, 10 Sept 1919). UKTS 11 (1919).®^  (Neuilly, 27 November 1919) UKTS 5 (1920).
®® (Trianon,4 June 1920) UKTS 10 (1920).
®® (Lausanne, 24 July 1923) UKTS 16 (1923).
(21 October 1921); 9 LNTS 174.
®® (12 May 1922) State Papers 118:876.
®® (7 July 1923) 22 LNTS, 393.
®® (30 May 1932) International Legislation Vol VI, 39 (1932-34).
For a description of legal positivism see SIEGHART, 12, (1983).
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the turn of the 20th century. The predominance of 
positivism, together with the strict application of the 
doctrine of national sovereignty, effectively prevented 
the international community from criticising any one 
nation for falling short of acceptable standards of 
treatment of its nationals.
Less than 50 years on from the first edition of 
Oppenheim's work on International Law, its bold rejection 
of individuals as subjects of International Law had to be 
considerably revised to account for a radical change in 
popular juridical thinking and what effectively must be 
considered a revolution in terms of the status of the 
individual in International Law.®® Sieghart accounts for 
this development in the following way:
"The apotheosis - and the consequent downfall of [legal positivism] came in 
national Socialist Germany in the late 1930's and early 1940's, where 
historically unprecedented atrocities were perpetrated by the regime there and 
then lawfully in power upon some millions of its own citizens. Many of these 
atrocities were carried out with complete legality under National Socialist 
legislation: the domestic laws authorised, and paralleled, the pernicious 
injustice installed under the constitution of a sovereign State. According to 
the strict doctrine of national sovereignty, any foreign criticism of those 
laws was therefore formally illegitimate; according to the strict positivist 
position it was also meaningless".®®
It was the creation of the United Nations ' Charter which 
epitomised this change; Professor Lauterpacht observed 
that its effect was that the individual had been 
"transformed.... from an object of international 
compassion into a subject of international right".^
In the 8th edition of OPPENHEIM, (1955) the text was revised as follows "__ the quality of
individuals as subjects of International Law is apparent from the fact that, in
various spheres, they are , as such, bound by duties which International Law imposes
directly upon them. The various developments since the two World Wars no longer 
countenance the view that, as a matter of positive law. States are the only subjects 
of International Law. In proportion as the realisation of that fact gains ground,there must be an increasing disposition to treat individuals, within a limited sphere, 
as subjects of international law", 638-639.®! SIEGHART, 14, (1983).
®^  LAUTERPACHT, at 4, (1950).
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1.3.2 The United Nations Charter 1945 65
The genesis®® of the United Nations' Charter is considered 
to be the Atlantic Charter®^ of August 14 1941, with its 
call for "freedom from fear and want". This international 
concern for individual welfare was consolidated by the 
Declaration of January 1942 by the 26 "United Nations" 
then fighting the Axis powers. It provides:
"that complete victory over their enemies is essential to defend life, 
liberty, independence and religious freedom, and to preserve human rights and 
justice in their own lands as well as in other lands".®®
It was, however, the Dumbarton Oaks proposal in 1944 for 
the establishment of a U.N. that would, inter alia, 
"promote respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms", which was to cement concern for human rights 
at an international level.®® This request found expression 
in Articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter.
Article 55 provides that:
"the United Nations shall promote...universal respect for, and observance of, 
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, 
sex, language or religion".®®
Article 56 states:
"all members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co­
operation with the organisation for the achievement of the purposes set forth 
in Article 55".®!
The use of the word "pledge" in Article 56, scholars 
agree, amounts to a legal obligation on the part of
®® T.S 57 (1946).
®® For an account of the gestation of the international law at the United Nations relating tohuman rights see HUMPHREY, (1984).
®® AJ, 35 (1941), Suppl, at 191.
®® AJ, 36 (1942), Suppl, at 191.
®® SIEGHART, at 14, (1983).® Supra note 65.
®! Id.
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member states to promote and protect human rights.®® 
However, the content of this legal obligation was 
unclear, hence it was decided that an International Bill 
of Rights should be drawn up detailing the rights and 
freedoms which States were required to recognise.®®
1.3.3 The International Bill of Rights
It was largely because a number of influential non­
governmental organisations criticised the United Nations 
Charter for being too weak with regard to provisions 
protecting human rights®^ that it was decided that an 
International Bill of Rights should be drawn up 
separately detailing fundamental rights and, possibly, an 
international procedure through which they might be 
invoked.®® The Preparatory Commission in late 1945, 
recommended that the Economic and Social Council should 
set up a Commission on Human rights to prepare an 
International Bill of Rights.®® The first session of the 
U.N.Commission began in January 1947.®® It proposed that 
the International Bill should have three sections. The 
first would be a declaration, the second, a convention 
containing legal obligations and the third would concern 
"measures of implementation".®®
See for example AKEHURST, at 75, (1985); and 6ANJI, 116-118, (1962). The British Government 
has stated that it considers that Articles 55 and 56 impose on member Governments of
the U.N. the positive obligation to pursue policies to promote human rights and to
cooperate with the U.N. organs to that end. Parliamentary Debates (Commons, vol. 960, col.89, written answers, 11 Dec. 1978),
®® U.N.Doc. E/CN.4/ACl/3/Add.l at 2, (1947).
®^  ROBERTSON, 24, (1989).
®® Humphrey, The U.N.Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in (EVAN, LUARD,1967).
'5 E.S.C.Res.5, 1 U.N. ESCOR 163, U.N. Doc. E/20 (1946).®® E/CN.4.AC.1/14.
®® Id.
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1.3.3.1 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948.
A Drafting Committee was set up to prepare a draft
Manifesto or Declaration®® on the basis of a draft that 
had been submitted by the Secretariat. This, following a
series of amendments and revisions, became the draft
Universal Declaration on Human Rights. The Declaration
was adopted by the General Assembly at its third session 
in December 1948 by Resolution 217 (III).®® The
Chairperson of the drafting committee to the declaration 
was Eleanor Roosevelt who described it as:
"first and foremost a declaration of the basic principles to serve as a common 
standard for all nations".®!
She added:
"It may well become the Magna Carta of all mankind".®®
Although it was a comment that may have been considered 
aspirational at the time, today it is one that fails to 
reflect the dynamic effect the Declaration has had on the 
development of the international law of human rights. It 
provided the impetus for the development of protection of 
human rights under customary international law, as well 
as the foundation of the two international covenants 
which were to codify further the rights first articulated 
in the Declaration. Moreover, the Declaration was to 
inspire numerous national constitutional provisions 
relating to human rights, in addition to the activities 
of non-governmental organisations.®®
Resolution 217 (III) included not only the text of the 
Universal Declaration, but also the requirement that work 
should continue on the remaining parts of the
®® U.N. Doc E/383.
®® Dec.10, 1948,G.A.Res.217A (III),U.N.Doc.A/810, at 71 (1948).
®! ROBERTSON, 26, (1989).
For example, the statute of Amnesty International refers to the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and its detail is based on the draft of the International Civil and Political Covenant.
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International Bill of Rights, After considerable debate 
it was decided that the Commission should draft not one 
but two Conventions - a protracted process which was to 
take 18 years, finally resulting in the International 
Civil and Political Covenant 1 9 6 6 and the International 
Economic. Social and Cultural Covenant 1966,®® The 
"International Bill of Rights" has now been supplemented 
by two optional protocols to the former treaty. The 
first, the Optional Protocol to the Civil and Political 
Covenant, provides an individual complaints procedure,®® 
the second, the Second Optional Protocol to the Civil and 
Political Covenant®®, provides for the prohibition of the 
death penalty in peace time.
Before it is possible to conclude this survey of 
international instruments confirming the status of the 
individual as a proper subject of International Law, it 
is necessary to note that there are now a number of 
treaties, which are commonly referred to as specialised 
treaties,®® at the United Nations. Many of these have 
detailed and expanded further the rights documented in 
the "International Bill of Rights". Three examples are 
the International Convention on the Suppression and 
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid.®® the International 
Convention Against Torture.®® and the International
Convention on the Rights of the Child 91
Finally, in addition to the United Nations' efforts to 
draft standards relating to human rights, there are three
®^  The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A.Res.2200, 21 U.N.GAOR,Supp.
(No.16) 52, U.N.Doc A/6316 (1966), UKTS 6 (1977), hereinafter cited as Civil and 
Political Covenant. As of 1 August 1992 this Covenant had been ratified by 104 States, 
U.N.Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General St/Leg/Ser.E/10.
®® GA Res. 2200, 21 UN GAOR Supp. (No.16) at 49, UN Doc,A/6316 (1966), id. As of I August 1992 
this Covenant had been ratified by 109 States, ibid.
®® Ibid. As of 1 August 1992 the Optional Protocol had been ratified by 63 States, id.
®® U.N. Doc. A/C.3/35/C.75.
®® SIEGHART, 58, (1985).
®® G A Res 3068 (XXVIII).
®® The United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment. G.A.Res.A/Res.A/Res/39/46 (1984), UKTS 107. See generally Botterud, 
(1984).
®! Cm. 1976, T.S No.44 (1992).
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regional organisations which have produced instruments 
codifying international human rights.®® The Council of 
Europe®® has documented civil and political rights in the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms 1950®^ and its additional protocols.®® The 
Organisation of American States®® has two principal human 
rights instruments : the American Declaration on the
Rights and Duties of Man 1948®^ and the American 
Convention on Human Rights 1969.®® The Organisation of 
African Unity®®is responsible for the African Charter of 
Human Rights 1985®-®® which documents civil and political 
rights, as well as emphasizing the rights of "peoples".
For a comparison and appraisal of these instruments see Weston, (1987).
The Council of Europe is a regional organisation of 28 European states whose aim is "To 
achieve a greater unity between its Members for the purpose of safeguarding and 
realizing the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating 
their economic and social progress". Preamble, Statute of the Council of Europe (May 
5, 1949). See generally ROBERTSON, 1-25, (1972).
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.4, 1950,
Eur.T.S.No 5, (entered into force, Sept.3,1953) hereinafter the "European Convention" 
or the "Convention." As of June 1993 there were 28 contracting states to the 
Convention, Information Sheet No. 32, Council of Europe, Strasbourg 1994. See 
generally BEDDARD, (1980); FAWCETT, (1987); COHEN-JONATHAN, (1989); VAN DIJK & VAN 
HOOF, (1990). For a comparative study between the Convention and the American Bill of Rights see JANIS & KAY, (1989).
There are now ten additional protocols to the Convention Protocol (No.I), 1952, Eur.T.S. 
No.9; Protocol (No,II) 1963, Eur.T.S. No.44; Protocol (No.Ill), 1963, Eur.T.S. No.45 
Protocol (No.IV), 1963, Eur.T.S. No.46; Protocol (No.V), 1966, Eur. T. S. No.55 
Protocol (No.VI), 1983 Eur.T.S. No.114; Protocol (No. VII), 1984, Eur.T.S. No.117
Protocol (No.VIII), 1985, Eur.T.S. No.118; Protocol (No.IX), 1990, Eur.T.S. Ho.140Protocol (No.X), 1992, Eur.T.S. No. 146.
The Charter of Bogota 1948 reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the 
Inter-American System, 0EA/Ser.L/V/ii.71 Doc.6 Rev.l (1987), established the 
Organisation of American States (OAS) to strengthen peace and security, ensure
peaceful resolution of disputes, provide for common action in the event of aggression, 
and promote economic, social and cultural development. ROBERTSON, at 162, (1989).
OAS Res.XXX, adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States (Mar.30-May 
2,1948), Bogata, OAS Off.Rec.OEA/Ser.L/V/1.4 Rev. (1965).
American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, OAS Off.Rec.OEA/Ser.L/V/II.23 doc.21 rev.
6 (1979) (entered into force, July 18,1978), UKTS 58 (1980).
The Charter of the Organisation of African Unity article II states the aims of the OAU to be 
to "Promote the unity and solidarity of the African States", "to eradicate all forms 
of colonialism from Africa" and "to promote international co-operation, having due 
regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights", 479 U.N.T.S. 39 (1963). ROBERTSON, at 200, (1989). See generally NALDI,(1989).
Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 28, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5 
(1981). IBM, XXI, 1982, p. 58.
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In conclusion, since 1945 and the formal expression of 
concern for human rights at an international level in the 
United Nations' Charter, what has developed is an 
intricate patchwork of human rights standards, consisting 
of a collection of regional and universal instruments 
concerned with the protection of human rights. As a 
result of these instruments it became possible to project 
the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment onto an 
international platform.
The efforts to draft a provision outlawing torture and 
ill-treatment for the purposes of these international 
instruments shall now be examined.
1.4 Genesis of an International Provision Prohibiting Torture and Ill-Treatment.
Although the American Declaration on the Rights and 
Duties of Man 1948!®! preceded the adoption of the 
Universal Declaration by a matter of a few months, it is 
to the Universal Declaration that it is necessary to turn 
to trace the origins of the modern day international norm 
prohibiting torture and ill-treatment.
Article 5 of the Universal Declaration provides that:
"No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment".!®®
The article, along with the remainder of the Universal 
Declaration, was prepared principally by the U.N. 
Commission on Human Rights!®® and its Drafting sub­
committee.!®^ It is these two bodies, together with the 
Economic and Social Committee!®® and the General Assembly's
!®! AJ, 43 (1949), Suppl, at 133.
!“® Universal Declaration G.A.Res. 217A, U.N.Doc A/810, at 71, (1948).
The Commission was established by the Economic and Social Council in 1946 to investigate and 
research the question of an International Bill of Rights. E.S.C. Res. 5, 1 U.N Escor 163, U.N.Doc. E/20 (1946).
!®J E.S.C Res.46 (1947). Doc E/325.
The Economic and Social Council (E.C.O.S.O.C) is a principal organ of the United Nations 
consiting of 54 members. Article 62 of the United Nations Charter provides:
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Third Committee^® and then its plenary session, which have 
been responsible for the form the provision now takes.
The initial proposal for the anti-torture provision 
suggested by the U.N Secretariat was:
"No one shall be subjected to torture, or to any unusual punishment or
indignity".
The proposal was first considered by the Drafting
Committee, where Koretsky of the Soviet Union questioned 
the principles which lay behind the grouping together of 
torture, physical integrity, and cruel punishments in the 
Secretariat's proposal.!®® Malik's response was to state 
that they had been grouped together as "natural rights of
the sheer physical body of man".!®® Concern was expressed
that the proposal did not adequately define the notion of
torture. Malik, from Lebanon, asked "whether forced 
labour, unemployment, or dental pain might be considered 
torture".!!® He concluded, however, that in light of events 
in Nazi Germany, it was preferable to "err on the side of 
vagueness than on the side of legal accuracy"!!! when
1. The Economic and Social Council may take or initiate studies and reports with respect to
international economic, social, cultural, educational, health and related matters and 
may make recommendations with respect to any such matters to the General Assembly, to 
the Members of the United Nations, and to the specialised agencies concerned.
2. It may make recommendations for the purpose of
promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all,
3. It may prepare draft conventions for submission to the General Assembly, with respect to
matters falling within its competence.
4. It may call, in accordance with the rules prescribed by the United nations, internationalconferences on matters falling within its competence.
The Third Committee is one of the Main Committees of the General Assembly. The Main 
Committees consider agenda items referred to them by the General Assembly. They 
prepare reports which include draft resolutions for submission to the General 
Assembly. U.N Department of Public Information, Handbook of the United Nations and the 
Specialised Agencies 24-25, (1949).
Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC. 1/3/Add. 1, at 20 (1947). It seems that the 
phrase was inspired by a number of domestic provisions which accompanied the initial report. See here HUMPHREY, at 17, (1984).!®® E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.16, at 8.
! ® Id.110 Yd,
Commission on Human Rights, U.N.Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.23, at 3, (1948).
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drafting the prohibition. The Australian delegate Harry, 
confirming Malik's approach, stated that:
"if any specific kind of torture were mentioned, the Commission might also have 
to include other types, such as mental torture and torture from involuntary 
experimentation".!!®
It was this question of the specificity of the proposed 
anti-torture and ill-treatment norm which was to plague 
the drafters, not only of the Universal Declaration and 
the International Civil and Political Covenant, but also 
the European Convention. The dilemma to be confronted on 
each occasion was how to define a norm definite enough to 
indicate the types of conduct to be outlawed, but at the 
same time sufficiently general not to exclude the many 
types of torture which the ingenuity of the human mind in 
the future might create.
Mindful of the criticisms relating to the vagueness of 
the Secretariat's initial proposal, the Drafting 
Committee considered an alternative proposal from the 
United Kingdom delegate. This read as follows:
No person shall be subjected to:
(a) torture in any form;
(b) any form of physical mutilation or medical or scientific experimentation 
against his will;
(c) cruel or inhuman punishments.!!®
This proposal, together with the original initiative of 
the Secretariat and further suggestions submitted by the 
United States, was forwarded in the Drafting Committee's 
report to the Commission on Human Rights. At its 
subsequent session, the Commission set up three working 
groups charged with the duty of finalising a declaration.
!!® Commission on Human Rights, U.N.Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.3, at 13, (1947). 
Commission on Human Rights, U.N.Doc E/CN.4/AC.1/4/Add. 1, at 1, (1947).
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detailing a more specific convention, and considering 
implementation measures for the instruments a g r e e d .
Further discussion relating to the proposed provision 
outlawing torture and ill-treatment took place during the 
meeting of the Working Party on an International Covenant 
on Human Rights. This Working Party chose to divide the 
United Kingdom proposal into two parts, retaining the 
term "torture in any form" in the first, and using 
"cruel" as a modifier for "inhuman dignity" in the 
second.!!® Delegates at the second session of the Drafting 
Committee followed this action by discussing the meaning 
of the words used in the draft, such as "cruel" or 
"inhuman". Wilson of the United Kingdom complained that 
the words "cruel or inhuman" were too subjective. What 
may be considered to be covered by each term, he argued, 
varied from one country to another.!!®
It was during the third session of the Commission on 
Human Rights that the provision prohibiting torture was 
joined to that outlawing slavery or involuntary 
servitude.!!^ This, from the point of view of defining a 
satisfactory working definition of torture and ill- 
treatment, was regrettable because, when the draft 
Declaration was debated article by article by the General 
Assembly's Third Committee, it became preoccupied with 
the promulgation of an acceptable definition of slavery, 
at the expense of further discussion of the content of 
the anti-torture provision.!!® Later a sub-committee on 
style once again separated the two freedoms, a decision 
unanimously approved by the General Assembly.!!®
!!^  U.N.ESCOR, Supp. (No.l) 4, U.N.Doc. E/600, (1948).
Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Working Party on an International Convention on 
Human Rights, U.N.Doc.E/CN.4/56 (1947) Part II, arts, 5 & 6, at 4, 6.
!!® Commission on Human Rights (30th mtg.) 213, U.N.Doc. A/C.3/SR.109 (1948).
!!' U.N. Dep't of Public Information, These Rights and Freedoms, 22, (1950).
The main problem encountered with the slavery prohibition was that the French text omitted
the phrase "involuntary" which appeared in the English version. After considerable
debate it was decided to omit the word from the English version as well, ibid, at 23. 
Ü® Ibid, at 24. See G.A. Res.217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 73, (1948).
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The origin of the final form of the Universal Declaration 
adopted by the General Assembly is unclear. Klayman 
claims that it was prepared by the Secretariat's Division 
on Human Rights, although his authority for this is 
unclear. !®®
Accepting that the source of what is now Article 5 of the 
Declaration is uncertain, a literal reading of the 
provision suggests that the words chosen were intended to 
reflect a descending scale of suffering to be outlawed, 
with torture at its most extreme end and degrading 
treatment at the other. There is certainly no indication 
that the terms used were selected because they would 
provide an exact indication of the types of conduct that 
were to be outlawed, whilst leaving others unaffected. 
Indeed, it is clear that this question of specificity was 
one that had not been adequately resolved by the time of 
the adoption of the Universal Declaration. However, as at 
the time of the adoption of the Declaration it had 
already been accepted that it was to be followed by a 
second instrument giving further detail to its 
provisions, this problem of lack of definition was one 
that for the time being could be overlooked. As Klayman 
notes :
"while not articulated, much of the pressure to clarify the torture prohibition 
was eased as a result of the decision to follow the U.N. Declaration...with 
another set of international instruments which would contain machinery for the 
implementation of the human rights guarantees".!®®
120 Klayman, 460-461, (1978).
Id. At the first session of the Drafting Committee, there were two competing views advanced 
concerning the form the "International Bill of Rights" should take. One view was that 
the Declaration should be non binding. The other was that it should be in the form of 
a convention or multilateral treaty, providing legally binding rights. A compromise 
was reached with the Draft Committee deciding to prepare two documents: a declaration 
containing general principles of human rights followed by a legally binding instrument 
defining specific rights. 10 U.N. G.A.O.R, Annexes (Agenda Item 28-11) 2, U.N. Doc A/2929, (1955).
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Thus far, it is possible to conclude only that the 
drafters had created a norm outlawing all suffering of a 
type yet to be resolved.
1.4.1 Adoption of a Provision Prohibiting Torture and 
Ill-Treatment in the Civil and Political 
Covenant.
Considering the limited debate of the provision 
prohibiting torture and ill-treatment during the drafting 
of the Declaration, it would not have been unreasonable 
to expect further elaboration of the provision in the 
Civil and Political Covenant. This is particularly so 
when it is recalled that the two instruments had distinct 
objectives. The former was intended as a "common standard 
of achievement",!®® the latter as a legally binding 
instrument. The Civil and Political Covenant was 
accompanied by an number of "monitoring" procedures^® 
intended to promote international accountability, each 
one capable of highlighting those areas of domestic law 
which did not comply with the standards documented in the 
Covenant,
Bearing in mind the differing purposes of the two 
instruments, it would have appeared incumbent upon the 
drafters of the Civil and Political Covenant to 
articulate more elaborate and detailed provisions than 
those first expressed in the U.N. Declaration. As the 
Covenant was legally binding on ratifying states which 
could be called to account before an international 
tribunal, the importance of providing a reasonable 
indication of the content of the rights and duties the 
State would be required to recognise upon ratification 
was not lost.
!®® Preamble to the Universal Declaration, supra note 80.
® These were accommodated in Articles 40 and 41 of the Civil and Political Covenant supra note 
84 and in the Optional Protocol to the Civil and Political Covenant supra note 85, 
Infra, Chapt. 2 at p. 77. ROBERTSON, at 41-72, (1989).
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An inspection of the Civil and Political Covenant 
indicates that most of the rights documented therein have 
been more comprehensively defined than in the U.N. 
Declaration. For example, Article 6 of the Covenant gives 
considerably more detail to the right to life than its 
earlier counterpart in Article 3 of the U.N. 
Declaration.!®^ Similarly, the right to a fair trial, in 
contrast to the Declaration, is comprehensively 
documented,!®® as are the occasions in which freedom of 
assembly, free speech, and freedom of thought, 
conscience, and religion may be restricted,!®®
It may appear surprising therefore that Article 7 of the 
Covenant chooses to replicate Article 5 of the Covenant 
adding only "In particular, no one shall be subjected 
without his free consent to medical or scientific 
experimentation" . !®®
This may be explained by reference to the problems the 
drafters experienced in elaborating a satisfactory legal 
norm. Once again, central to these difficulties was the
Article 3 of the Universal Declaration provides:
"Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person"., supra note 80. 
Article 5 of the Civil and Political Covenant provides:
1. Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law.
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be
imposed only for the most serious of crimes in accordance with the law in force at the 
time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present 
Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court.
3. When deprivation of life constitutes the crime of genocide, it is understood that
nothing in this article shall authorise any State Party to the present Covenant to 
derogate in any way from any of the obligation assumed under the provisions of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
4. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or communication of the
sentence. Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence of death may be granted in all cases.
5. Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below eighteen
years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant women.
6. Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or to prevent the abolition of
capital punishment by any State Party to the present Covenant, supra note 84.!®® Article 14, id.
!®® Articles 18, 19, 21 and 14, ibid,
^  Article 7, ibid.
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problem of specificity, matched against the desire not to 
define a norm that would unnecessarily restrict its 
reach.
The Commission of Human Rights, still occupied with the 
duty of promulgating an International Bill of Rights, 
discussed two main proposals for an anti-torture and ill- 
treatment norm,!®® One followed closely the language of 
Article 5 of the Universal Declaration,!®® The other was 
based on the original British proposal to the Drafting 
Committee in 1947 dealing with scientific and medical 
experimentation.!!® Eventually the two were merged becoming 
draft Article 7,!®! which was adopted as part of the text 
of the Civil and Political Covenant by the General 
Assembly on December 16, 1966.!®® once again, the
definition of torture did not receive comprehensive 
attention. This was because delegates were preoccupied 
this time, not with another right joined with the 
Article, but with the proposed phrase singling out for 
additional emphasis the question of medical or scientific 
experimentation. ®®®
What proved problematical was defining a provision which 
would outlaw the types of atrocities practiced by the 
Nazis, without, at the same time, making impossible 
necessary scientific and medical experimentation. A World 
Health Organisation representative advised against the 
addition to the original version in the Declaration 
fearing that it would prevent proper scientific inquiry,!®^ 
This area involved a number of complicated issues which
!®q U.N.ESCOR, Supp. (No.l) Annex B at 25, U.N. Doc. E/600 (1948).
It stated: "no person shall be subjected to torture or to cruel or inhuman punishment or to 
cruel or inhuman dignity." 6 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No.l) Annex B, Art. 7, at 25, U.N.Doc. E/600 (1948).
This states: "It shall be unlawful to subject any person to any form of physical or 
scientific experimentation against his will." Id, at Art 6.
Commission on Human Rights 10th Session. 16 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No.8) 42, U.N.Doc. E/2447 
n, (1953).G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967).!®] Klayman, at 468, (1978). 
ication 
(1950).!®^  Commun of the Director-General of the World Health Organisation, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/359
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were frequently discussed during the drafting of the 
Article, but, it seems, never satisfactorily resolved. 
For example, consent to medical procedures would 
effectively disqualify the provision from application, 
but where consent was impossible because the patient was 
unconscious or incompetent the situation was less clear.
The question of "justification" for torture and ill- 
treatment was raised only once during the consideration 
of Article 7 and received little attention. This was put 
in issue, although not explicitly, by the Yemen delegate, 
Zebara, who expressed concern that the norm "implicitly 
condemned certain modern scientific methods currently 
applied by many countries to track down criminals,
methods which were authorized by law".!®®
His comment reflected a question which was central to the 
protection the provision was to offer against torture and 
ill-treatment. What needed to be resolved was whether the 
protection from such treatment was absolute, or whether 
in certain circumstances it could be limited. 
Consideration needed to be given to whether there were 
any circumstances in which, although a given form of 
treatment or punishment could be said to amount to 
torture and ill-treatment, it would not violate a
provision outlawing the same, because the conduct could 
be said to be justified, for reasons, for example, of 
state security or crime prevention. It was this issue 
which should have been the focus of the drafters' 
attention, instead of, or at least in addition to, their 
efforts relating to medical and scientific 
experimentation. It was because, as stated earlier,!®® the 
utility of the practice of torture was doubted, as much 
as a reaction to the nature of the practice itself, that 
torture was rejected as acceptable State behaviour. It 
needed to be clarified whether there were any
circumstances in which torture and ill-treatment might be
!®® 5 U.N.GAOR, C.3 (290th mtg.) 122, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.290 (1950). !®® Supra, p. 26.
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considered acceptable. It followed, therefore, that the 
creation of a satisfactory provision prohibiting torture 
would have required, at the very least, not only an 
indication of the types of conduct to be prohibited, but 
also the question of "justification" to be addressed. 
This the drafters failed to provide. It was left unclear 
as to whether there could be any justification for 
conduct amounting to torture or ill-treatment, and if so, 
what this may be.
1.4.2 The Adoption of Article 3 of the European Convention at the Council of Europe,
If the position relating to justification for torture and 
ill-treatment was left ambiguous at the United Nations, 
the situation could not have been more different at the 
Council of Europe. During the discussion of the drafting 
of the provision to prohibit torture and ill-treatment in 
the European Convention the following request was made 
and accepted:
"therefore, I ask this Assembly to announce to the whole world that torture is 
wholly evil and absolutely to be condemned and that no cause whatever-not even
the life of a wife, a mother or a child, the safety of an army or the security
of a State-can justify its use or existence. I say that if a State, in order to 
survive, must be built upon a torture chamber, then that State should 
perish".^ ^^
The work for the drafting of Article 3 was based on the
following recommendation:
"Art.2-In this Convention, the Member States shall undertake to ensure to all 
persons residing within their territories:(1) Security of person, in accordance 
with Articles 3, 5, and 8 of the United Nations Declaration".
Although the final wording of Article 3 of the Convention 
is an almost exact restatement of Article 5 of the
Delegate Cocks. Council of Europe Collected Edition of the Travaux Préparatoires, (1975),Vol II, at 40. 
endation to 
261 (1949).Recomm the Committee of Ministers, Eur. Consult, Ass., 1st Sess., Doc.No. 108, at
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Universal Declaration,the travaux préparatoire to the 
Convention are considerably more helpful to those 
attempting to decipher the intention of the drafters of
the provision than the U.N. counterpart because of the 
suggested amendments to it made by the British delegate.
Cocks.
Cocks was concerned that Article 5 of the Universal
Declaration did not emphasize adequately the condemnation 
of torture. He proposed an amendment to Article 1 of the 
original Committee recommendation, calling upon the 
Committee of Ministers to draft a human rights treaty
which would illustrate that:
"torture is wholly evil and absolutely to be condemned and....no cause 
whatever...can justify its use or existence".^^ 0
This read as follows:
"The Consultative Assembly takes this opportunity of declaring that all forms 
of physical torture, whether inflicted by the police, military authorities, 
members of private organisations or any other persons are inconsistent with 
civilized society...and must be prohibited. They declare that this prohibition 
must be absolute and that torture cannot be permitted by any purpose 
whatsoever, either by extracting evidence for saving life or even for the 
safety of the State".141
Cocks also advocated an amendment to Article 2, which
119 The minor difference being the omission of the adjective "cruel" in the Convention 
provision. The Committee of Experts on Human Rights of the Council of Europe, 
concluded that the inclusion of the word "cruel" in the United Nations texts did not 
amount to any difference in substance. Council of Europe, Committee of Experts on 
Human Rights: Problems Arising from the Co existence of the United Nations Covenants 
on Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights, Doc. H(70)7 (1970). An 
inspection of the travaux préparatoire to the Convention provides no indication as to why the word "cruel" was omitted from the Convention.Supra note 137, at 40.
Amendment, Eur. Consult, Ass., 1st Sess., Doc. No.91, at 236, (1949).
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provided :
"in particular, no person shall be subjected to any form of mutilation, or 
sterilization, or to any form of torture or beating. Nor shall he be forced to 
take drugs nor shall they be administered to him without his knowledge and 
consent. Nor shall he be subjected to imprisonment with such an excess of 
light, darkness, noise or silence as to cause mental suffering".14%
These suggested amendments were significant because they 
attempted to achieve two purposes. The first was to 
indicate clearly in the text itself that there was to be 
no justification possible for torture. The second was 
that an effort had been made to indicate the types of 
conduct to which the prohibition should be applied.
In choosing to raise directly the issue of 
"justification". Cocks was calling for international 
debate of a vital component of the torture debate which 
the United Nations had failed to address properly. 4^3
The delegates objected to Cocks’ amendments for fear 
that, in seeking to specify the types of conduct the 
proposed provision was to prohibit, it would 
unnecessarily limit its scope. Teitgen argued that it was 
better "simply to state that all torture is prohibited". 4^ 
However, Klayman, it is submitted, is right to point out 
that Cocks’ examples were intended to amplify the 
importance of the prohibition and were by no means
intended to be exhaustive .^45
Eventually Cocks agreed to withdraw his amendments after 
it was accepted that what he was proposing was already 
encompassed in the language to be used. Sir David Maxwell
J42 Amendment, Eur. Consult., 1st Sess., Doc. No.90, at 235, (1949).
Cocks' objection to justification for torture was that such a practice debases the torturer 
as well as the victim, and was not a proper instrument of a civilized nation "...It 
would be better even for society to perish than this relic of barbarism to remain", supra note 137, at 38. 
f44 Eur. Consult. Ass. Deb., 1st Sess. (Part II at 596.) (Sept. 8, 1949).445 Klayman, at 472, (1978).
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Fife commented:
"by the method which we have adopted, in drafting the Resolution, Mr Cocks 
point is covered. There is no doubt that those who join the ultimate Convention 
will undertake the cause which he has so movingly put before us; they will 
undertake that no one will be subjected to torture".445
At this point it is necessary to note that there were two 
alternative proposals for drafting styles for the 
Convention. One was a system of "simple enumeration" and 
the other was termed "precise definition". The United 
Kingdom Delegation, favouring the latter approach 
considered that it was necessary:
"to make it quite clear what was the nature and extent of the obligations to 
be assumed by the States party to the proposed Convention".44?
It was the dilemma of ensuring clarity, without unduly 
restricting the scope of Article 3, that was the central 
issue in the drafting process and the same one which the 
drafters of the International Bill of Rights at the 
United Nations had found problematical. In the end, after 
further representations to the Consultative Assembly, the 
Committee of Ministers, preferring the style of simple 
emuneration of rights, chose to reproduce the wording of 
Article 5 of the Universal Declaration.448
Although Cocks' amendments were not adopted for the 
reason identified, much is owed to him for forcing debate 
on the issue of justification, which had been addressed 
so inadequately at the United Nations.
445 Eur. Consult.,Ass., 1st Sess. at 42, (Part II) (1949).
44' Supra note 137, Vol III, at 254-256, (1976).
Letter from the Committee of Ministers to the President of the Consultative Assembly, 
Eur.Consult., Ass., Ordinary Sess. (Part II), Doc. No.11, at 600, 603 (1950).
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1.4.3 Comments on the Drafting of the Prohibition of Torture and Ill-treatment.
From the above inspection of the genesis of the 
international prohibition of torture and ill-treatment, 
it is possible to arrive at the following conclusions 
pertinent to this thesis.
The prohibition of torture in International Law was 
created at a time when the Nazi holocaust was still fresh 
in the minds of its drafters. As these practices 
demonstrated, it was clear that any provision intended to 
safeguard the "natural rights of the sheer physical body 
of man" would be required to provide protection against 
many types of conduct, including some which could not be 
described properly as amounting to torture as it is 
commonly understood. Practices such as human 
experimentation and the detention of individuals in 
inhuman prison conditions were clearly also in need of 
prohibition. These were not, however, types of conduct 
which fitted comfortably inside a prohibition which 
mentioned only torture. In adopting the term "No-one 
shall be subjected to torture or to cruel or inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment” the drafters of the 
provision had succeeded in creating a provision which had 
the potential to offer the individual complete protection 
against all forms of conduct threatening his or her 
dignity and humanity.
This absolute protection, although commendable, 
nevertheless presented a considerable problem with 
respect to the application of the provision, e.g, how to 
distinguish between conduct which might be considered 
tantamount to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment which clearly needed to be prohibited by the 
provision, and treatment which might result in equal 
amounts of suffering being inflicted on an individual, 
that was not to be prohibited. Eleanor Roosevelt’s 
example was a case in point. She expressed concern during 
the discussion of the U.N. anti-torture and ill-treatment
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provision that the proposed article must not outlaw the 
practice of compulsory vaccinations which was in use at 
the time in the United States of America.The drafters 
of the prohibition, however, provided no indication as to 
how this dilemma of discriminating between different 
types of suffering was to be resolved.
It is submitted that the drafters could have attempted to 
resolve this difficulty in one of two ways. First, by 
introducing the concept of justification into the 
provision prohibiting torture and ill-treatment. A given 
form of conduct would be examined initially to ascertain 
the level of suffering involved. If this was beyond a 
certain threshold it would then be necessary to determine 
whether the conduct could be considered justifiable for a 
given reason. Compulsory vaccinations, for example, might 
be justified on the grounds of protection of public 
health. Other treatment, such as personal body searches 
by customs officers or prison officers, which might 
otherwise be considered degrading, could be justified on 
the grounds of public security or the protection of 
others. But this would have had the disadvantage of 
implying that some forms of torture might also be 
justifiable. The lesson from the teachings of Beccaria 
and his contemporaries which first led to the 
condemnation of torture in domestic law was that torture 
was never justifiable, as its usefulness was unproven, 
and later, because it was contrary to the "natural 
rights" of the individual. Although this question of 
justification for torture had not been directly discussed 
at the United Nations, it is clear that in the immediate 
aftermath of the Nazi atrocities no concept could be 
accommodated in a provision intended to exclude, inter 
alia, torture. This view is confirmed by the more 
thorough consideration given to the same provision at the 
Council of Europe.
445 Doc E/800. BOSSUYT, at 51, (1987).
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A second possibility at the disposal of the drafters was 
to deny that the clause applied to certain forms of 
treatment or punishment, such as compulsory vaccinations, 
because it did not satisfy the exact definition of 
"torture" or "inhuman" or "degrading" treatment. The 
problem here, however, was that they were unwilling to 
provide an exact definition of what amounted to torture 
and ill-treatment for fear that they would unnecessarily 
restrict the reach of the provision. This method 
therefore was also unworkable.
This dilemma could have been resolved in the following 
manner. Instead of choosing to add to the prohibition of 
torture, it would have been preferable to create a second 
provision altogether, in which a limited concept of 
justification could be accommodated thereby allowing 
certain types of conduct satisfactory consideration. This 
second provision might have protected, for example, the 
individual's right to physical integrity which could be 
denied only in certain restricted circumstances. 
Alternatively, the drafters could have indicated that the 
prohibition they chose to create contained in effect two 
regimes. Within the first, that of torture, no concept of 
justification could be admitted. In the second, which 
consisted of the remainder of the provision, 
justification issues could be addressed. The advantage of 
such an understanding of the prohibition would have been 
that certain types of conduct, which although far removed 
from the types of treatment many of the drafters had in 
mind when creating the provision, but which nevertheless 
raised issues relating to the proper treatment of 
individuals, could be adequatley examined with regard to 
all the relevant circumstances, including its social 
value, without jeopardizing the absolute protection from 
torture which was clearly required in International Law. 
It is this point which will be developed later in the 
thesis .458
4^ 8 See infra Chapt. 6.
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To conclude, what had been created was a norm which, 
despite its importance, had been ill-defined and 
inadequately considered. Not only had the drafters 
deferred to a subsequent body the difficult task of 
defining the terms they chose to adopt, but they also 
made that task more difficult by choosing to join the 
phrases "torture" and "inhuman and degrading" treatment, 
which would have been better considered separately.
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2. THE IMPORTANCE OF DEFINING THE TERM:"TORTURE. INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT,"
Introduction to Chapter
This Chapter examines the importance of developing a 
satisfactory understanding and application of the 
international norm prohibiting torture and ill-treatment. 
It concludes that, although the individual as a subject 
of International Law is a relatively recent phenomenom, 
international instruments documenting human rights 
standards now have considerable significance for 
ratifying States. This is because the State may be 
required to account for its actions at an international 
level, and also because the individual may be able to 
invoke a right documented internationally in domestic 
courts- This requires that the provisions in 
international treaties relating to human rights, 
including the right to be protected from torture and ill- 
treatment, are satisfactorily interpreted, providing the 
State with a reasonable indication of the rights it has a 
duty, in International Law, to secure to individuals 
within its jurisdiction.
For the purposes of this thesis, this Chapter will be in 
two parts. The first considers the effect of 
international human rights norms on domestic legal 
systems. The second considers the international 
consequences of a State violating a fundamental right 
documented at a supra-national level.
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2.1.The International Law of Human Rights and Domestic Legal Systems.
International human rights law may be said to have an 
influence on domestic legal systems in one or more of 
three ways.4
First, it may be applied directly into domestic law, 
having a status comparable to "statute law"Secondly, 
human rights standards may be invoked in national courts 
through the application of customary international law. 
Thirdly, constitutional courts may refer to international 
human rights standards when interpreting a constitution 
or bill of rights. These shall each be examined in turn.
2.1.1 The Application of International Treaties into Domestic Law.
International Law does not require a common approach by 
States with respect to the method of internal application 
of international treaties.4 The effect of a treaty in 
domestic law is dependent upon the law of each State. 
Scholars, however, have studied the question of the 
relationship between international treaties and domestic 
law by identifying two separate approaches.4 One is 
referred to as "monist", and the other is termed 
"dualist". Dixon describes the latter as follows:
"Dualism denies that international law and municipal law operate in the same 
sphere, although it does accept that they deal with the same subject matter.
For dualists such as Triepel, international law regulates the rights and 
obligations of individuals within states. International law deals with the 
subject matter on the international plane, whereas municipal law deals with the 
subject matter internally".5
In those states that apply a dualist approach to 
international treaties such as, for example, the United
Hartman, 659, (1983).
4 JACOBS, 141, (1987).
4 See generally STARKE, 71-91, (1990)
4 BROWNLIE, (1990) 33-57, "The Relation of Municipal and International Law."5 DIXON, 71, (1993).
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Kingdom and Denmark, a treaty has no effect in domestic 
law, other than through national rules purporting to 
incorporate the treaty. Therefore, although both Denmark 
and the United Kingdom have ratified the Civil and 
Political Covenant,8 Article 7 of the treaty outlawing 
torture and ill-treatment is likely to have, at best, 
only a persuasive effect in national courts without 
direct incorporation of the U.N. instrument. This is not 
to say that international treaties are unable to provide 
rights to individuals in those States which are "dualist" 
and choose not to incorporate treaties directly into 
domestic law. As the operation of the European Convention 
demonstrates, decisions of the European Commission and 
Court? have afforded individuals protection of their human 
rights in countries such as the United Kingdom, which 
have not incorporated the European Convention into 
domestic law, by persuading the legislature to introduce 
new legislation to protect more adequately a right 
documented in the European Convention. In the United 
Kingdom, the case of Malone v . United Kingdom, ^ which 
preceded the Interception of Communications Act 1 9 8 5 .5 j^s 
often referred to as an example of a decision of the 
European Court which led to a change in the law in the 
United Kingdom. The Education Act of 198 6  following the 
Court's decision in the case of Campbell and Cosans v. 
United Kingdom. 48 is also frequently quoted as another 
example.
Dixon describes the "monist" position as follows:
"The monist theory supposes that international law and municipal law are simply
two components of a single body of knowledge called law. "Law" is seen as a
5 Supra Chapt. 1, note 84.
? For discussion of "monism" and "dualism" with regard to the European Convention see VAN DIJK S 
VAN HOOF, 11-12, (1990).
8 Series A. 82, (1982).
5 Halburys Statutes 4th ed, vol.45, 416-430.
48 Series A. 48, (1982).
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single entity, of which the "municipal" and "international" versions are merely 
particular manifestations".44
In those states commonly referred to as "monist" in their 
approach to International Law, such as Belgium, France, 
and the Netherlands,^ a treaty which has been ratified by 
the State and has entered into effect at the 
international level automatically enters into force in 
domestic law. In the Netherlands, the Constitution states 
that it is a legal and constitutional duty for the courts 
to apply self-executing rules of International Law even 
if they conflict with rules of national law:
"Regulations which are in force in the Kingdom of the Netherlands shall not be 
applied if this application is not in conformity with provisions of treaties or 
decisions of international organisations which are binding upon everyone".44
Similarly, by virtue of Art. 93 of the Constitution of 
the Netherlands, decisions of international organisations 
may have direct effect and, therefore, the force of law. 
It follows that any domestic legal provision not 
compatible with the Civil and Political Covenant, and the 
European Convention, both of which have been ratified by 
the Netherlands, is likely to require modification by the 
legislature of the Netherlands, or alternatively, the 
domestic courts will choose to apply the international 
provision. For example, in a case dated 10 October 1978, 
the Hoge Raad upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal, 
which suspended the application of Articles 423 and 424 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure because the person 
indicted had not been informed of the charge in a 
language he understood, as required by Article 6 , 
paragraph 3 of the Convention.^ Similarly, in a judgment 
dated 31 May 1978, Voerman v. Municipality of Riderkerk. 
the Raad van Staat (Council of State) accepted the 
appellant's plea that the refusal to grant him permission
44 DIXON, 69, (1993)
44 JACOBS, (Ed. 1987).
44 Art. 94 of the Netherlands Constitution. BLAUSTEIN & FLANZ, Vol XII, at 24. 
44 NJ (1979), no.144, quoted from DRZEMC2EWSKI, 90, (1983).
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to erect an aerial violated Article 10 of the European 
Convention.45 in a more recent decision of the European 
Court of Human Rights it was stated that the practice of 
using an anonymous witness in criminal proceedings did 
not comply with the Convention.^ In light of the 
decision, a court in the Netherlands suspended a term of 
imprisonment in a similar case.47
In the United States of America it has long been accepted 
that the U.S. Constitution declares a treaty to be the 
"law of the land".48 However, with regard to human rights 
treaties, it has yet to be resolved as to what is their 
exact effect in U.S. domestic law. This is because the 
courts have effectively limited and, at times, even
negated their effect by referring to the concept of self­
executing treaties or self-executing provisions of 
treaties.45 As early as 1829 the U.S. Supreme Court stated 
in unambiguous terms that:
" Our Constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is,
consequently, to be regarded in the courts of justice as equivalent to an act
of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself, without the aid of any
legislative provision".48
However, there is still confusion as to whether many
treaties and provisions of treaties may be applied
directly in domestic law, because they were not intended
to have direct application.44 in the well-known authority
45 Bulletin of the NJCM, 90, (1979) no. 14, 23.
45 Kostovski Case, Series A. 166, 21, (1990).
4? Vervuele, J., quoted from (Ed. DELMAS-MARTY, 1993) at 211,
48 Foster v Neilson, 2 Pet.253 (U.S. 1829).
As JACOBS notes, (1987) at xxvii, terms such as "direct effect", and "direct applicability" are also used but not consistently.48 Jackson, at 148, (Ed. JACOBS 1987).
44 There is an exhaustive amount of scholarly writing on the subject of "self-executing"
provisions and treaties. See for example Riesenfeld (1980); Iwasawa, (1986); Faust
(1988); Damrosch, (1991); and more particularly for questions of human rights
Schachter, (1951); Schuluter, (1973); Stotter, (1976); Siegal, (1991); .
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of Sei Fuiii v State^ it was stated that:
"In determining whether a treaty is self-executing courts look to the intent of
the signatory parties "44
In applying this approach, it has been decided that the 
human rights provisions of the United Nations' Charter, 
and the Universal Declaration are not self-executing. 44 
The Civil and Political Covenant is considered by most 
scholars to be self-executing.45 However, the reservations 
attached to the recent ratification of the Civil and 
Political Covenant by the United States make it clear 
that the provisions of the Covenant are not to have 
direct effect, and are only valid insofar as they comply 
with the rights and freedoms documented in the U.S. 
Constitution, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court.45 
It may be concluded, therefore, that Article 7 of the 
Covenant prohibiting torture and ill-treatment is 
unlikely to be directly applicable to the individual in 
the jurisdiction of the United States.
2.1.2 Application of Human Rights Standards in Domestic Courts by Reference to Customary International Law.
It is clear from the above survey of States that, in the 
absence of protection from torture and ill-treatment in 
domestic law, an individual's ability to claim protection 
by invoking international provisions depends largely on 
the effect a State chooses to give to International Law 
in its own domestic system. However, even in those States 
such as the United States of America in which provisions 
of international human rights instruments may not be 
available to the individual to enforce in domestic
44 38 Cal.2d 718, (1952).
44 Id, at 721. See here Jackson, (Ed. JACOBS 1987) at 155-168.
See generally with regard to the United States and International Human Rights standards 
Newman & Weisbrodt, (Ed. LUTZ, HANNUH, BURKE, 1989).45 See for example Lillich, (1989).
See here in relation to the recent ratification of the Covenant by the United States Strossen, (1992)
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courts, the freedom from torture and ill-treatment may be 
enforced by the application of customary international 
law which includes a prohibition against such conduct.
Under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice, international custom is recognized as a 
source of International Law. Although the International 
Court of Justice has, on occasion, applied customary 
international law in its judgments, 4? it is to the
practice of enforcing the same source of law in domestic
courts that it is necessary to turn when considering the
question of enforcement of rights by the individual. This 
is because the individual, in not having locus standi 
before the I.C.J. can seek to enforce customary 
international law only in domestic courts. At this stage,
it must be noted that, although to date it is possible to
find only a few examples of cases where the individual 
has successfully enforced a right codified in customary 
international law, its importance must not be
underestimated. This is because, although few in number, 
they indicate that in cases where human rights are not 
guaranteed to the individual in the form of a
constitution or international treaty the possibility may 
still exist for the individual to claim rights by 
referring to customary international law. This
possibility, as yet underdeveloped, Meron argues,48 offers 
some potential for the enforcement of individual rights 
not properly protected by domestic legislation. First of
See for example the case of Right of Passage over Indian Territory Case (Portugal-India) ICJ 
(1960) 6, where the I.C.J. decided, inter alia, that a particular practice between two 
states only, which is accepted by them as law, may give rise to a binding customary 
rule inter partes. In the Asylum case I.C.J, Reports (1950), 266 the I.C.J. refused to 
accept that rules relating to asylum had become part of customary international law: 
"...there has been so much inconsistency in the rapid succession of conventions on 
asylum, ratified by some States and rejected by others, and the practice has been so 
much influenced by considerations of political expediency in the various cases, that 
it is not possible to discern in all this any constant and uniform usage, accepted as 
law..." id, at 276-277. In the case concerning U.S. Nationals in Morocco I.C.J. 
Reports, (1952) 199, the I.C.J. stated: "In the present case there has not been 
sufficient evidence to enable the Court to reach a conclusion that a right to exercise 
consular jurisdiction founded upon custom or usage has been established in such a 
manner that it has become binding on Morocco", id.
48 See the concluding remarks of MERON, 246-248, (1989).
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all, however, it is necessary to recount the development 
of customary international law and identify certain of 
its characteristics.
2.1.2.1 The Development and Recognition of Customarv International Law.
Custom is the oldest, and the original source of 
International Law.45 Customary rules were rules which 
developed over a long period of usuage and came to be 
recognized as customary rules of law by the international 
community. 48 There is evidence that, as far back as 
Ancient Greece, rules of war and peace were recognized by 
customary international law. 44 with the development of 
greater international trade came the need for more 
thorough codification of customs and usuage. In the 
absence of an international court to effectively police 
these codes it was domestic courts which were called upon 
to enforce the same which were responsible for the 
continued development of customary international law. As 
evidence that domestic courts followed broadly similar 
patterns in recognizing and applying customs considered 
part of International Law, Starke cites the decision of 
the U.S. Supreme Court in The Scotia.44 The facts of the 
case may be summarized as follows. In 1863 the British 
Government adopted a series of regulations intended to 
prevent collisions at sea. Similar rules were soon 
adopted in the United States of America and by the 
governments of all of the leading maritime nations. A 
British vessel, The Scotia, collided with an American 
ship. The Berkshire, and sank. The court decided that the 
case was to be resolved in accordance with the customary 
rules of International Law, which had evolved through the 
widespread adoption of the British regulations. It 
explained its reasoning as follows:
45 OPPENHSIM, 25, (1992). 
44 (1871) 14 Wallace 170.
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"This is not giving to the State of any nation 
extra-territorial effect. It is not treating 
them as general maritime laws, but it is 
recognition of the historical fact that, by 
common consent of nations, these rules have
been acquiesced to as general obligations. Of 
that fact we think we may take judicial notice. 
Foreign municipal laws must indeed be proved as 
facts, but it is not so with the law of
nations " .44
Before an international custom is accepted as binding in 
law, two tests must be satisfied.4^ The first relates to 
the material content of the rule, the second to the 
psychological aspects involved in the formation of the 
customary rule.45 with regard to the former, in the German 
case of Lubeck v. Mecklenburq-Schwerin .45 the court 
decided that a single act of a state or its agency could 
not create any rights in custom. Conduct, it concluded,
to lead to custom must be regular and repeated. Minor 
deviations from a practice are unlikely to affect 
recognition of a customary rule, although material 
departures are likely to weaken the case in favour of
recognition of a rule in customary international law.4?
The second requirement of customary international law is 
sometimes referred to as the opinio juris slve 
necessitatis. This is the need to establish that there is 
a "mutual conviction that the recurrence... is the result 
of a compulsory rule" .48 starke explains this condition as 
follows :
"Recurrence of [a] usuage or practice tends to develop an expectation that, in 
similar situations, the same conduct or the abstension therefrom will be
44 Ibid, at 188.
II LAUTERPACHT, 61, (1970).4 Id.
° Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases 1927-8, NO.3.
4? Cf Anolo-Norweaian Fisheries Case ICJ (1951) 116, at 138.
Judge Negulesco of the Permanent Court of Justice, Pubm PCIJ (1927) Series B. No 14, at 105.
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repeated. When this expectation evolves further into a general acknowledgment 
by states that the conduct or the abstension therefrom is a matter both of 
right and of obligation, the transition from usage to custom may be regarded as
consumated".45
From decisions of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice, such as the Lotus c a s e  .^ 8 it is possible to 
conclude that ascertaining the opinio juris is a matter 
of inference from the circumstances of each case. General 
recognition of the custom would appear to underline the 
nature of the court's inquiry in establishing the opinio 
juris. In the English courts, the question of recognition 
of the rule has been expressed in the following manner:
"it is a recognized prerequisite of the adoption in our municipal law of a 
doctrine of public international law that it shall have attained the position 
of general acceptance by civilised nations as a rule of international conduct, 
evidenced by international treaties or conventions, authorities' textbooks, 
practice and judicial decision. It is manifestly of the highest importance that 
the Courts of this country before they give the force of law within this realm 
to any doctrine of international law, should be satisfied that it has the 
hallmarks of general assent and reciprocity". 4^
2.1.2.2 Application of Human Rights in Domestic Courts by Reference to Customary International Law.
The Courts in England have, on occasion, acknowledged 
that certain human rights are recognized by customary 
international law, including the right not to be 
subjected to torture. For example, in the case of 
Oppenheimer v Cattermole.^  Lord Cross of Chelsea 
considered that a Nazi decree stripping Jews of their 
nationality was invalid since it was contrary to what he 
considered to be a common customary human right. He 
stated:
45 STARKE, id, at 38-39, (1989).
8^ Pub PCIJ (1927), Series A No.10.
|4 Compania Naviera Vasconaasdo v. Steamship "Cristina". [1938] AC 485,497. 4^ [1976] AC 249,278 (HL).
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"To ray mind a law of this sort constitutes so grave an infringement of human 
rights that the courts of this country ought to refuse to recognize it as law
at all". 4^
In Ahmad v Inner London Education Authority,^  Lord 
Scarman admitted that the courts:
"..will interpret statutory language and apply common law principles, wherever 
possible, so as to reach a conclusion consistent with our international
obligations".45
Meron states that there are a number of jurisdictions 
which have followed the English precedent of treating 
recognizable customary international law as part of the 
law of the land when considering questions of human 
rights.46 For example, explicit reference to international 
customary law can be found in the Australian case of 
Koowarta v. Bielke-Petersen and Others 1 9 8 2 .4? Stephen J, 
considering the question of racial discrimination, 
commented :
"it was contended on behalf of the Commonwealth that, quite apart from the 
[Racial Discrimination] Convention, Australia has an international obligation 
to suppress all forms of racial discrimination because of respect for human 
dignity and fundamental rights and thus, the norm of non-discrimination on the 
grounds of race is now part of customary international law as both created and 
evidenced by state practice and as expounded by jurists and eminent publicists.
There is, in my view, much to be said for this submission ".48
In the Federal Republic of Germany the Supreme 
Constitutional Court was required to consider whether 
customary international law prevented the Court from 
extraditing a man to Turkey, the result of which would be 
to subject him to a sentence for which he had already
44 Ibid, at 277.
44 [1977] 3 MLR 396, 406 (CA). 
f  Id, 406.46 at 134, (1989).
4? 68 Int'l L.Rep. 181 (1985). 
48 Heron, at 118, (1984).
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been p u n i s h e d . 49 citing Article 14(7) of the Civil and 
Political Covenant, Article 8(4) of the American 
Convention, and Article 4 of the Seventh Protocol to the 
European Convention, the Court found that:
"[a]11 of these circumstances justify in any case the conclusion that, in the 
sense of article 25 of the Basic Law, the principle ne bis in idem is a general 
rule of international law which prohibits a second conviction of a defendant in 
the same state based on the same facts".58
In the United States of America, the concept of customary 
international law with regard to the enforcement of human 
rights has attracted some judicial attention and 
considerable academic commentary.^
The classic statement on customary international law in 
U.S. courts is to be found in the Paquete Habana.5^ in 
which Justice Gray stated:
"International law is part of our law and must 
be ascertained and administered by the courts 
of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often 
as questions of right depending upon it are 
duly presented for their determination".54
The leading case concerning recognition of human rights 
through customary international law in the United States 
is Filartiqa v Pena-Irala.54 where an action was taken in 
New York against a Paraguayan police official for torture 
of a third Paraguayan citizen whilst living in Paraguay.55 
Because the cause of action did not rise under any 
international treaty, the court was required to consider
45 1987 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJM] 2155.58 Ibid, at 2158.
54 As examples of the academic commentary see: Schrader, (1982); Hartman, (1983); Maier, (1989);
Praust, (1990); Simma, (1992).54 175 US 677 (1900).
54 Ibid, at 700.
54 630 F. 2d 876 (2d Cir.1980).
55 Jurisdiction for the action was claimed under the Alien Tort Claims Act (28 USC 1350) which
states: "the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by 
an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States".
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whether the prohibition of torture was provided by
customary international law,56 citing Articles 55 and 56 
of the United Nations' Charter as evidence that concern 
for human rights was now expressed in International Law, 
the court decided that, although there was no general 
agreement as to the exact content of the rights, they
did, as a bare minimum, include a prohibition against 
torture. 57
However, in the case of Tel Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic ,58 another action was brought under the Alien 
Tort Claims Act by victims of a P.L.O. attack on a bus in 
Israel. Judge Bork refused to accept that customary 
international law provided the plaintiff with a cause of 
action. International instruments such as the Universal 
Declaration and the International Civil and Political 
Covenant, he stated, are not intended to be judicially
enforceable because a number of them contain rights of 
such a general nature that they are incapable of 
traditional judicial application. The decision in Von 
Darde 1 v. U.S.S.R,^  just a year after the Tel Oren case, 
indicates that Judge Bork's remarks did not signify an 
end to the use of customary international law in the 
enforcement of human rights in the domestic courts of the 
U.S. In this decision, although the Court dismissed the 
action on a technical matter, it did appear to 
acknowledge that individuals could, in certain 
circumstances, invoke rights in U.S. courts by reference 
to customary international law.
The academic commentary on the case is extensive. As a selection see Rusk, (1981); Blum & 
Steinhardt, (1981); George, (1984); Randall, (1986).5' Supra note 54 at 882.
58 726 F.2d 774 (DC Cir.1984).59 IRL, 77, (1988).
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2.1.2.3 Comments on the Prohibition of Torture and Ill- treatment in Customary International Law.
Whilst accepting the feasibility of enforcing human 
rights by the application of customary international law 
in domestic courts, the number and content of these 
rights has yet to be settled. However, it is possible to
state a number of rights which are recognized in
customary international law. It is long settled that 
freedom from torture is one such right. In addition to 
the many judicial cases recognizing the content of 
customary international law as including the matter of 
torture, the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations 
Law of the United States, which lists generally accepted 
violations of the customary international law of human 
rights, is unambiguous in its reference to torture. 
Comment n(d) of section 702 of the Restatement recognizes 
freedom from "torture or other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment", as being a peremptory 
human right.^
It is important to note that the international 
prohibition of torture and ill-treatment is considered 
peremptory. This is because it is possible for a state 
not to be bound by customary international law, simply by
virtue of the fact that it dissents from the practice as
it develops.84 However, it is firmly established that the 
prohibition of torture is considered jus cogens. This is 
the concept, in International Law, that there exist some 
principles which are so compelling that they invalidate 
any ordinary provisions of a treaty or custom in conflict 
with them. 84 a State, therefore, is not permitted to 
derogate from standards in International Law considered 
jus cogens, of which torture is one. In the Inter-
88 Also recognized as the same are: genocide, slavery or slave trade, the murder or causing the
disappearance of individuals, prolonged arbitrary detention, systemic racial
discrimination. See generally Meron, (1986).
84 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States 102(2) (1987) comment b
provides: "A principle of customary law is not binding on a state that declares its 
dissent from the principle during its development".
84 AKEHURST, 40-41, (1984). See generally Christenson, (1988).
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American case of Roach and Pinkerton v . United States,^  
the Inter-American Commission accepted that execution of 
juveniles was prohibited jus cogens and thus the United 
States was unable to derogate from the prohibition of 
such provisions in customary international law. This case 
remains an important illustration of the significance of 
customary international law, because it enabled a 
tribunal to find a State in violation of a human rights
norm, in a way other than the application of a provision
documented either in a national or international 
instrument.
It is at this point that it is necessary to consider a 
matter relating to the prohibition of torture and ill- 
treatment as being jus cogens in nature. Article 53 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 4^ 
provides that a norm to be considered "jus cogens" must 
be one "accepted and recognized by the international 
community of States as a whole".85 it follows, therefore, 
that if it is correct to conclude that the norm 
prohibiting torture and ill-treatment is "jus cogens", 
there must be evidence that States agree to its
prohibition. A survey of State practices suggests that 
there is agreement in respect of the outlawing of conduct 
which may generally be described as tantamount to
torture.
Amnesty International states that, although a third of 
the world's governments practice or condone torture, they 
are unanimous in condemning its use. Although a minority 
of States, it seems, fail to take practical steps to 
implement this condemnation, it does appear that there is 
unanimous agreement that it is unacceptable, for example, 
to seek to interrogate an individual by the extraction of 
finger nails or by breaking limbs. However, as soon as 
conduct is considered which is removed from this extreme
84 Case No. 9647, Inter-Am C.H.R. 147, ser.L/V/II.71,doc.9 rev.1(1987), reprinted in 21.3 Human 
Rights: The Inter-American System 61, 73, (1988).84 ILM 8 (1969) 679.85 Id.
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end of cruelty universal consensus becomes more difficult 
to find. Indeed, as soon as conduct is considered which 
has been recognized by the European Court as being 
"degrading", but not inhuman or tortuous, considerable 
disagreement can be expected between states as to whether 
it is conduct properly falling within the torture and 
ill-treatment prohibition. In the European Court of Human 
Rights decision of Tvrer v. U.K^^ it was decided that 
judicial corporal punishment was degrading and contrary 
to the European Convention's provision which oulaws 
torture and ill-treatment. A cursory glance at a number 
of legal systems indicates that this punishment is not 
only not prohibited, but is actually provided for by 
domestic law. 8? Similarly, the decision in Soerlng v. 
United Kingdom,86 indicates that there may be disagreement 
between the U.S. Supreme Court and the European Court of 
Human Rights as to whether facing the "death row 
phenomenon" amounts to inhuman and degrading treatment.89 
This is despite the fact, that as noted earlier, ?8 the 
U.S. Constitution contains a clause prohibiting "cruel 
and unusal" punishment which derives from the English 
Bill of Rights. It is submitted that there is little 
evidence to support the view that conduct which may raise 
implications for that part of the norm which prohibits 
inhuman and degrading conduct is also prohibited "jus 
cogens". It follows therefore, that the norm prohibiting 
torture and ill-treatment in its current form with regard 
to the concept of "jus cogens", is naturally separated 
into two sections. The first is the prohibition of 
torture, which is "jus cogens", and the second is the 
prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment or
88 Series A. 26, (1978).
See for example the Malaysian authority of Public Prosecutor v. Tan Hock Hai 1983 1 M.L.J 163 
where the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment and 10 strokes, and AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL ANNUAL REPORT 1992, report on Sudan at 241 "a new penal code based on 
the NSRLC's interpretation of Sharia (Islamic) law introduced in March [1991]...it 
reintroduces judicial amputations and floggings..."88 Series A. 161, (1989).
85 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.153,173 (1976), See generally on the legality of death row 
conditions as examined by U.S Courts, Quigley and Shank, (1989).Supra Chapt. 1, at p. 28.
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punishment, which is not. This would appear to be a 
compelling argument for acknowledging that the norm 
contains two quite separate regimes. The first which 
outlaws torture and is a prohibition "jus cogens" in law. 
The second, prohibits inhuman and degrading treatment or 
punishment and is not. It is this point which will be 
developed in Chapter 6 of this thesis.?4
2.1.3 Reference to International Human Rights in Constitutional Interpretation.
The importance of achieving a satisfactory understanding 
of the prohibtion of torture and ill-treatment can only 
be fully appreciated when a third means by which 
international human rights norms can influence domestic 
law is discussed. This is the technique of using 
international norms to interpret the meaning of 
constitutional provisions,?4 referred to by Hartman as the 
"weak" theory of enforcement of international human 
rights standards.?4
A number of constitutional courts engage in this 
practice. For example, the Spanish Constitutional Court, 
in referring to its own prohibition of torture and ill- 
treatment, has referred to the jurisprudence of the 
European Commission and Court of Human Rights.?4 when it 
is remembered that there are some 24 Commonwealth 
countries that have transplanted the European Convention 
into their own constitutions, ?5 it is not difficult to 
understand the importance constitutional courts give to 
the decisions of international bodies such as the 
European Court of Human Rights and the U.N-Human Rights
?4 Supra Chapt. 6, at p. 234.
There is considerable academic commentary on this subject. See Martineau, (1983); Perry, 
(1981); Builder, (1981); Henkin, (1984); Lillich & Hannum (1985); Lillich, (1985); Hasche, (1990).
This theory maintains that the courts are required to consider the international definition 
of human rights within the framework of constitutional interpretation. Hartman, at 659, (1983).
?4 PREDRERI, (Ed) (1981). See generally Amnesty International, (1985)
?5 See here Lester, 56, (1984).
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Committee. It is true that reference to international 
human rights instruments by domestic courts in developing 
countries is not uncommon when interpreting a 
constitution or a bill of rights. The Constitutional 
Court of Nigeria has, for example, referred to the human 
rights instruments of the United Nations on a number of 
o c c a s i o n s . 7G The Supreme Court of India has sometimes 
referred to the Civil and Political Covenant in its 
decisions.77 The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 
which is the final court of appeal in some criminal and 
civil matters for a number of British Commonwealth 
countries,78 has referred to international human rights 
instruments on several occasions. In Pratt and Morgan 
v.A-G for Jamaica79 the Privy Council examined. Inter 
alia, section 17(1) of the Jamaican Constitution, which 
prohibits torture and ill-treatment, after considering a 
decision of the United Nations Human Rights Committee®*^  
and jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.^
In the United States, Perry, in advocating reference to 
international norms for constitutional interpretation, 
acknowledges that there is neither textual nor historical 
justification for interpreting the U.S. Constitution with 
reference to human rights standards.He offers a 
functional justification for such a "non-interpretive 
review", based upon what he refers to as the "American 
religious self-understanding", an understanding which 
includes the responsibility to realize, if only
In Adewole & Others v. Jakande & Others [1981 1 N.C.L.R. 262] the court in examining a number 
of rights documented in the Nigerian Constitution stated: "having regard to the 
language used in the provisions of the constitution of fundamental rights...and the 
fact that the Constitution was influenced by the United Nations Universal Human Rights 
[sic] the provisions [are] to be generously interpreted to give full effect to the 
fundamental rights and freedoms referred to...", id, at 272. See generally AJOHO,
Jolly Georg Verqhese v. Bank of Cochin AIR (1980) Supreme Court, p. 470. See generally on the 
U.N. Covenants in relation to the Constitution of India ARGAML (1983).
For the present jurisdiction of the Privy Council see Information sheet of the Privy Council 
"Judicial Committee of the Privy Council: Jurisdiction as at August 1992", (1992).
II [1993] 4 All E.R, 769.
8" Ibid, at 781.
8^  Ibid, at 785.
8^  Perry, supra note 72, at 281.
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"partially and fragmentally..,a higher law" The U.S. 
Supreme Court has occasionally adopted this interpretive 
technique when interpreting the meaning of the Eighth 
Amendment to the Constitution prohibiting "cruel and 
unusual" punishment 84 Oyama v C a l i f o r n i a ,85 the Court
recognized that its decision was consistent with the 
human rights provisions of the United Nations Charter. In 
Coker v Georgia,8® the Justices looked to the practices of 
other states to determine whether capital punishment for 
rape amounted to "cruel and unusual" punishment, and 
conducted a similar exercise in Edmund v Florida.^  
involving an accomplice to felony murder. In Thompson v 
Oklahoma, ®8 information regarding the international 
position relating to execution of juveniles was relied on 
by the plurality^ in finding that the imposition of the 
death penalty on persons below the age of sixteen at the 
time they committed the offence violated the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.^ Therefore, although under this 
heading it can be seen that development of a satisfactory 
definition of torture would assist courts in formulating 
national provisions, it is when national constitutional 
courts are compelled to take cognizance of international 
norms that such a definition will take on added 
significance. This, as Justice Scalia indicated in 
Stanford v Kentucky®^ and Wilkins v Missouri.^  the U.S. 
Supreme Court, is not prepared to do. In the Stanford 
decision the judge stated:
"We emphasize that it is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive, 
rejecting the contention of petitioners and their various amici that the 
sentencing practices of other countries are relevant. While "the practices of
Id, quoting Bellah (1973). For the interpretivists response to this understanding of the 
constitution see Bork, (1971); Rehnquist, (1975) BERGER (1977);8J Perry, 281, (1981).88 332 U.S.633 (1948).
88 433 U.S.584, 592-93 n.4 596 n.lO (1977).
87 458 U.S. 782, 796-97 n.22 (1982).
88 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
88 Ibid, at 830-31 (plurality opinion).
88 Ibid, at 838.
81 Stanford, 109 S.Ct.2980.
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other nations, particularly other democracies, can be relevant to determining 
whether a practice uniform among our people is not merely an historical 
accident, but rather so "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" that it 
"occupies a place not merely in our mores, but, text permitting, in our 
Constitution as well", they cannot serve to establish the first Eighth 
Amendment prerequisite, that the practice is accepted among our people".81
To summarise this brief examination of the manner in 
which fundamental rights expressed at an international 
level have had an effect in domestic legal systems it may 
be said that despite the relative infancy of 
international human rights as a source of binding rights 
and therefore as "law", their effect has not been 
insignificant. It is clear from the above study that in 
some jurisdictions the right documented internationally 
not to be subjected to torture and ill-treatment will be 
available to the individual by the direct application of 
the provision into domestic courts. In other 
jurisdictions the protection may be provided to the 
individual by means of interpreting constitutional 
provisions in accordance with international human rights 
standards. In other, albeit isolated, cases the 
individual may claim freedom from torture and ill- 
treatment in jurisdictions which recognise that the 
freedom is part of customary international law which is 
enforcable in domestic courts.
So far this analysis has considered the importance of the 
prohibition of torture and ill-treatment from the point 
of view of the individual. However, the significance of 
defining its scope and content can only be fully 
appreciated if it is considered in relation to the 
State's duties in International Law.
82 Id.
88 Ibid, at 2975.
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In the Barcelona Traction Case^^ the International Court 
of Justice stated that "droits fondamentaux de la 
personne humaine" create obligations erga. omnes^^. The Law 
Commission considered this to mean that there are:
"a amber of international obligations which, by reason of the importance
of their subject-matter for the international community as a whole, are - 
unlike the others - obligations in whose fulfilment all States have a legal 
interest".88
In light of the above it is submitted that the right not 
to be subjected to torture and ill-treatment as the 
principal component of the "droits fondamentaux de la 
personne humaine" is properly considered a right which 
the State has an international duty to provide. Failure 
to do so represents a breach of its obligations not only 
to individuals in its jurisdiction, but also to other 
States and the international community. Persistent acts 
of torture and ill-treatment will be perceived as a 
threat to the peace and security upon which the 
principles of International Law are founded and conduct 
to which other states have a legitimate interest in 
seeking to overcome.
Having noted the importance of defining the content and 
scope of the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment 
from the point of view of the State, it is necessary to 
consider finally the manner in which States may be made 
accountable internationally for human rights violations 
and the sanctions which may follow a finding that a state 
has failed to adequately protect individuals in its 
jurisdiction from torture and ill-treatment.
8^  ^ Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co..Ltd. (New Application) (Belg.v.Spain), 1970 ICJ Rep.4(judgment of Feb. 5).88 Ibid, 32.
[1976] 2 Y.B Int'l L. Commission, pt.2 at 99, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/1976/Add.1 (pt.2),
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2.2 The International Consequences for a State Considered to Have Violated Fundamental Human Rights Standards.
The importance of arriving at a satisfactory 
understanding of the international norm prohibiting 
torture and ill-treatment can be seen when the 
consequences for a State considered to be in violation of 
it are fully considered. This requires the discussion of 
two areas. First, the many "monitoring" procedures which 
have the capacity to expose violations internationally of 
human rights abuses must be examined. Second, the effect 
of the standing of a State in the international community 
must be considered.
2.2.1 State Accountability to International Bodies Human Rights Monitoring Procedures
2.2.1.1 International (United Nations) Treaties.
At the United Nations, Article 5 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights 194887 has been repeated 
almost verbatim in Common Article 3 of the four Geneva 
Conventions (1 9 4 9 ).88 Article 7 of the International Civil 
and Political Covenant 1966,88 the U.N Declaration on the 
Protection of All Persons from Torture and Other Cruel,
87 Resolution 217 (III) Art. 5 "Ho one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment".
88 This prohibits "cruel treatment and torture of persons taking no active part in hostilities".
It also proscribes "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and
degrading treatment or punishment".
88 Art, 7 "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to
medical or scientific experimentation".
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Inhuman or Degrading treatment or Punishment (1975) "^ and 
the U.N .Torture Convention 1984.881
Although the U.N. Torture Convention contains a procedure 
requiring States Parties to submit reports on the 
measures they have taken to give effect to the Convention 
to the Committee on Torture, 2^ it is the monitoring 
procedures of the International Civil and Political 
Covenant which have to date proven to be the most 
effective in highlighting human rights violations.
These are divided into three categories. The first is the 
inter-state p r o c e d u r e . ^8 This allows one State to take 
another to the Human Rights Committee alleging a 
violation of a right in the Covenant. 8-04 The second, is 
the reporting procedure,^8 which requires the ratifying 
states to submit periodic reports^^ to the Committee, 
indicating the measures taken to safeguard the rights 
documented in the Covenant. The Committee is empowered to 
make comments on these reports, communicating them to the 
State Party, and also to the Economic and Social 
Committee of the United N a t i o n s . 7^ Although the only 
sanction available to the Human Rights Committee in this 
procedure is one of publicity, this can at times prove
Art. 3 provides; "No State may permit tolerate torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. Exceptional circumstances such as a state of war or a threat 
of was, internal political instability or any other public emergency may not be
invoked as a justification of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment". The same can also be said of the numerous special rules and codes of 
conduct such as the U.N Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (1957); 
the U.N. Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (1979); Art. 5, the U.N
Principles of Medical Ethics (1982) Principle 2.
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
1985, G.A.Res.A/Res/39/46 (1984). Hereafter U.N. Torture Convention. See generally BURGERS & DANELIUS, (1988).Art.19. BURGERS, id, at 4.
8-88 Art,41 Civil and Political Cov, supra Chapt. 1, note 84.
This to date, has not been used by any State recognizing the competence of the Committee to 
receive such petitions, McGOLDRICK, 37, (1990).
1^ 8 Art. 40, Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 103 and McGOLDRICK, ibid, pp. 62-119.
At present these reports are submitted every 5 years or whenever the Committee deems it
appropriate. Art 40, id.
8-''7 Ibid, McGOLDRICK, at 96, (1991).
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formidable. This weapon of publicity will be discussed
below.
Not infrequently, the State will be asked to account for 
action taken with regard to a certain area of rights 
within its jurisdiction, and its efforts to implement 
suggested improvements may be reviewed at a later date. 8-09 
Although the language of the Reports of the Human Rights 
Committee demonstrates restraint and diplomacy, in an 
attempt to maintain a constructive dialogue with States, 
it has, on occasion, been extremely critical of States. 
For example. Sir Vincent Evans in discussing a Soviet 
Report commented:
"Reports had been published of healthy persons being interned in Soviet 
psychiatric institutions for political or punitive reasons, which would appear 
to be a clear violation of the terms of [article 7]".88-0
He continued:
"— some of the sentences meted out in previous years to persons convicted of 
political offences seemed excessively severe to observers in other countries.
It would be appreciated if some comments could be made to assist the Committee 
in its understanding of this matter".888
On occasion, members of the Committee have chosen to go 
as far as making specific allegations against a number of 
States of practicing torture. Examples can be found in 
the Reports concerning Iran, 882 Afghanistan, 882 El
Salvador,884 Uruguay,885 and Chile.885
Infra, at pp. 83-84.
8?^  McGOLDRICK, at 81, (1991).
885 Ibid, at 363, quoting Sir Vincent Evans from SR 108 pr.50,
II; Doc.A/37/40, pr. 309.888 Doc.A/40/40, pr. 598.
884 Doc.A/42/40, pr. 160.
885 Doc.A/37/40, prs. 272, 278.
885 Docs.A/34/40, pr. 80; A/39/40, prs. 463-64.
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Finally the Optional Protocol to the Civil and. Political 
Covenant887 provides for the individual applications 
procedure allowing an individual the right to petition 
the Human rights Committee alleging a violation of the 
Covenant, The Committee is empowered to "forward its 
views to the individual and the state c o n c e r n e d " . %t is 
through this mechanism that the Committee has brought to 
the attention of the international community violations 
of "torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or 
punishment on a number of o c c a s i o n s  .885
2.2.1.2 Regional Human Rights Treaties.
There are two regional treaties dealing specifically with 
torture. They are the Inter-American Convention to 
Prevent and Punish Torture 1985,820 and the European 
Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1 9 8 7 .828
The latter treaty, recalling the definition of torture in 
Article 3 of the European Convention, 822 tg innovative in 
providing for on-site inspection by an international body 
of the Council of Europe to visit any place it so 
requests. 823 To date this has led to a number of reports 
that have, on occasion, been extremely critical of member 
States. For example, a report of the Torture Committee
887 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res 2200 
(XXI), U.N.Doc. A/6316 (1966).885 Art 5, id.
885 See for example the many cases against Uruguay including Ambrosini v. Uruguay (Doc.A/34/40, 
p.124); Antonaccio v. Uruguay (Doc.A/37/40, p.114); Lanza and Perdoma v. Uruguay 
(Doc.A/35/40, p.Ill); Massera v. Uruguay (Doc.A/34/40, p.124).
25 25 ILM 519. It is interesting to note that this treaty is the first to abandon the standard 
definition first utilized in the Universal Declaration. Art. 2 to the Convention 
provides: "For the purposes of this Convention, torture shall be understood to be any 
act intentionally performed whereby physical or mental pain or suffering is inflicted 
on a person for the purposes of criminal investigation, as a means of intimidation, as 
personal punishment, as a preventive measure, as a penalty, or for any other purpose. 
Torture shall be understood to be the use of methods upon a person intended to 
obliterate the personality of the victim or to diminish his physical or mental 
capacities, even if they do not cause physical pain or mental anguish".
828 UKTS 5 (1991). See generally Cassese, (1989).
822 Council of Europe, Doc H (87). Reprinted in 27 ILM (1988) 1152.823 Art 2, ibid.
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with regard to the United Kingdom chose to describe a 
number of its prisons as having conditions leading to 
"inhuman and degrading" treatment for its p r i s o n e r s ,824
The three regional treaties dealing with civil and 
political rights: the African Charter 1981,825 the American 
Convention on Human Rights 1969 5^ and the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental F r e e d o m s ^ ^  all 
provide legal obligations on States parties to comply 
with the standards documented in e a c h  .828 Each of these 
treaties has at least one tribunal charged with the task 
of ensuring that ratifying States comply with its terms.
824 report to THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT ON THE VISIT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM CARRIED OUT BY 
THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR THE PREVENTION OF TORTURE AND INHUMAN AND DEGRADING 
TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT (CPT) CPT/Inf (91) 15. The Report noted "that the CPT's 
delegation found that the condictions in the three male local prisons visited were 
very poor. In each of the three prisons there was a pernicious combination of 
overcrowding, inadequate regime activities, lack of integral sanitation and poor 
hygiene. In short, the overall environment in which the prisoners had to lead their 
lives amounted, in the CPT's opinion, to inhuman and degrading treatment", para. 229.
ILM 21 (1982) 58. The African Charter on Human and People's Rights was adopted in 1981 and 
came into force in Oct 1986. It is administered under the auspices of the Organisation 
of African Unity (O.A.U). Art. II of the Charter of the O.A.U states that its aims are
to "promote the unity and solidarity of the African States" "to eradicate all forms
of colonialism from Africa" and "to promote international co-operation, having due 
regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Right". Robertson, , at 200, (1989). As of 1988 the Charter had been ratified by 35 
States. (J.Marie, IX International instruments relating to human rights, Human Rights 
Law Journal, IX, 113 (1988). See generally on the African Charter Umozurike, (1983); Ojo S Sesay, (1986).
ILM, 9(1970) 673. The American Convention was adopted in 1969 and came into force in 1978. 
It is administered under the auspices of the Organisation of American States, (O.A.S) 
which was established in 1948 in Bogota. Its governing instrument the Charter of 
Bogata states the purposes of the O.A.S as including the strengthening of peace and 
security, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the promotion of economic, social 
and cultural development. ROBERTSON, at 162, (1989).
827 For a comparison of these three human rights treaties see Weston, Lukes, and Hnatt, (1987).
The American Convention Art 1 provides: "The States Parties to this Convention undertake to 
respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons
subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights " Art. 2
states: "Where the exercise of any of the rights or freedoms referred to in Article 1 
is not already ensured by legislative or other provisions, the States Parties 
undertake to adopt,...such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give 
effect to those rights or freedoms." Art. 1 of the African Charter states: "The Member 
States of the Organisation of African Unity....shall recognize the rights, duties and 
freedoms enshrined in this Charter and shall undertake to adopt legislative or other 
measures to give effect to them. Under Art. 1 of the European Convention states 
parties are required to "secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and 
freedoms defined in set forth in" the Convention, Under Art. 53 states parties are 
obliged to abide by the decision of the European Court of Human Rights.
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In the Council of Europe, it is not uncommon for an 
adverse decision emanating from either the European 
Commission of Human Rights^^ or the European Court of 
Human Rights^^ to expose deficiencies in domestic laws 
which require amendment. Following the decision in Tyrer 
V United Kingdom.831 the United Kingdom discontinued the 
use of corporal punishment for a criminal offence. 
Following Campbell v. United K i n g d o m , 832 the U.K. was 
required to examine carefully its policy relating to 
corporal punishment in schools to ensure that it was 
compatible with Protocol 1 Article 2 of the Convention.833 
In Marcx v .B e l g i u m .834 the Court considered that changes 
were necessary in Belgian Law which discriminated against 
certain children born out of wedlock. Perhaps the most 
significant case reflecting the development of the 
international law of human rights is the decision of the 
Court in Soering v.United Kingdom.835 The case concerned 
the request of the United States of America for the 
return of Soering from the United Kingdom to face two 
charges of capital murder. If returned, he would have had 
to face the " death row phenomenon" and possible 
execution. He contended that if the U.K. chose to 
extradite him it would be responsible, for subjecting him 
to "inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article 
3. The European Court of Human Rights unanimously agreed. 
As a general rule, the international mechanisms designed 
to protect human rights become operative only after the 
violation has occurred. The Soering decision is important 
as an example of the capacity of human rights systems to 
prevent violations.
825 The Commission consists of experts acting in their individual capacity in numbers equal to 
that of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention, Arts 19-23, See ROBERTSON, at 109-112, (1989).
The European Court consists of a number of judges equal to that of the Members of the the 
Council of Europe. Art 38. They are elected for a period of nine years. See ROBERTSON, at 113-115, (1989).
838 Series A. 26, (1978).
832 Series A. 48, (1982).
833 4 E.H.R.R. 293 (1982).
834 Series B. 29, (1982)
835 Series A. 161, (1989).
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Although the European Convention enforcement machinery is 
dependent to a large extent on the goodwill of States in 
taking remedial action following case decisions, in the 
final resort there is also the possibility that a State 
considered to have committed serious human rights 
violations can be expelled from the Council of E u r o p e , 836
2,2.2 Declarations of Human Rights Violations and the Standing of a State in the International Community.
A study of the promulgation of international human rights 
standards suggests that international agreement, 
particularly across the universal spectrum, is often only 
possible by searching for a basic common consensus. Once 
this has been achieved, it is then possible to develop 
standards that are more exacting, A study of the drafting 
of the International Bill of Rights supports this point,832 
It began with the Universal Declaration consisting of 
"common standards" and was followed by the two 
international covenants, both of which provide detailed 
and legally binding duties on States.
It is because the international standards at the United 
Nations are often considered to represent no more than 
this basic standard that considerable significance is 
attached to compliance with them. Moreover, despite being 
basic standards, they have achieved significant 
international status, because they have been assented to 
by a majority of the members of the United Nations, and 
vicariously, a majority of the world's population.835
States are often able to deflect criticism of their human 
rights record by responding that the allegations made 
relating to the same were politically motivated. This 
reaction is difficult to justify as against international 
tribunals, which consists, of experts sitting in an
83^  Arts 3 and 8 of the Statute of the Council of Europe. 
837 See generally HUMPHREY, (1984).
835 For ratifications see supra Chapt 1. note 84.
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independent capacity and not as representatives of their 
governments. 835
The sanction of publicity available to international 
human rights tribunals, which in many cases remains their 
most potent means of persuading states to comply with 
international standards, can prove formidable. Analysis 
of the European Convention mechanism suggest that states 
go to considerable lengths through the Convention’s 
conciliation procedure to avoid having to have "their 
dirty linen washed in public". As a result of the inter­
state case against Greece^^ in 1967 which alleged 
violations of a number of rights under the European 
Convention, the activities of the Greek government came 
under close scrutiny by the international community. 
Greece, anticipating expulsion, withdrew from the Council 
of Europe in 1969.848
The power of this weapon of international exposure varies 
in accordance with a number of factors. These include the 
existing standing of the State in the international 
community and its sensitivity to allegations of human 
rights transgressions .842 This itself may be dependent on a 
number of factors. The recent trend towards linking 
international trade with respect for human rights is a 
case in point. In 1990 a E.C. trade agreement with 
Argentina, at the letter's insistence, links trading 
status with a continuing respect for human rights in that
835 Art. 28(3) Civil and Political Covenant, states that the members of the U.N. Human Rights 
Committee "shall be elected and shall serve in their personal capacity".
Members of the European Court are elected by the Consultative Assembly to the Council of 
Europe, Art. 39.(1). Art, 39 (3), provides "The candidates shall be of high moral 
character and must either possess the qualifications required for appointment to high 
judicial office or be jurisconsults of recognized competence".
Yearbook H.R. XII 186 (1969). For an excellent account of the efforts to bring to the 
attention of the world community through the use of human rights procedures the human 
rights abuses in Greece during the time of the Greek dictatorship of the 1960's see 
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT ON TORTURE, 79-105, (1975). See generally BECKETT, (8970).
The State withdrew its membership in Dec 1969 but renewed it in 1974 following the downfall 
of the Colonel regime.
842 JOYCE, (1978), Chapt. 3 "The Mobilisation of Shame".
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c o u n t r y . 843 Lome IV, an international trade agreement with 
African, Pacific and Caribbean countries also makes 
reference to the importance of human rights standards .844 
Political aspirations of States seeking to align 
themselves with other international actors or to join 
international institutions may also be a relevant 
consideration. Turkey, for example, has in recent years 
made considerable efforts to improve its standing in the 
international community with regard to human rights, as 
it seeks to be considered for membership of the European 
Community. 845
Conclusion
Although the individual is a relatively new subject of 
International Law, it is clear that he or she may expect 
considerable assistance in claiming a number of 
fundamental rights from this source of law. The tentacles 
of international human rights law have in less than half 
a century penetrated national legal systems in a variety 
of ways thereby assisting in the enforcement of human 
rights. However, from the examination of the techniques 
through which this has happened, by direct application of 
international provisions, through customary international 
law, or constitutional interpretation, one factor is 
clear: for these mechanisms to work it is essential that 
it is possible to obtain a reasonable indication of the 
content and scope of rights documented internationally. 
If this requirement is not satisfied domestic courts will 
be unwilling to refer to international human rights norms 
as a satisfactory indication of acceptable State conduct 
with regard to individuals.
International exposure and declarations to the effect 
that a State has violated a basic human right can prove 
to be a formidable disincentive to States that promote or
843 Trade Agreement between the E.C. and Argentina signed April 12, 1990,
844 Article 5(2) and Annexes IV, V and VI of the Fourth Lome Convention. T.S No. 47 (1992).845 See The Guardian, 14 April, 1987.
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permit violations of human rights. However, it is because 
this sanction can be so effective and has important 
repercussions for States that it is necessary to provide 
adequate indications as to the nature and content of the 
rights which States are under a duty internationally to 
protect. Just as the individual has a right under the 
International Civil and Political Covenant for state 
actions to be carried out "according to law"846 and under 
the European Convention for measures to be "prescribed by 
law",842 then so must states, in themselves being subjected 
to a system of "higher law", be allowed to expect the 
same. The force of the above conclusion, when considered 
in relation to the right not to be subjected to torture 
and ill-treatment, is reinforced when it is recalled that 
this right, "jus cogens" in nature, is to foe regarded as 
one of the most important of all fundamental human 
rights.
This phrase or others similar appear frequently in the substantive provisions of the treaty 
in addition to the duty placed on each State Party by Art. 2 (2) to "...take the 
necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the 
provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such legislative or other measures as may 
be necessary to give effect to the the rights recognized in the present Covenants 
This is essentially the requirement that the law is "forseeable" and "accessible." See VAN 
DIJK & VAN HOOF, at 578-583, (1990). The European Court of Human Rights has stated in 
respect of the requirement of foreseeability "the law must be adequately accessible; 
the citizen must be able to have an indication that is adequate, in the circumstances, 
of the legal rules applicable to a given case", Sunday Times v. United Kingdom Series A. 30, 31, (1979).
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3 . THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS.
Introduction to Chapter
The purpose of this Chapter is to assess the contribution 
the European Commission of Human Rights and the European 
Court of Human Rights have made to the development of the 
international law of human rights. This is necessary as 
it provides three observations important to this thesis.
The first, is that although it remains correct to 
describe the European Convention as subsidiary to 
national legal systems for the protection of human 
rights, it is clear from the volume and complexity of 
applications taken to the European Commission to date 
that an elaborate and well-defined system of law is 
required to resolve the many disputes between the State 
and individuals which are not satisfactorily settled at a 
domestic level. A thorough understanding of each 
substantive right of the Convention, including Article 3, 
is therefore a pre-requisite for an acceptable operation 
of the European Convention enforcement machinery.
The second observation relates to the effect the European 
Court's dynamic interpretation of the European Convention 
has had on the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment. 
It is argued that the nature of the prohibition, the 
wording of which is virtually identical in every human 
rights treaty, has been completely transformed. Intended 
initially to prohibit the most serious forms of torture 
and ill-treatment, it has now become a standard against 
which all forms of conduct leading to suffering of a 
minimum severity may be examined.
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The final observation made in this Chapter concerns the 
contribution the jurisprudence of the European Commission 
of Human Rights and the European Court has made in 
developing and advancing the status of the individual as 
a subject of International Law, It is concluded that this 
development requires, and to a point compels, a 
reappraisal of the relationship between State and 
individual in International Law, Initially, this 
relationship was characterized by consideration of what 
amounted to a reasonable concession on the part of the 
State regarding its sovereignty. Decisions of the 
European Court now suggest that this approach is better 
substituted for one based upon the effective application 
of human rights to the individual. It is this emphasis on 
the "sovereignty of the individual" which will be 
important later in this thesis, when a satisfactory 
definition of torture and ill-treatment is p r o p osed,8 The 
material to substantiate these claims is discussed later
in this Chapter,2
3.1 The Development of an International Human Rights System for Europe.
Laski observed in 1948 that the Second World War had 
shown that: "the principle of national sovereignty ha[s]
exhausted its u s e f u l n e s s " .3 Immediate postwar 
international relations were characterised, not by 
efforts to preserve independence, but to promote inter­
dependence which would strength a region that had been 
torn apart by the effects of two world wars in less than 
half a century.
It was amid the "rarefied mood of European entente"4 that, 
in parallel with economic developments, efforts at a
8 Infra Chapt. 5, pp. 194-202.
2 Infra, pp. 110-113.
3 LASKI, at 3, (1948).
BEDDARD, at 19, (1980). Beddard comments of the birth of the Convention,."It is interesting to 
speculate whether at any time in the history of this Continent, either before or 
since, such a step could have been taken", id.
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European level were made to reaffirm in international 
instruments the political ideals documented in the 
Charter of the United Nations. On 17 March 1948 the
Brussels Treaty was signed by Belgium, France,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. They 
confirmed their resolve:
"To fortify and preserve the principles of democracy, personal freedom and 
political liberty, the constitutional traditions and the rule of law, which are 
their common heritage".5
In the same year various European interest groups joined 
together in a Congress of Europe in The Hague under the
Chairmanship of Winston Churchill. This meeting resulted 
the following year in the Statute of the Council of
Europe, which was signed by the five states of the 
Brussels Military Alliance.^ Article 1 of the Statute 
provides that the aim of the Council of Europe is:
"to achieve a greater unity between its Members for the purpose of safeguarding 
and realizing the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and 
facilitating their economic and social progress".7
Article 1(b) states that this:
"shall be pursued through the organs of the Council by discussion of questions 
of common concern and by agreements and common action in economic, social, 
cultural, scientific, legal and administrative matters and in the maintenance 
and further realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms".®
It is Article 3 however, that is important from the point 
of view of the development of human rights standards. It
I ROBERTSON, at 2, (1972). State Papers vol 150, 672.
5 State Papers vol 154, 509.
7 Statute of the Council of Europe (May 5, 1949), Eur. T.S. 5 Id.
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States :
"Every Member of the Council of Europe must accept the principles of the rule 
of law and of the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, and collaborate sincerely and effectively in 
the realisation of the aim of the Council ..,."5
As Robertson concludes:
"the maintenance of human rights and respect for the rule of law are not only 
included araoung the objectives of the Council of Europe, they are actually made 
a condition of Membership".85
It was these constitutional provisions which provided the 
basis for the development of a human rights instrument 
similar to that planned at the United Nations: 88 the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms signed on 4 November 1950^ Although criticised 
for failing to adopt a number of rights originally 
proposed by the Assembly of the Counil of Europe, the 
Convention was, in the words of Lord Layton, "a most 
important landmark in European h i s t o r y " . 8 3
The Convention entered into force on 3 September 1953, 
when the required minimum of ten States had ratified the
treaty ,84
ROBERTSON, at 3, (1972).88 Infra, Chapt.1, pp. 33-35.
Robertson concludes with regard to the drafting of the Convention:
"If the negotiations seemed slow and protracted at the time, continuing as they did from August 
1949 to November 1950, that period of fifteen months seems in retrospect astonishingly 
short when it is compared with the period of eighteen years (from 1948 to 1966) that 
was required to give birth to the United Nations Covenants." Supra note 10, at 14.83 Ibid, at 13.
ROBERTSON, at 16, (1977); UKTS 71 (1953). By the end of 1974 it had been ratified by eighteen 
states. By June 1993 there were 28 contracting states to the Convention. Info. Sheet 
No.32 at 1, Strasbourg, (1994).
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3.3 Initial Acceptance of the Competence of the Commission and Court to Receive Individual Petitions.
The acceptance of the individual petitions procedure and 
the jurisdiction of the Court was a gradual process. 
Sweden was the first to accept the right of individual 
petition on 4 February 1952,85 with Ireland and Denmark 
ratifying in 1953 .8® Following an Assembly Recommendation^ 
in that same year urging all States to ratify the 
Convention and the First Protocol, Iceland, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, and Belgium accepted the right of 
individual petition in 1955, bringing the total to six, 
the minimum needed for the procedure to become 
operational .88 By 1974, 13 of the 18 Contracting States
had accepted the petition procedure under Article 25.85 
of March 1994 all those States which had ratified the 
Convention had recognized the right of the individual to 
petition the Commission.2®
It was not until September 1958 that the Court came into 
operation, following the recognition of its jurisdiction 
by eight members of the Council of Europe being the 
minimum number required before the Court could become 
operative,28 By 1974 its jurisdiction had been accepted as 
compulsory by fourteen of the eighteen Contracting 
Parties. By March 1994 all Contracting States of the 
Council of Europe had recognized its competence.^
85 ROBERTSON, id.
“ m .I' Recommendation 52 September 1953, id.
8® ROBERTSON, supra note 36, at 16.
85 The remaining countries accepted the petitions procedure on the following dates: Iceland 
1955; Belgium 1955; Federal Republic of Germany 1955; Norway 1957; Luxembourg 1958;
Austria 1958; the Netherlands 1960; the United Kingdom 1966; Italy 1973; Switzerland
1974; France 1982; Liechenstein, Greece 1985; Malta 1987; Turkey 1987; Cyprus 1989; 
San Marino; Finland 1990; Hungary 1992; Czech Rep. 1992; Poland 1993. See Chart of 
Signatures and Ratifications 01/03/94, Council of Europe.
n “ •See ROBERTSON, at 195 (1977), The eight were: Ireland 1953; Denmark 1953; the Netherlands
1954; Belgium 1955; Federal Republic of Germany 1955; Luxembourg 1958; Austria 1958;
Iceland 1958.
22 Supra note 14.
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3.4 The Petitions Procedure before the EuropeanCommission of Human Rights.
The Commission may be required to consider two types of 
petitions. Under Article 24 it may receive what are 
commonly referred to as inter-state complaints where one 
State alleges that another Contracting State has failed 
to respect the terms of the Convention. To date, the 
Commission has been required to consider 12 such cases.2® 
Article 25 permits an individual, non-governmental
organisation, or groups of individuals to petition the 
Commission, once a number of conditions regarding
admissibility have been s a t i s f i e d . 24 The Commission, upon 
finding that the petition is admissible, will draw up a 
report and attempt to reach a friendly settlement between 
the parties in dispute. If this is not possible, the case 
will be referred to the Committee of Ministers, which, if 
the complaint has not been forwarded to the Court after 
three months have elapsed, will determine whether there 
has been a violation. At present, it is only the 
Commission or an interested State which has the 
competence to refer cases to the Court. This does not 
mean however, that the individual is not represented 
before the Court. This is because the Court has, over a 
period of time, given a very wide interpretation to its 
rules of procedure, which now effectively allow the 
individual the possibility of presenting her/his case 
before t h e m . 2® in the case of De Wilde, Ooms and Versiip v 
Belgium,2® the Court considered that, by virtue of Rule 
29(1) of the Rules of Court, the delegates of the 
Commission "may have the assistance of any person of 
their choice"22 who may be called upon to make oral 
presentations before the Court. This granting of locus 
standi indirectly before the Court has now been provided
23 Survey of Activities and Statistics, at 22, Council of Europe, (1992).
24 Articles 26 and 27 of the Convention.
Rule 29(1) of the Rules of Court allows the delegates of the Commission to "have the 
assistance of any person of their choice" who may be called upon to appear and make oral representations before the Court.
2® Series A. 12, (1971), at 6-8.27 Id, at 7.
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directly to the individual by the revised Rules of
Procedure of the Court.28 Rule 30(1) states:
"The applicant shall be represented by an advocate authorised to practice in 
any of the Contracting States and resident in the territory of one of them or 
by any other person approved by the President. The President may, however, give 
leave to the applicant to present his own case subject, if need be, to his 
being assisted by an advocate or other person as aforesaid".25
Further, it seems that the locus standi of the individual 
will be fully confirmed with the coming into force of 
Protocol Nine to the Convention.3® This allows the
individual to request that her/his case be considered 
before the Court independently of the Commission or an 
interested State.
3.5 The Enforcement and Nature of the Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights
Under Article 50, the Court is empowered to award "just 
satisfaction".38 This often amounts to little more than a 
finding by the Court of a violation of the Convention by 
the State concerned.®2 The Court has, however, interpreted 
the Article to empower it to award compensation to the 
victim. In Neumeister v. Austria,33 the Court decided that 
Article 5(3) had been violated and awarded compensation 
amounting to 30,000 Austrian schillings. The Court may 
also award small sums of compensation in cases where it
considers that, although a violation of the Convention
2® See generally Whitfield, (1988).
25 Rules of Court (as in force 20 April 1992).
Eur. T.S. 140. Protocol No.9 will enter into force after 10 ratifications. As of May 1992 it 
had been ratified by Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Norway. Info. Sheet No,30. Strasbourg, 2, (1993).The full text of Article 50 is:
"If the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by a legal authority or any other 
authority of a High Contracting Party is completely or partially in conflict with the 
obligations arising from the present Convention, and if the internal law of the said 
Party allows only partial reparation to be made for the consequences of this decision 
or measure, the decision of the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to
the injured party", supra, note 14.
32 For example Colder v. United Kingdom Series A. 18, (1975) at 23.
33 Series A. 8, (1974) at 16-21.
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has been established, the loss to the applicant was 
slight. For example, in Engel v. Netherlands,34 the Court 
awarded a symbolic D.fl 100, after deciding that the loss 
to the application as a result of the State's violation 
of Article 5(1) was not significant.
Under Article 53, States are required "to abide by the 
decision of the Court in any case to which they are 
parties". Supervision of decisions is carried out by the 
Committee of Ministers.3® Although the Convention system 
depends largely on the goodwill of States in putting into 
effect the findings of the Commission and Court, in the 
event of political pressure being unable to persuade 
States to comply with a Court's decision. Article 8 of 
the Statute of the Council of Europe allows the Committee 
of Ministers to suspend and ultimately expel a State 
which has seriously violated its obligations as a member 
of the Council of Europe.®®
3.6 Early Decisions of the Commission and Court - a Tale of Judicial Conservatism and Teleological Self- Restraint .
The early decisions of the Commission illustrate clearly 
that its members were aware that they were operating 
within a legal system still in its infancy, and as such, 
fragile and yet to gain the full confidence of member 
States. Decisions of the Commission proceeded 
unadventurously and with caution, reflecting the concern 
to demonstrate to States that decisions would at all 
times be taken with full cognizance of their consequences 
for member States.
34 Series A. 22, (1976) at 3.
35 Article 54, supra note 14.
Article 8 of the Statute of the Council of Europe, provides: "Any Member of the Council of 
Europe which has seriously violated Article 3 may be suspended from its rights of 
representation and requested by the Committee of Ministers to withdraw under Article 7. If such Member does not comply with this request the Committee may decide that it 
has ceased to be a Member of the Council as from such date as the Committee may 
determine", Eur. T.S No. 8.
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No decision of the Commission in its early years, with 
the exception of the inter-state Greek case, 37 could be 
said to have presented difficulties for domestic legal 
systems or have had serious political repercussions. An 
example of the Commission's caution can be found in the 
1963 decision of Iversen v Norway. 3® In this case 
Norwegian legislation was examined for compatibility with 
Article 4 of the Convention, which prohibits, inter alia, 
forced labour.35 By Norwegian law, junior dentists could 
be compelled to work for a period of time in particular 
areas of northern Norway in which there was a shortage of 
dentists. The majority of the Commission, six in total, 
decided that Article 4 of the Convention had not been 
violated. Four of the six considered that there was no 
question of forced or compulsory labour, because the 
employment was only for a short period of time, was 
adequately remunerated and was in keeping with the 
practice of the dentistry profession in Norway, which was 
freely chosen by the applicant. Two of the majority 
disagreed however with this reasoning, considering that 
it did amount to forced labour, but that it did not 
violate Article 4 because it satisfied part (c) of 
paragraph 3, which states that "forced or compulsory 
labour" does not include "any service exacted in case of 
an emergency or calamity threatening the life or well­
being of the community". Four of the Commission 
considered however, that the facts of the case indicated
37 This case involved an inter-state action against Greece taken collectively by the Governments 
of Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands. Yearbook XII (1969).
3® Yearbook VI, 278, (1963).
35 The full text of Article 4 reads as follows:
"i.No one shall be held in slavery or servitude.
2.No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour.
3.For the purpose of this Article the term "forced or compulsory labour" shall not include:
(a) any work required to be done in the ordinary course of detention imposed according to the
provisions of Article 5 of this Convention during conditional release from such 
detention;
(b) any service of a military character or, in case of conscientious objectors in countries
where they are recognized, service exacted instead of compulsory military service;
(c) any service exacted in case of an emergency or calamity threatening the life or well being
of the community;
(d) any work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations", supra note 14.
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forced or compulsory labour and that the application 
should be admitted for review on the merits. In the light 
of this divergence of opinion within the Commission as to 
the decision and its reasoning, it is difficult to 
consider it satisfactory that the case was declared 
manifestly ill-founded.^ Professor Jacobs summarises the 
events surrounding the decision as follows:
"It is hard to escape the conclusion that the Commission's decision to reject 
the application was influenced by political considerations. The case had caused 
considerable controversy in Norway and the decision coincided with a decision 
of the Norwegian Government to renew its declaration accepting the Commission's 
competence under Article 25 for a period of only one year".48
It was because during the Commission's early years only a 
few States had accepted the Article 25 p r o c e d u r e , 42 and 
only 3 of these had accepted the right of individual 
petition indefinitely, that the Commission was not well 
placed to be particularly activist in interpreting the 
Convention. For a considerable period of time the 
Commission was required to nurture a system of law which 
was directed along a completely unchartered path and one 
which member States would be happy to see the Commission 
to go no further, if its decisions were considered to 
produce unnecessary difficulties.
Similar considerations applied to the European Court. 
States, in the early days of the European Convention, 
were slow to accept its optional jurisdiction. Therefore, 
the Court was compelled to approach cases with restraint 
and little adventurism, allowing States few opportunities 
to question its decisions as being unnecessarily 
interventionalist,
As late as 1976, in the case of Handvside v United 
Kingdom.4® the Court demonstrated its willingness to defer
f  VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, at 245, (1990). 48 JACOBS, at 40, (1975).
42 Supra p. 90.
43 Series A. 24, 1-37, (1976).
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to State discretion and invoke a wide margin of 
appreciation in favour of the Respondent G o v e r n m e n t .44 in 
this case, the Court was required to consider whether the 
United Kingdom had, in seizing a publication it 
considered to be obscene, entitled the "Little Red School 
Book", violated Article 10 of the Convention which 
protects free expression. Despite the fact that the book 
was already in circulation in some parts of the United 
Kingdom, where no measures had been taken against 
publication and that the original Danish translation was 
freely available in most member States of the Council of 
Europe, the Court considered that the action of the U.K. 
government was "necessary" in a democratic society. The 
Court stated:
"By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of 
their countries, States' authorities are in principle in a better position than 
the international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of these 
requirements [of the protection of morals] as well as on the "necessity" of a 
"restriction" or "penalty" intended to meet them".4®
It was shortly after this decision that a change in the 
nature of the Court's jurisprudence may be detected. This 
coincides with the date by which, as noted above, 4® a 
large majority of member States of the Council of Europe 
recognized the competence of the Court. It is in 
assessing this change in the Court's approach to the 
interpretation of the Convention that it is possible to 
assess properly the modern-day importance of the 
jurisprudence of the European Commission and Court.
This requires an examination of a number of its most 
important decisions since the Handyside case. Those 
selected for the purposes of this exercise are: Tyrer v
The "margin of appreciation" may be said to be the discretion allowed the State in 
determining the extent to which a right or freedom may be restricted. See VAN DIJK & 
VAN HOOF, 585-606, (1990).
45 Handyside, supra note 43, at 22.
Supra p. 90.
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United Kingdom ; Campbell and Cosans v United Kingdom ; 
The Sunday Times v.United Kingdom;^  Soering v. United 
Kingdom.
Tyrer v United Kingdom The facts of the Tyrer case may be 
briefly described as follows. Anthony Tyrer, a 15-year-” 
old school boy living on the Isle of Man, was convicted 
of assault and was sentenced to be birched. This 
consisted of three strokes across his bare posterior. The 
birching "raised, but did not cut, the applicant's skin 
and he was sore for about a week and a half afterwards". 
He petitioned the Commission alleging that he had been 
subjected to degrading treatment contrary to Article 3, 
In seeking to defend the practice, the Attorney General 
of the Isle of Man referred to a number of factors. He 
submitted before the Court that there was considerable 
support for this type of punishment in the Isle of Man. 
He mentioned that there were a number of safeguards in 
place to ensure that the punishment^ was effected 
according to specific procedures. He mentioned that the 
punishment had been practiced on the Island for many 
years, and that it was necessary as a deterrent, not only 
for the local population, but particularly for the many 
young visitors to the Isle of Man.^  ^ The Court, despite 
the force of some of these arguments, decided that the 
punishment was degrading and in violation of Article 3. 
Although the Court claimed that the decision was special 
on the facts of the case. Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, 
it is contended, was right to point out in his dissenting 
judgment that it clearly amounted to a decision outlawing 
judicial corporal punishment in every c a se.54
Series A. 26, (1978), and Series B. 24, (1977-78). See Chapt. 6, pp. 210-217.
4j Series A. 48, (1982). 
f  Series A. 30, (1979).5” Series A. 161, (1989).51 Tyrer, supra note 47.
5^  This included a medical examination prior to the birching which was carried out in the 
presence of a doctor a parent, ibid.55 Tyrer, ibid, at 76.
54 Tyrer, ibid, at 24. See also Mylniec, (1985).
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There was considerable reaction to the decision in both 
mainland Britain and the Isle of Man, with a number of 
commentators calling for a review of the United Kingdom’s 
position in respect of the European Convention. With 
regard to the position of the Court, the case prompted 
Professor Zellick to comment:
"The period when the judges of the Court moved with great caution, lest they
forfeited the confidence of member States and thus jeopardised the future of
the Convention, appears to be at an end "55
The Tyrer case was the first of a series of cases
involving the practice of corporal punishment in the 
United Kingdom. In Campbell and Cosans v United Kingdom.^  
it fell to be determined whether corporal punishment in
schools was compatible with the Convention. It is
commonly forgotten that the schoolboys had not actually 
been subjected to corporal punishment. What was in 
dispute was whether the threat of the punishment was
sufficient to raise an issue with Article 3. The Court 
did not consider that this was the case although it did 
find that the United Kingdom, in refusing to allow
parents to decide whether their child could be caned at
school or not, had failed to respect the wishes of 
parents to education of their children in accordance with 
their philosophical convictions, in violation of Protocol 
1 Article 2 of the Convention, The consequences of this 
decision were not insignificant. As Sir Vincent Evans was 
to note in the case, it left the United Kingdom with a 
number of possibilities. The first was separate schools 
for those parents wishing their children to be caned and 
those who did not. The second possibility was separate 
classes for the two groups, which he considered was not 
practicable. A third was a system allowing parents the 
right to exempt their children from corporal punishment 
in the school. A fourth which he did not mention, was of 
course complete abolition. This was the eventual outcome
55 Zellick, (1978).
55 Campbell and Cosans v. United Kingdom, supra note 48.
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in state schools. The effect of the Education Act 19865^ 
was to outlaw corporal punishment in British state 
schools.
The case caused considerable controversy not only in 
Scotland, but also the remainder of the United Kingdom, 
and was heavily criticised by the many groups which still 
favoured corporal punishment.58 Although the question of 
the compatibility of corporal punishment with the 
Convention has yet to be fully resolved,5^ the decision 
remains an important example of the Court's work which
prompted a member State to review and amend its
legislation to conform with the Convention.
In The Sunday Times v. United K i n g d o m ,58 just two years
before the decision in the Campbell case, the Court
demonstrated that it was prepared to take decisions in 
relation to rights other than Article 3 which would have 
been unlikely in its early days. This case concerned an 
application challenging an injunction obtained in a 
English court prohibiting the publication of an article 
in the Sunday Times discussing the so called thalidomide 
tragedy before an action relating to the matter was due 
to be heard in court. The European Court considered that 
the action was not necessary in a democratic society for 
maintaining the authority of the judiciary and the need 
to secure a fair trial and declared that the United 
Kingdom had violated Article 10.
The decision was considered to have amounted to a very 
narrow interpretation of the State's margin of
5^  Halsbury's Laws of England, vol 15, para.125.
In 1974 Terry Casey, the then General Secretary of the National Association of
Schoolmasters/Union of Women Teachers was quoted as saying that "the swish of the
cane" was "one of the essential sounds" of education." Quoted from "Corporal
Punishment in Schools-the law" Information Sheet of the Children's Legal Centre,
London. In 1978 the National Association of Heads and Matrons of Assessment confirmed
its belief in the use of corporal punishment as a deterrent for hard core offenders
under 14 years of age. (TES) Feb, 10, at 99, (1978).
See here the recent corporal punishment cases of Costello-Roberts v. United Kingdom, Series
A. 247-A (1992), and Y v. United Kingdom, Series A. 247-C (1992).
5" Series A. 30, (1982).
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appreciation, and as such, a departure from the earlier 
case of Handyside, where it was considerably wider. In 
that case, it will be recalled that the Court stated that 
the national courts were in a better position than 
international judges to assess what action might be 
considered "necessary" in respect of Article 1 0 (2 ).51 in 
the Sunday Times case the Court was clearly prepared to 
be more interventionist, stating that the margin of 
appreciation does not mean:
"that the Court's supervision is limited to ascertaining whether a respondent 
State exercised its discretion reasonably, carefully, and in good faith. Even a 
Contracting State so acting remains subject to the Court’s control as regards 
the compatibility of its conduct with the engagements it has under the 
Convention".52
Although this change in approach to the doctrine of the 
margin of appreciation may be attributed, not to a 
developing sense of judicial adventurism, but to the 
rights involved, it remains a good example of a decision 
which had a demonstrable impact on a domestic legal 
system. In 1981 the Contempt of Court Act^ was passed 
incorporating the findings of the European Court of Human 
Rights .54
It is, however, the case of Soering v United Kingdom55
which better than any other authority illustrates that 
the Court must be considered to have entered a new period 
of decision making when compared with its early
judgments. It was in this case that the Court
demonstrated that, not only were the European Court 
judges prepared to reach a decision that would create
considerable difficulties for a member State, but also 
that their reasoning was not going to be adversely
5J Seris A, 24, (1976) 26-27.
52 Supra note 49, at 35-37.
55 Halsbury's Statutes vol 11 177.
During the passage of the Contempt of Court Bill the Government spokesman conceded that legal 
advice had been taken to ensure that the Bill did comply with both the European 
Convention and the Sunday Times case. Hansard (HL) vol 415, col 665.55 Supra note 50.
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influenced by a world superpower, the United States of 
America, which also had a strong interest in the outcome 
of the case.
The facts of the case may briefly be described as 
follows. Jens Soering, a German national, living in the 
United States of America, murdered the parents of his 
girlfriend on the letter's prompting. They were later 
arrested in the United Kingdom and extradition 
proceedings were commenced at the request of the State of 
Virginia. Soering, in an attempt to resist return to the 
United States and, with it, the "death row phenomenon" 
and possible execution, claimed that the United Kingdom 
would be responsible for subjecting him to "inhuman and 
degrading treatment" if it permitted extradition in such 
circumstances. The Commission considered, albeit on a 
slim 6-5 majority vote, that the United Kingdom would not 
violate Article 3 if it chose to honour its extradition 
treaty with the United States and return Soering. The 
Court, however, unanimously decided, that the United 
Kingdom would violate Article 3 if it permitted 
extradition to go ahead.^
The Court's decision was significant for a number of 
reasons. First, it demonstrated that the European human 
rights system has developed to the extent that it is now 
able, albeit in exceptional circumstances,^ to take 
preventive measures to ensure that a violation of a human 
right does not occur, in distinction from its more usual 
procedure, which is post facta, i.e operative only after 
the violation has taken place. Secondly, it represented a 
departure from an earlier case involving very similar 
facts, that of Kirkwood v United Kingdom.58 in this case
The outcome of the affair was that the British Government agreed to return Soering after 
assurances that from the U.S. that he would not be charged with capital murder.
These are dealt with under the Rule 36 procedure, which allows the Commission to request the 
government concerned not to take any further action until the Commission has had time 
to consider the application. It is normally invoked in cases of extradition or expulsion.
58 37 D & R 158, (1984).
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the applicant claimed that his return from the United 
Kingdom to the State of California to face trial for 
capital murder and possible sentence of death (including 
exposure to the death row phenomenon) would result in him 
being subjected to inhuman treatment. The Commission 
declared the case inadmissible on the grounds that it was 
manifestly ill-founded and stated:
"....the Commission recalls its finding in the Kirkwood case that the treatment 
the applicant was likely to endure in the circumstances of the case did not 
attain the degree of seriousness envisaged by Article 3 of the Convention".5^
Although the two cases may be distinguished on the facts 
(in the Soering case special attention was given to the 
nature of the applicant, considered to be young, 
vulnerable and mentally unstable),^ it represents a 
significant development in the jurisprudence of the Court 
relating to the death penalty under the Convention. This 
is because the Court rejected the submissions in favour 
of extradition with such force^ l that it must now be 
questioned whether the death penalty can be said to be 
compatible with the Convention despite the fact that 
express provision is made for it in Article 2 of the 
treaty. ^2
58 Series A. 161, para. 151 (1989).
Soering was said to have been suffering from a psychiatric syndrome called folie a deux. This 
was described as "a well-recognised state of mind where one partner is suggestible to 
the extent that he or she believes in the psychotic delusions of the other", para. 21, supra note 50.
See for example the comments of Judge De Meyer who stated that capital punishment is "not 
consistent with the present state of European civilization", 11 E.H.R.R. (1989) at
Quigley & Shank, (1989) state: "The Court might, in future cases, limit its holding to the 
facts of Soering and rule that it is permissible to extradite a person of mature years 
who did not have the mental condition that made Soering particularly fearful of death 
row. Given, however, the Court's strong language about death row conditions, it is 
unlikely that it will so limit its holdings", at 270.
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Thirdly, the Soering case clearly demonstrated that the 
Court would not be deterred from protecting the right of 
an individual even if this required a judgment which 
would create considerable difficulties for the member 
State concerned and attract fierce criticism from a state 
power as influential as the United States of America.
In discussing the above cases of Tyrer v . U.K. Campbell 
and Cosans v. U.K. The Sunday Times v. U.K and Soering v. 
U.K. it is important to note that they are representative 
of the nature of judgments which are now possible because 
of the developing interpretation of the Convention given 
by the Court. They are not isolated examples of where the 
Court has chosen to depart from a strict textual 
interpretation of the Convention to arrive at what it 
considers to amount to a just decision in the particular 
case. Instead, they represent markers in a series of 
cases that illustrate the manner in which the Court has 
developed its interpretation of the Convention to ensure 
the effective enforcement of human rights in member 
States. To complete this study of the Court's 
jurisprudence, it is necessary to briefly examine the 
manner in which the Court has developed its 
interpretation of the European Convention making the 
above decisions possible.
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3.7 Interpretation of the Convention by the European Court of Human Rights.
Guidance for standard treaty interpretation is to be 
found in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 3^
Article 31 (1) provides:
"A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the 
light of its object and purpose". 4^
Article 32 of the Vienna Convention further specifies:
"recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the 
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in 
order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31..."'^5
In Colder v.United Kingdom^ the Court accepted that it 
should be guided by Articles 31-33 of the Vienna 
Convention subject to "any relevant rules of the 
organisation" of the Council of Europe.^ The rules of the 
organisation, as noted earlier, 2® require both 
"maintenance" and "further realization" of human r i g h t s . ^8 
That has allowed, and to an extent required, the Court to 
take into account first and foremost the object and 
purpose, not only of the Council of Europe, but of the 
European Convention.
Professor Bernhardt, judge at the European Court of Human 
Rights, has explained this understanding of the 
Convention by noting the special nature of human rights 
treaties, arguing that they belong to a separate category 
with regard to techniques of interpretation. This is 
because, he notes, they are not concerned with "the mutual
5^ ILM 8 (1969) 679.
According to Art. 31 para.(2) "context" must be understood to include the text of the treaty itself.
76“ -Series A. 18, (1975).
Id, at 14.
Supra pp.88-89.’«Id.
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relations and the exchange of benefits between sovereign 
States" He continues: "Instead, they proclaim solemn
principles for the humane treatment of the inhabitants of 
the participating States".^
A dynamic interpretation of the Convention is therefore 
permitted of the Court and is, to a certain extent 
compelled, if rights which are commensurate with the 
"developing standards of decency that mark the progress 
of a maturing society" are to be recognized and
developed. 82
The Court's modern-day understanding and application of 
the Convention may be compared with that attributed to 
the constitutions of the United States and Canada.
With regard to the former, the dynamic interpretation of 
the U.S. Constitution was explained in the Weems v . 
United States®® as follows:
"Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and new purposes. 
Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the 
mischief which gave it birth "®4
Dickson J of the Canadian Supreme Court described the 
interpretation of constitutional provisions safeguarding 
human rights as follows :
"A constitution...is drafted with an eye to the future. Its function is to 
provide a continuing framework for the legitimate exercise of governmental 
power and when joined by a Bill or a Charter of Rights, for the unremitting 
protection of individual rights and liberties. Once enacted, its provisions 
cannot easily be repealed or amended. It must, therefore, be capable of growth 
and develop over time to meet new social, political and historical realities 
often unimagined by its framers".®5
Bernhardt, at 65, (Ed. MATSCHER 8 PETZOLD) (1988).
8285- Id.Phrase borrowed from the judgment in Trop v. Dulles 356 U.S 217 
Id.
85 U.S.349 at 373, (1910).
85 Hunter v Southam [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 at 155, (1984) 11 D.L.R. (4th) 641 at 649.
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Mirroring this approach by the supreme courts of North 
America, the European Court acknowledged in the Tyrer 
case that the Convention is to be interpreted as a 
"living instrument.[and]». in light of...present day 
conditions" .85 This interpretive approach has been 
confirmed subsequently in a number of cases, including 
Marcx V .Belgium^ and Dudgeon v. United K i n g d o m .®8
It is not only the special nature of human rights 
treaties that leads the Court away from the traditional 
interpretive approach of international treaties. What is 
also a factor is that many of the terms of the Convention 
are borrowed directly from national law. Bernhardt 
states :
"Since human-rights conventions are designed to set standards for the internal 
order of States, they use notions which are familiar to and employed in 
national law. "Arrest or detention", "criminal offence", "court", "witness",
"legal assistance", "family life", "freedom of expression", "freedom of 
peaceful assembly", "freedom of association with others" (expressions which are 
all used in the European Convention on Human Rights) are notions which have no 
traditional connotation in international law; they refer to the internal legal 
order and have been coined primarily by the language used in the municipal law 
of States".89
This reliance on national legal concepts also has the 
effect of moving the Court away from the role of an 
arbitrator of an international treaty and closer to that 
commonly associated with constitutional adjudication. It 
is this question of the modern-day status of the 
Convention that finally requires examination, before 
conclusions pertinent to this thesis may be drawn.
85 Series A. 26, (1978) para.31.
8' Series A. 31, (1979).
88 Series A. 45, (1982) para.60.
89 Ibid, para's, 66-67.
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3.8 The European Convention:____Constitution orInternational Treaty.?
Gearty comments on the Convention: "It is not improbable
that the Court will emerge over time as a supreme court 
of Europe, at least so far as human rights are
concerned" .98 To support this view reference may be made
to a number of cases including Airey v.Ireland^ and
Feldbruqge v. Netherlands92 in the Airey case, the Court 
interpreted Article 6, which provides for a right to a 
fair trial, and includes a right, in certain 
circumstances, to legal aid. This decision was described
by Merrills "...as an extreme application of the 
effectiveness principle" .95 He continued:
"Since the Court has neither the authority nor the competence to act as
legislature, there is much force in Judge Vilhjalmsson's view that "at least at
this particular stage of the development of human rights" the approach favoured 
by the majority in Airey "would open up problems whose range and complexity can 
not be foreseen but which would doubtless prove to be beyond the power of the 
Convention and the institutions set up by it".94
In the Feldbrugge case, the Court was required to 
consider whether a decision relating to provision of 
social insurance fell within Article 6(1) of the
Convention. Article 6 provides, inter alia, that an
individual has a right to a fair trial in the
"determination of ....civil rights and obligations" .9® The 
minority of the Court in the decision looked to the 
object and purpose of Article 6(1) and concluded that 
there was no basis for the "judicialisation of procedures 
for allocation of public welfare benefits..."^ The
majority decided, however, that Article 6 did apply, 
considering that to exclude the application of the
98 Gearty, at 89, (1993).
94 Series B. 30, (1982) 32.
92 Series A. 99, (1986). For an analysis of this case see Warbrick, 711-714, (1989).95 MERRILLS, at 93, (1988).
94 Ibid, at 94.
95 Art.6, supra note 14.
95 Supra note 92, para.15.
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Article would be to deny to the individual a right 
crucial to individuals.
Warbrick makes the following comment regarding the 
Feldbrug decision:
"This is not merely vehement centralisation of rights but an assertion of an 
active role for judicial review. If pursued vigorously by the Court, this 
process will transform the Convention into a constitutional bill of rights 
rather than an international convention.
The majority's approach will have profound repercussions if it is sustained in 
future cases. It seems to mark a clear passage across the divide, however 
difficult it may be to define exactly, between international and constitutional 
interpretation. Even on the minorities technique, the reach of the Convention 
into national legal systems has been substantial and unanticipated".94
For some influential figures in the Council of Europe, it 
is exactly a "constitutional bill of rights" which is 
aspired to. Professor Treschel, Second Vice-President of 
the Commission, recently stated when discussing the 
question of merging the two organs of the Commission and 
Court :
"I am convinced that the merger of the Convention organs into a permanent
Court should be envisaged, if the Convention for the protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms is to continue to be shining example of the regional 
protection of human rights.
However, is this not taking the Utopian view? I think not. My reason? It lies 
in the true Utopia, which is the back drop to our Convention. What I mean is 
the Utopia of the European Confederation and its Constitutional Court seeing to 
the observance of human rights. A Court endowed with other powers and whose 
judgments would become effective immediately".9®
It is unclear at present what authority there is for this 
gradual transformation of the Court into a fully fledged 
Constitutional Court, other than the requirement in the
94 Warbrick, at 714, (1989).
Merger of the European Commission and European Court of Human Rights, (1987).
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Statute of the Council of Europe to secure the 
"maintenance" and "further realisation" of human rights.99
If it is necessary to attribute an exact description to 
the nature of the instrument the Court must now be said 
to be applying, it may be that neither "international 
treaty," nor "quasi-constitution," nor, for that matter, 
"European Constitution" will suffice. The Convention is 
perhaps more properly described, as Drzemcewski argues, 
as sul generis,^® i.e. an instrument unique in itself and 
unlike, at present, any other.
Whatever the most satisfactory description of the 
Convention, it is clear from the above survey of cases
and interpretive techniques that the Court has been
required to examine and develop rights over a wide 
spectrum of public law. Although it is correct to 
consider the Convention protection machinery as being 
subsidiary to national systems, it nevertheless has been 
required to develop an elaborate adjudicative system to 
deal with the many and varied cases which are not 
resolved satisfactorily at a domestic level.
To the variety of cases discussed above might be added 
Cossey V. United Kingdom.^ 4 concerning the right of a
transexual to official recognition of a change in sex, 
Kieldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark. 4®2 
concerning compulsory sex education in schools, and X v. 
Federal Republic of G e r m a n y , 485 concerning the sale of 
contraceptives, all of which required careful analysis of 
prevailing social attitudes towards each of these subject 
areas. Not only has the Court been required to address 
cases considered by many to be on the very fringes of
public law concepts, such as in the Feldbrugge case, but
99 Art. Kb) supra note 8,
Drzemczewski, 54, (1980). But see Muchlinski, (1985) who rejects the third order nature of the Convention,
484 Series A. 184, (1990).
482 Series B. 21, (1978) 44
485 Yearbook XIX, (1976) 277.
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it has also been required to adjudicate in cases which 
suggest that the Convention may now have significance for 
practitioners not directly concerned with public law 
issues. The commercial lawyer now has reason to consider 
the terms of the European Convention and the 
jurisprudence of the European Court. For example, in 
Lithaow V .  United K i n g d o m . 4^ the Court was required to 
consider whether the nationalisation of various ship 
building companies in the U.K. amounted to a violation of 
Protocol 1 Article 1, which protects the rights to 
peaceful enjoyment of property. This case involved an in- 
depth examination of the means of calculating 
compensation for property acquired as a result of a 
State's policy of compulsory acquisition orders. The 
Court announced its decision, having first carefully 
considered its method of interpreting the Convention in 
the light of International Law, in a judgment which ran 
to some 86 pages. From the decision in the Traktorer 
Aktiebolaq case ®^® and in Pudas v. Sweden ®^ it is clear 
that the Convention may provide a remedy to those in 
business who have been refused permission by the State to 
begin or continue trading. The Court's dynamic 
interpretation of the European Convention has, it may be 
concluded, extended its application into many areas of 
public and private law and, therefore, most lawyers, 
whatever their practising interests would be well advised 
to become familiar with the Court's jurisprudence.
3.9 The European Convention and the Status of the Individual as a Subject of International Law.
The phrase "International Law" was first used by Bentham 
in 1789.484 He considered International Law as relating to 
the mutual transactions between sovereign states 
throughout the world. It was not until after the Second
484 Series A. 98, (1986) 38,485 Series A, 159.485 D & R 40 (1985) 234.104 at 96, (Ed. BURNS & HART, 1970).
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World War that this definition was required to be revised 
to include the rights of individuals.^®
The immediate postwar expression of concern for human 
rights in the United Nations Charter has now developed as 
a result of declarations and international human rights 
treaties, to the extent that it is correct to consider 
the individual as a full subject of International Law.489 
Any acceptable definition of International Law must now 
account for this development .44® The jurisprudence of the 
Court is important because it has not only confirmed the 
individual as a legitimate subject of International Law 
but has significantly enhanced the individual’s standing 
in this regard. The first active human rights 
"enforcement" procedure at the United Nations level was 
its system of State reporting. Its purpose was to 
"monitor" State compliance with the international 
covenants, as opposed to providing individuals with the 
possibility of claiming a right as against a State at an 
international level. The importance of the Strasbourg 
adjudication procedure is that it has provided the 
individual with the machinery to challenge State 
behaviour. It has developed satisfactorily a procedure 
which allows the individual, sometimes with the 
assistance of a lawyer, but in many cases without, the 
possibility of enforcing a human right in a supra­
national court. In so doing, it has transformed the 
nature of the individual's status as a subject of 
International Law from beneficiary or passive recipient 
of rights to active claimant.
Supra Chapt. 1, pp. 33-33.
489 Janis, at (1984). See generally Komarov, (1980).
"International Law" may be defined as "The standard of conduct, at a given time for states 
and other entities subject thereto": It includes "(a) the rules of law relating to the 
functioning of international institutions or organisations, their relations with each 
other, and their relations with States and individuals; and (b) certain rules of law 
relating to individuals and non-State entities so far as the rights or duties of such 
individuals and non-State entities are the concern of the international community." 
Tre Traktorer AB, quoted from PARRY AND GRANT (1986).
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To substantiate this observation it is necessary to 
recall two points. The first, as noted above, is that the 
individual now has what may be termed "conditional 
locus standi before the Court. He or she can expect to 
appear before the Court, if the Commission or an 
interested State party so requests. Upon the coming into 
effect of the Ninth Protocol, which will permit the Court 
to grant leave to an individual to present a case before 
the Court independent of the consent of Commission or the 
interested State party, it seems that even this
limitation of the individual’s standing will be removed.
Until such time, it must be remembered that the
interested State party itself does not have the right to 
deny an individual access to the Court. It has the 
competence to ask that a case be forwarded to the Court, 
but not the ability to prevent it, if the Commission so 
decides. The standing of the individual and States is not 
as unevenly balanced as it may at first appear.
The second point in support of the contention that the 
jurisprudence of the Commission and Court has 
strengthened the standing of the individual in
International Law concerns the volume of case law. The
Commission has now dealt with over 20,000 cases^ ^^  since 
December 1990 the Court has considered some 189 cases,
and found a violation in 130 of them. From these 
statistics, it is clear that, as far as member States of 
the Council of Europe are concerned, the major actor in 
bringing actions before an international tribunal in the 
form of the European Court is not other States, but the 
individual. The significance of these figures can be
fully appreciated when they are compared to the
statistics of the International Court of Justice, which 
does not recognize individuals as competent to petition
444 Whitfield, at 40, (1988).
442 The Council of Europe and Human Rights, 5, (1993).
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the C o u r t . 413 first case entered in the General List of
the Court was submitted on 22 May 1 9 4 7 .444 Between then and 
31 July 1991 the Court has had to deal with a total of 86 
cases, i.e, 66 contentious cases and 20 advisory cases. 
In those cases it gave 52 judgments and 21 advisory 
opinions.445 it is clear that this is a insignificant 
number when compared with the many complaints lodged by 
individuals in Strasbourg. There are clearly few A small 
number in comparison to the many complaints lodged by 
individuals against States in the Council of Europe. 
These figures are themselves reinforced when placed 
alongside others involving individual applications before 
international tribunals. In European Community law, 
during the period 1953 to December 1989 there have been 
1,997 preliminary rulings and a total of 4,656 direct 
actions.445 As of August 1990 there have been 418 placed 
before the Human Rights Committee for consideration with 
regard to the the Optional Protocol.444
Finally, when considering the effect of international 
procedures in respect of the position of the individual, 
it is worth recalling the comments of Merills concerning 
the European Convention. He states:
"When governments know that policies must be justified in an international 
forum an additional element enters their decision-making. Thus, with the 
State's obligations to the individual as a constant background to official 
deliberations, the impact of a treaty such as the European Convention is likely 
to be out of all proportion to the number of cases in which conduct is actually
challenged".44®
443 Art. 34(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice states: "Only States may be
parties in cases before the Court", UKTS 67 (1945). The Statute of the Court is
annexed to the Charter of the United Nations and is published by the Court in thevolume I.C.J. Acts and Documents No. 5, pp. 60-89.
444 Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Albania) I.C.J. Reports (1949), p. 4.
445 l.C.J.Y.B. 3 (1990-1991).
This includes actions brought by B.C. officials. Synopsis of the Work of the Court of
Justice of the European Communities in 1988 and 1989, at 20, (1990). See generally
Harding, (1992).
444 Doc. A/44/40, pr.614, as updated.
44® MERILLS, at 1, (1988).
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Conclusion
From the above survey of the development of the European 
Convention, three conclusions are pertinent to this 
thesis.
The first is that, although the Convention is properly 
described as a mechanism subsidiary to national laws and 
constitutions for the enforcement of human rights, it is 
clear that the variety and complexity of applications to 
the Strasbourg organs necessitate a thorough and 
comprehensive system of dispute resolution. The
complexity and diversity of legal concepts illustrated by 
the cases of Tyrer, The Sunday Times, Cossey, and 
Feldbrugge, indicate that a comprehensive understanding 
of each substantive article of the Convention is a pre­
requisite for its satisfactory application.
Secondly, it is equally clear that the European Court's 
dynamic interpretation of the Convention has transformed 
the nature of many of the substantive rights documented 
in the treaty. Article 6, created to safeguard the right 
to a fair trial, has now been interpreted to include the 
right to institute proceedings to review an individual's 
right to social security benefits.44® Article 8, intended 
to protect, inter alia, the right to privacy, now has 
implications for the State's treatment of homosexuals,42® 
in addition to many other concepts, such as access to 
children424 and care records, 422 more readily identified 
with concepts relating specifically to family law. 
Similarly the application and, it might also be said, the 
very raison d ’etre of Article 3 has changed. Created as a 
provision to outlaw torture, with the human rights abuses 
committed in Nazi Germany and occupied territories still 
very much in mind, the Article has developed to the point 
where it may be considered to amount to a standard
44® Supra note 92.42® Supra note 88.
424 Hendriks case, D & R 30 (1982), p. 5.
422 Gaskin v. United Kingdom. Series A. 160, (1989).
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against which all forms of treatment or punishment to 
which the individual may be subjected can be compared. 
The Tyrer case marked its application to judicial 
corporal punishment, the Campbell case to school 
discipline, and the Soering case to extradition, the 
death penalty and imprisonment. This transformation of 
the Article remains the most compelling argument in 
favour of the development of a satisfactory understanding 
and application of the norm prohibiting torture and ill- 
treatment .
Finally, this examination of the development of the 
Court's jurisprudence indicates that the Court's 
interpretation of the Convention has advanced the status 
of the individual to a degree where it is advisable, and 
perhaps obligatory, to reappraise the relationship 
between the individual and a State in respect to the 
international law of human rights. This relationship was 
characterized initially by concentrating upon what might 
be considered to amount to a reasonable concession on the 
part of the State in favour of greater rights for the 
individual. State sovereignty was still in the foreground 
of this legal relationship. The effect of the 
jurisprudence of the Court is that this approach must be 
considered to be in need of review. The European Court's 
pursuit of the effective enforcement of human rights has 
advanced the status of the individual as a subject of 
International Law to the stage where it is more accurate 
to emphasise the importance of the sovereignty, not of 
the State, but the rights of the individual. It is this 
observation that is important for later in this thesis, 
when an acceptable definition of torture and ill- 
treatment is proposed.
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4. TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE COMPONENT PARTS OFARTICLE 3 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION.
Introduction to Chapter
Article 3 is one of only a few substantive rights^ to the 
European Convention from which it is not possible to
derogate even in time of war or public emergency.2 it is 
the only article which does not accommodate 
qualifications or exceptions, and as such, must be
regarded as one of the most important rights documented 
in the European Convention.® It may appear anomalous 
therefore, that it remains the shortest article in the 
Convention, providing a freedom from torture and inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment, but no accompanying 
definition of these phrases, or examples of the types of 
conduct likely to be prohibited by them.
As noted in Chapter 1,4 this latter omission may be
explained by reference to the fact that the drafters of 
the provision were concerned that, to provide examples of 
conduct prohibited by the article, would be to imply that 
any practice not listed would be outwith the scope of the 
article and consequently permissible. This would not 
serve to deter the torturer, but to encourage her/his 
ingenuity to invent a form of treatment equally as 
painful and repugnant as any listed, but incapable of
Derogations are permissible to all rights in Part 1 of the Convention except Art. 2 (the right 
to life), Art. 3, Art. 4 (para.l) (freedom from slavery or servitude), and Art. 7 (non 
retrospective legislation), European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov, 1950, UKTS 71 (1953).
Article 15(1) states: "In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the 
nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations 
under the Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its obligations under International Law", ibid.
5 For discussion as to whether there may be said to be a "hierarchy of rights" see Meron, 
(1985). Warbrick, (1989), notes of the Convention: "There is a growing practice of 
regarding some rights as more important than others, so that the burden on the State 
to justify its interference is correspondingly higher". He quotes Abdulaziz v United 
Kingdom, (Series A. 94, para. 78) (1985), requiring "very weighty reasons" to justify 
discrimination on grounds of sex; Dudgeon v United Kingdom, (Series A. 45, para. 52) 
(1981), requiring "particularly serious reasons" for interference with sexual 
activities, "a most intimate aspect of private life", at 720,4 Supra Chapt. 1, pp. 38-43.
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being classed within any of the categories contained in 
the provision. The former omission relating to the 
definition of the terms accommodated in the provision can 
be understood when it is recalled that there was
considerable difficulty both at the United Nations and 
the Council of Europe in reaching a consensus as to what 
treatment or punishment should be the focus of the
article.5 Not wishing to jeopardize the future of the
prohibition, or the instruments themselves, the drafters 
effectively passed on this complex task to others, a 
possibility not available to the European Commission and 
the European Court of Human Rights which were the first 
tribunals required to give effect to the prohibition.
This Chapter seeks to analyze the nature of the
prohibition which was passed to the European Commission 
and Court. It suggests that Article 3, although simple in 
form, is nevertheless highly complex and requires to be 
examined in a number of stages. It is argued that the 
prohibition is properly considered as having three 
component parts. They are: applicability; qualification;
and compatibility. The Chapter concludes that the failure 
to recognize these principal elements, and to develop a 
satisfactory understanding of each, has resulted in 
confusion and an unsatisfactory application of the 
prohibition of torture and ill-treatment.
4.1 Towards An Acceptable Dissection of Article 3.
The article, although brief, is nevertheless extensive in 
its application. It is for this reason that it is better 
discussed in sections, facilitating a proper 
understanding of the complexities of the prohibition. The 
Commission and Court have chosen to discuss Article 3 by 
considering "torture" and then by assessing the 
categories of "inhuman" and "degrading" treatment or 
punishment. This approach began in the Greek case® and has
5 Id.
5 Yearbook XII, 186, (1969).
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been followed subsequently without exception. It is 
perhaps because of this that scholars of the subject have 
also chosen to discuss the prohibition in a similar 
fashion,4
A study of Article 3 jurisprudence suggests that this 
approach does not promote clarity and understanding. This 
is because it operates from the assumption that the
function of the Commission and Court relating to Article
3 is to outlaw certain practices considered to be 
degrading, inhuman or tortuous. This is one of its tasks. 
But it does not take full cognizance of their role which 
is considerably mote complex. This is so for a number of 
reasons.
First, as with any public right, it needs to be
determined as against whom the prohibition may be
enforced. The individual can expect protection from acts 
of the State, but it must also be resolved as to whether 
he or she can expect protection from the acts of other 
individuals, and if so, to what extent.® The first 
question to be resolved by the Commission, therefore, is 
whether the protection of Article 3 is available to the 
particular applicant.
The second difficulty to which the Commission must 
address itself is the type of conduct it may be called 
upon to review for compatibility with Article 3. The 
phrase, in accommodating the word "treatment" as well as 
punishment, is potentially all-encompassing. It would 
seem therefore, that it is available to the individual 
following a sentence of the court, but also during 
her/his pre-trial or even pre-charge encounters with the 
authorities. More importantly, and this is the area which 
introduces considerable complications into the operation 
of the prohibition, the word "treatment" also means that
4 See for example Doswald-Beck, (1978); Spjut, (1979); Duffy, (1983); Sudre, (1984); RODLEY, at71-95, (1987); VAN DIJK S VAN HOOF, at 227, (1990).® See generally for a discussion of state and individual responsibility for acts of tortureRODLEY, Chapt.8, (1987) (Ed. LUTZ, HANNUM, BIRKE, 1989).
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the provision is available to test not only State conduct 
but also other conduct which may be unconnected with the 
State such as for example, the activities of private
medical personnel and their treatment of patients. There 
appears no valid reason why, subject to the 
considerations noted above, Article 3 should not be 
applicable to the individual while sat in the dentist's 
chair or lain on the surgeon's table, for this too is 
"treatment" in the common sense of the word which is
frequently, but not necessarily always, for the benefit
of the patient.
Commendable though this potentially unlimited protection 
may be, it introduces a considerable difficulty into the 
application of Article 3. The clause is not a provision
outlawing all treatment of a certain severity. As Sir 
Gerald Fitzmaurice correctly observes:
"..if Article 3 is interpreted literally, any infliction of pain severe enough 
in degree to amount to torture would involve a breach of that provision 
whatever the circumstances in which it had occurred - for instance, the case of 
an army surgeon who amputates a leg on the battlefield under emergency 
conditions and without anesthetic. In all such cases...the "victim" is, 
according to the ipissima verba of Article 3 "subjected to torture" which the 
Article states that "No one may be"-ever, even if in certain instances, or up 
to a point, the subjection is voluntarily accepted".®
Article 3, it may be observed, prohibits only that
conduct of a certain severity which may be considered as 
falling into one or more of the terms provided. It 
follows, therefore, that any operation of the prohibition 
must accommodate a mechanism which selects from this 
unlimited source of conduct, treatment or punishment 
which leads to a particular degree of suffering to be 
considered degrading, inhuman or tortuous. The task of 
the tribunal seeking to apply Article 3 is to identify
the element or elements which qualify the conduct as
being within one or more of these categories.
® Separate Opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice, Tyrer v. U.K Series A. 26, 23-24, (1978).
B. PHILLIPS, 1994 CHAPTER FOUR 12 0
This problem of "qualification", it can be seen, is a 
fundamental component of the prohibition. It is one, 
however, which the Commission and Court have failed to 
acknowledge expressly and, indeed, the importance of 
determining a satisfactory "qualifier" appears not to 
have been fully considered. The reasons for this 
oversight will be examined later in this Chapter,4®
It is submitted that the third issue which the Commission 
and Court must address when considering Article 3 is the 
issue of justification. It must be resolved whether, even 
though the conduct qualifies into one or more of the 
categories accommodated in the article, it may still be 
said not to violate the provision because the conduct is 
justifiable for a particular reason. Although dismissed 
by the drafters of the provision^ as having a rightful 
place in the anti-torture and ill-treatment equation, it 
is submitted that it is no longer possible to reject 
summarily the concept of justification for conduct which 
would otherwise be declared contrary to Article 3. This 
is because in 1948, when the prohibition was conceived, 
the drafters had in the forefront of their minds the most 
severe forms of suffering comparable to that which took 
place in Nazi Germany and occupied territories.42 To date. 
Article 3 has undergone a complete metamorphosis, being 
utilized to test the detention of mentally ill patients,4® 
the use of corporal punishment in schools^ and racial 
discrimination.45 These types of conduct are far removed 
from the classic conceptions of torture that, as long ago
4® Infra, pp. 130-137.
44 Supra, Chapt. 1, at pp. 47-50.
42 Cocks recalled "the nazis stamping with their jackboots upon the faces of women and Jews.
Then more ingenious forms of torture were applied. People had their toenails or their 
finger torn out, or they had their teeth drilled with holes and filled with acid". 
Collected Edition of the Travaux Préparatoire, vol II, Council of Europe, at 38,(1975).
No. 7994/77, Kotalla v. the Netherlands. Dec.6.5.78, D & R 14,238; B v. United Kingdom, Comm.
Report 7.10.81, D & R 32, 5.
Campbell & Cosans Series A. 48, (1982); Warwick v United Kingdom, Res. DH (89) 5 of 2 March 
1989; Costello United Kingdom, Series A. 247-C, (1992) and ¥ v United Kingdom, Series A. 247-A, (1992).
45 The East African Asians Case, 3 E.H.R.R.76.
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as Beccaria in the 18th Century, were rejected as being 
unjustifiable .45 Although it remains an important function 
of Article 3 to prohibit torture, it is perhaps 
misleading to describe the article today as an anti­
torture and ill-treatment provision. It is contended that 
it is more properly considered as amounting to a standard 
against which all forms of conduct, leading to suffering 
of a certain severity, can be tested. It becomes 
necessary, therefore, to reappraise the concept of 
justification to determine whether it must now be 
considered to have a proper place in this assessment 
process. This third component part of the prohibition for 
the purposes of this research will be referred to as the 
"compatibility" stage. This is because it will be asked 
whether, despite the fact that a given form of conduct 
may be considered as tantamount to torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, it may still be said 
to be compatible with the torture and ill-treatment 
prohibition because it is justifiable on certain, albeit 
restricted, grounds.
The failure to identify the breakdown of the provision as 
described above has, it is submitted, on occasion caused 
considerable confusion. An inspection of the 
jurisprudence of the European Commission and Court 
provides examples of inconsistent statements and 
decisions. Much of this, has been caused by an 
inconsistent use of the definition of each term employed 
in Article 3, or what, for the purposes of this research, 
is more properly called the "qualification" 
consideration. Difficulty has also arisen because the 
Commission and the Court have confused the two stages of 
"qualification" and "compatibility". For example, in the 
Northern Ireland case44 the Court stated that there can be 
no justification for any conduct amounting to degrading, 
inhuman or tortuous treatment. However in relation to the
45 Beccaria, An Essay on Crimes and Punishment, RUTHEN, at 9, (1978). 
Ireland v. United Kingdom. 2 E.H.R.R, 25, (1978).
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same case the then President of the Commission, Sir James 
Fawcett, stated:
"What ill-treatment constitutes inhuman treatment or torture will depend upon 
its character and the circumstances in which it it is inflicted; the notion of 
inhuman treatment or torture is not then absolute".^®
He continued:
"Severe physical suffering, deliberately imposed by medical and particularly 
surgical treatment, may be justifiable. In other words, there are situations in 
which severe ill treatment^^ is justifiable in the individual interest or the 
public interest".20
Fawcett, it is submitted, is right to state that the 
treatment mentioned does not violate Article 3. But it is 
acceptable practice, not because it is tortuous treatment 
which is justifiable, but because it is conduct that does 
not qualify in the first instance as being tortuous, or 
for that matter inhuman or degrading. Fawcett's remarks 
illustrate the confusion between the question relating to 
what conduct qualifies as belonging within one or more of 
the categories provided in Article 3, and which of these, 
if any, may still be considered compatible with the 
prohibition. The question of "justification" is properly 
addressed in determining compatibility with Article 3 of 
conduct considered to be tortuous, inhuman or degrading. 
Whether it qualifies as that sort of conduct in the first 
place is an altogether different matter, in which, the 
concept of justification has no rightful place. To permit 
"justification" to enter the definition of torture and 
ill-treatment would be to confuse two distinct elements 
of the prohibition. Allow the two to merge and the 
definition becomes complicated at an early stage. 
Moreover, if it is necessary to compromise the freedom 
protected by Article 3, it is submitted that it is more
I® Report of the Commission, Series B.23/I, 495, (1976-1978).
The Commission used the words ill treatment to cover the remainder of the provision that does not apply to torture.
2** FAWCETT, at 496, (1987).
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sensible to do this by adopting a system which 
acknowledges the existence of the freedom in every 
situation, while accepting that there are a limited 
number of situations in which it may be restricted. This 
is preferable to an application of the prohibition of 
torture and ill-treatment which incorporates 
"justification" into the definition of Article 3 and 
permits certain suffering by denying that the freedom, on 
occasion, exists at all. At first sight the difference 
between the two approaches may not be considered 
significant, particularly where the same "justification" 
issues are in operation. It is contended that the first 
is to be preferred, however, because it makes it clear 
when the freedom is being compromised and at what point 
the need for close scrutiny of conduct is at its highest.
To conclude, it is submitted that Article 3 is better 
discussed by examining, first, the "applicability" of the 
provision; second, the question of "qualification" and 
third, the issue of "compatibility".
4.1.1 The Question of "Applicability" of Article 3.
In determining the applicability of Article 3, two
questions must be addressed. First, it must be resolved 
as to what type of conduct the prohibition applies. 
Secondly, it must be determined whether Article 3 may be 
invoked as against every type of perpetrator.
The first question is resolved without difficulty.
Article 3 provides that the provision is to apply to both 
punishment and treatment leading to suffering of a
certain severity. It follows, therefore, that the 
prohibition is applicable to all penalties imposed 
following an offence at law 21 in addition to treatment,2% a
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th Ed. 1990) defines "punishment" as "Any fine, penalty, or 
confinement inflicted upon a person by the authority of the law and the judgment and 
sentence of a court, for some crime or offence committed by him, or for his omission of a duty enjoined by law. A deprivation of property or some right".
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noun sufficiently wide to cover every other sort of 
conduct to which a person may be subjected leading to 
suffering of a certain severity.23
This contrasts with the anti-torture and ill-treatment 
provision in the United States Constitution which is 
restricted to consideration of "punishments"2^ which may 
be said to violate the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution which prohibits "cruel and unusual" 
punishment and so relates only to treatment following 
sentence of a court.25 it also contrasts with the U.N. 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment,2G which, although 
choosing to repeat the phrase adopted by the Council of 
Europe, also adds that torture "does not include pain or 
suffering arising from, inherent in or incidental to, 
lawful sanctions to the extent consistent with the 
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners" .22 
In so providing, the U.N. Torture Convention is prevented 
from applying to conduct which may lead to particularly 
severe suffering simply because it is coloured by lawful 
sanction.28 As such, it must be doubted whether the treaty 
has any application to, for example, judicial capital 
punishment. Unlike Article 3 to the Convention, it is 
unlikely that it may develop into a vehicle for 
challenging the very efficacy of lawful penal measures.^
The second question concerning applicability of the 
Article 3 relates to the status of the perpetrator. Again 
a comparison with the United Nations’ instruments is
"Treatment" is: 1. the process or manner of dealing with a thing; 2. something done in order 
to relieve or cure an illness or abnormality", OXFORD DICTIONARY, (3rd Ed. 1988).
23 This question of severity of suffering is discussed in Chapt. 5, at pp. 153-168.
2^  See supra Chapt, 1, at note 31.
2^  Ingraham v. Wriaht. 525 F.2d 909, 915 (5th Cir, 1976).
25 G.A.Res,A/Res/39/46 (1984), UKTS 107. 
les.663(c), 24 U.N.ESCOR Suf 1 it must be opened to crit 
DANELIUS, at 46-47, (1988)
22 E.S.C.Res. pp. (No.l) at 11, U.N. Doc.E/3048 (1957).
As such icism in containing a considerable loophole. See
Cases such as Tyrer v. U.K. for example, demonstrate clearly that Article 3 has become, inter 
alia, a standard against which lawful penal measures may be tested. See infra Chapt. 6 at pp. 209-216.
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useful. Article 1 of the U.N. Torture Convention provides 
that the suffering must be:
"inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a
public official or other person acting in an official capacity". 30
During the drafting of the U.N. Torture Convention there 
was some debate as to whether the prohibition of torture 
should be limited to acts committed by public officials.31 
During a meeting of a working group concerned with the 
drafting of the instrument in 1979, a proposal was made 
to include acts of private individuals within the 
definition of torture. This proposal was rejected by the 
working group because its members considered that 
domestic legislation would adequately deal with acts of 
private individuals .32 it was pointed out that the purpose 
of the Convention was to provide protection against acts 
committed by the State.33 However, the individual could 
also expect the State to protect her/him from the 
activities of an individual acting in her/his own 
capacity, by having in place criminal and civil laws to 
prevent and discourage such practices. In the absence of 
such legislation or effective enforcement of it. Article 
l31 of the Convention becomes effective.35
In determining whether a similar position is reflected in 
Article 3 of the European Convention, it is noted that
3® Supra note 26.
31 See generally BURGERS & DANELIUS, at 45, (1988).
Commission on Human Rights: Report on the Thirty-Fifth 
Session,U.N.ESCOR,Supp.(No,6),U.N.Doc.E/CN.4/L,1470 (1979).33 Id.
Article 1 of the Convention states: The High Contracting Parties shall secure within their 
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section 1 of this Convention. Id, See also Botterud, at 73, (1984).
But cf here Art. 3 of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture which 
provides: "The following shall be held guilty of the crime of torture: 
a. A public servant or employee who acting in that capacity orders, instigates or induces 
the use of torture, or who directly commits it or who, being able to prevent it, fails to do so.
b. A person who at the instigation of a public servant or employee mentioned in 
subparagraph (a) orders, instigates or induces the use of torture, directly commits it 
or is an accomplice thereto". OAS Treaty Series No.67, OEA/Ser.A/42 (SEPF). See 
generally BUERGENTHAL, NORRIS, SHELTON, (1990).
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this provision contains no equivalent restriction 
relating to the status of the perpetrator. However, the 
immediate conclusion is not necessarily that the 
application of Article 3 of the European Convention is 
wider than that provided at the United Nations. This is 
so for a number of reasons.
First, Articles 24 and 25 of the Convention permit 
individuals to petition the European Commission alleging 
a violation of the Convention by States parties to the 
Convention and not other i n d i v i d u a l s.38 if the Convention 
is to provide rights to the individual as against, not 
the State, but another individual, then these rights must 
still be sought in a tri-partite fashion, involving the 
relationship between the State and the two individual 
parties.
Secondly, in the Greek case32 the Commission stated:
"Acts prohibited by Art 3—  will engage the responsibility of a Contracting
State o n l y  i f  t h e y  a r e  c o m m i t t e d  b y  p e r s o n s
e x e r c i s i n g  p u b l i c  a u t h o r i t y " ? ^
Such a comment would appear to exclude the possible 
application of the prohibition to the individual acting 
completely in her/his own capacity. However, Duffy
contends that this statement should be given little 
a t t e n t i o n . 39 His skepticism of the early Commission 
comment, it is submitted, is justified because it is 
clear from later decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights that the State is under an obligation to regulate 
relations between individuals.
This issue of State liability for regulating the
behaviour of individuals to each other is one that is 
beginning to receive some judicial and academic
35 See Appl.6956/75, X .v United Kingdom. D & R 8 (1978), 103; VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, at 77, (IMO).
Yearbook XII, 186, (1969).
38 Id, emphasis added.
39 Duffy, at 324, (1983).
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commentary at the level of the European Convention and it 
is to this subject that it is necessary briefly to turn.
4.1.1.2 State Responsibility for the Conduct ofIndividuals.
Although there is no indication from the t r a v a u x
p r é p a r a t o i r e s  that rights and freedoms in the Convention 
were intended to apply as between individuals it is 
submitted that Van Dijk is right to observe:
"nothing in the Convention prevents the States from conferring D r i t t w i r k u n g ' ^ ®  
upon the fundamental rights and freedoms within their national legal systems in 
so far as they lend themselves to it"/^
Of course, the individual is likely to avoid the
considerable complexity and uncertainty involved in the 
process of basing an application on the concept of 
liability of the State for the actions of an individual
if it can be established that her/his rights have been
violated by the State directly. "State liability" has
been interpreted widely. In Cosans v. United Kingdom^ the 
Commission accepted that the State was responsible for 
the actions of the local education authorities. In the 
so-called "closed shop cases" the Commission decided that 
British Rail, being a public industry, came under the
responsibility of the United Kingdom, and that the
applications were admissible r a t i o n e  p e r s o n a e .
8^ This is a reference to the theory from German law of the application of rights to legal 
relations between individuals. "Drittwirkung is more accurately Drittwirkung der 
Grundrechte or the third party effect of fundamental rights/"effets quant aux tiers 
des droits fondamentaux", CLAPHAM, note 8, at 90, (1993).
VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, at 16, (1989). Van Dijk distinguishes two interpretations of the 
concept. The first is that provisions of the Convention a p p l y  in mutual legal 
relations between private individuals, and not only in legal relations between an 
individual and the public authorities. According to the second view, Drittwirkung of 
human rights only applies when the individuals can e n f o r c e  his rights against another individual, id, at 15.
See Application No. 7743/76, Cosans v United Kingdom, D & R 12, 140 (149).
Application No. 7601/76, Young and James v United Kingdom. Yearbook XX (1977), p. 520, (560- 
562) and Application No. 7806/77, Webster v United Kingdom. D & R 12 (1978), p. 168, (173-175).
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In the absence of a direct connection between the State 
and the offending conduct, however, attributing state 
liability for human rights violations becomes more 
problematic. The individual may be assisted by seeking to 
establish that there was in existence what has become 
known as an "administrative practice",In the Greek case 
this was said to exist when two elements could be shown. 
The first it considered to be :
"an accumulation of identical or analogous breaches which are sufficiently 
numerous and interconnected to amount not merely to isolated incidents or 
exceptions but to a pattern or s y s t e m " . 5^
The second element, that of official tolerance, was 
explained as follows:
"though acts of torture or ill-treatment are plainly illegal, they are 
tolerated in the sense that the superiors of those immediately responsible, 
though cognizant of such acts, take no action to punish them or to prevent 
their repetition; or that a higher authority, in face of numerous allegations, 
manifests indifference by refusing any adequate investigation of their truth or 
falsity, or that in judicial proceedings a fair hearing of such complaints is
denied".45
However, it is clear from the recent decisions of X and Y 
V. The Netherlands^ and Plattform Arzte fur das Leben^ 
that it is not necessary for the indivdual to go as far 
as establishing official tolerance before the issue of 
State liability will arise. The Court accepted in these 
decisions that State liability will arise in cases where 
positive measures are required to protect the rights of 
one individual from the activities of another. In respect 
of Article 11 of the Convention the Court stated: "Like
Article 8, Article 11 sometimes requires positive
The Commission has accepted that the local remedies rule need not be applied in those cases 
were an "administrative practice" can be shown. It is in this respect that the concept is most often discussed.
45 Application No. 176/56, Greece v United Kingdom. Yearbook II (1958-59), p. 182, (1964).
45 Report of 5 November 1969, Greek case, Yearbook XII (1969), p. 196.
42 Series A. 91, (1985).
48 Series A. 139, (1988).
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measures to be taken, even in the sphere of relations 
between individuals, if need be".49
It is submitted that the above developments can be 
summarised in the following manner. Although the 
Convention is essentially a treaty concerned with the 
relationship between the State and individuals, it can be 
seen that this also includes the duty on the State to 
prevent interference with an individual’s rights by a 
private person. Therefore, with regard to Article 3 of 
the Convention, it may be concluded that the State is 
obliged to ensure that the individual is adequately 
protected from all forms of "torture" or "inhuman" or 
"degrading" conduct to which he or she may be subjected 
even if the person responsible for the conduct is acting 
entirely in her or his private capacity. This it must do 
by having in place legislation prohibiting conduct likely 
to amount to a violation of Article 3 and the means by 
which this legislation may be effectively enforced. In 
addition to this duty, the State must not itself directly 
participate in conduct that violates Article 3. It may be 
concluded, therefore, that the individual is protected 
under Article 3 from all conduct of a certain severity, 
whether its source is the State, an agent of the State or 
a private individual. Article 3, it can be seen, 
accommodates a potentially unlimited prohibition of 
torture and ill-treatment.
This unlimited application of the prohibition is to be 
commended. Torture, traditionally considered to be the 
domain of the agent appointed by the State to extract 
evidence or confessions, must now be attributed a more 
up-to-date meaning. It must be correct that the modern 
understanding of the prohibition not only includes the 
medieval torturer, but does not exclude from 
consideration punishments which may follow from court 
decisions and are in full compliance with the remaining
49 Id, para.32,
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terms of the Convention, such as corporal or capital 
punishment. The conduct of the surgeon likewise must not 
be excluded from the application of the prohibition, for 
although the medical practitioner normally acts with the 
complete interests of the patient in mind, the latter 
must not be denied the protection of Article 3 in the 
unlikely situation that the treatment is not intended 
primarily for her/his benefit. The provision prohibiting 
torture and ill-treatment in the International Civil and 
Political Covenant provides expressly for this event in 
stating:
"In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical
or scientific experimentation".58
Moreover, the State must not be allowed the possibility 
of disclaiming the application of the prohibition by
contending that the conduct was carried out by a person
belonging to a category outwith the scope of Article 3. 
It follows that the provision is not only relevant to the
servant of the State briefed to secure a confession from
an individual, but must be available to the person who 
performs a compulsory abortion^ and the doctor who 
performs non-consensual sterilization.52
This unlimited scope of the Article introduces a 
considerable difficulty. This is to distinguish between 
those acts of a certain severity that must be condemned 
as amounting to torture or ill-treatment, and those 
(which may possibly result in an equivalent amount of 
pain and suffering) which must not. It is to this 
difficult question of "qualification" of conduct that it 
is now necessary to turn.
58 Article 7, UKTS 6 (1977).
5J See infra Chapt.5 at p. 190.
52 For a discussion of the same see Kennedy, at 81, (Ed BLACKBURN S TAYLOR, 1991).
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4.1.2 The Question of "Qualification” of Conduct for the Purposes of Article 3.
The European Convention was adopted in 19 and came
into force in 1953.54 it was not until 15 years later in 
the Greek case55 that the Commission first attempted to
define the terms included in Article 3, and in so doing
determine which factor, or factors, would qualify conduct 
as belonging within one or more of the three categories 
mentioned in the provision.
The case involved an inter-state application^ against 
Greece by the governments of Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Norway and Sweden alleging violations of a number of the 
substantive rights guaranteed in Part I to the
Convention. The Commission embarked on an exhaustive 
inquiry into the violations alleged, including on-site 
investigations, culminating in an extensive report of 
almost 700 pages concluding that the government of Greece 
had been responsible for denying its citizens a number of 
fundamental rights protected by the Convention.^
Often referred to as a useful illustration of the 
operation and effect of the inter-state procedure,5® the 
case represents the starting point for those seeking to 
determine a definition of the terms contained in Article 
3.
At the time of the Greek case, Greece had not recognized 
the competence of the European Court under Article 46 of 
the Convention. It fell to the Commission to attempt to 
give flesh to the bare-boned terms of Article 3.
53 See Chapt. 3, pp. 87-89. 
Yearbook, XII, 186, (1969).
55 Article 24 of the Convention. For information on the 18 cases that have been taken to date
under this Article see "The European Commission of Human Rights: Organization,
Procedure and Activities". Information Note by the Secretary to the EuropeanCommission of Human Rights, Council of Europe, at p. 5.52 Supra note 55.
5® Art. 24 provides: "Any High Contracting Party may refer to the Commission, through the
Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, any alleged breach of the provisions of 
the Convention by another High Contracting Party", supra note 1.
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The Commission began by elaborating on the terms of 
Article 3 and defining them in relation to each other. 
Torture, the Commission observed, was in every case also 
to be considered inhuman treatment; and all conduct that 
could be said to be labelled inhuman must also be 
considered d e g r a d i n g .
The Commission then defined each term in isolation. 
Degrading treatment, it stated, occurs if conduct:
"grossly humiliates [an individual] before others or drives him to act against 
his will or conscience".5®
Inhuman treatment, the Commission stated, is conduct 
which :
"deliberately causes severe suffering, mental or physical which, in the 
particular situation is unjustifiable".53-
Torture, the Commission concluded, is:
"inhuman treatment or punishment which has a purpose, such as the obtaining of 
information or confessions, or the infliction of punishment, and...is generally 
an aggravated form of inhuman treatment".52
The definition of conduct said to amount to inhuman 
treatment proved troublesome in incorporating the concept 
of justification. The understanding of the article, 
following comments made by the drafters to the 
Convention,53 was that there was no justification for any 
treatment contrary to the provision. It was also 
considered unsatisfactory because, as torture had been 
defined in relation to inhuman treatment, it followed by 
inference that "justification" had also been incorporated 
into the definition of torture. This apparent judicial
59 Yearbook XII, at 186, (1969).
Id. In a more recent case it was said to amount to measures which "constitute an insult to 
the applicant's human dignity". Application No. 8930/80, X, Y and C v. Belgium 
(unpublished) quoted from VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, at 228, (1990).53 Supra note 59.52 Id.
53 See supra Chapt. 1, at pp. 48-50.
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faux pas was rectified in the Northern Ireland case.^  
Here the Commission stated in unambiguous terms:
"there can never be under the European Convention or under international law, a
justification for acts in breach of that provision".
Incorporating this amendment into the original 
understanding of the article by the Commission, it 
follows that the principal means by which the Commission 
and the Court qualify treatment from the unlimited field 
covered by the prohibition is by looking for the 
additional element of intent to cause suffering. This is 
true for torture and inhuman treatment, but when 
considering degrading treatment the "qualifying" factor 
is not an intent to degrade, but that degrading treatment 
resulted from the conduct.
An alternative interpretation of the above definitions is 
as follows. The Commission was seeking to outlaw all 
deliberate acts which had the foreseeable result of 
severe suffering. If this is correct it is likely to 
provide protection against a greater amount of conduct 
than the definition previously discussed. It would 
prohibit all deliberate conduct which resulted in
suffering even though the suffering was not intended 
merely foreseeable. Its effect is to eliminate a causal 
link between act in question and its result. As long as 
the act was itself a deliberate one it does not matter 
that no suffering was intended as long as it was 
foreseeable. Unlike the first interpretation discussed 
above, it would provide protection against a person who 
deliberately drives a motor vehicle whilst drunk and 
causes injury to another which although not intended was 
considered by most to have been foreseeable.
"Foreseeability" would, of course, require further 
consideration to determine whether it should be
64
55 Ibid, at 390.Series B.23/I (1976-1978).
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attributed a subjective or objective application. 
Although it is correct that the Commission in the Greek 
case does not refer explicitly to "intent", it is 
submitted that the earlier interpretation stated above is 
to be preferred. This is because the Commission uses the 
term "deliberate" in relation to the suffering which 
results not the act that causes it to occur. The question 
properly posed therefore, is whether the suffering was 
deliberate i.e. intentional, not the act which brought it 
about.
In the Northern Ireland case the Court effectively added 
a further qualification. The Court stated that conduct 
"must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall 
within the scope of Article 3 " . 5®
No mention is made of this additional element^ in the 
travaux préparatoire^^ and as such it must be regarded as 
an example, albeit a minor one, of judicial creativity.^ 
Although lacking a treaty justification for its 
incorporation into the Article 3 equation, it can be 
defended in enabling the Commission to dispose of cases 
which, although relevant to Article 3, are so trivial 
that they must be considered frivolous and an abuse of 
the individual application procedure.
It may be concluded that there are three elements 
relevant to this process of conduct selection. One 
severity - is common to the other two. For both 
qualifiers of "intent" and "result" it is necessary to
55 Series A. 25 (1978), para. 162. See also Tyrer v. United Kingdom, Series A. 26, 14, (1978).
Cf European Union Law where there is a similar provision, performing a not dissimilar 
function, in vetting those cases that merit scrutiny before a supra national tribunal. 
The De Minimus Principle enables the European Court of Justice to disregard certain 
agreements that might otherwise have implications for Article 85 (relating to 
restrictive trade agreements and concerted practices between private undertakings) 
when they have little or no appreciable effect on trade. See STEINER, at 16-17, (1992).
Collected Edition of the Travaux Préparatoires, Vols I -VIII, Council of Europe, (1975).
Likewise, the origins of the De Minimus principle can be traced to the case of 5/69 Volk v. Vervaecke. (1969) ECR 295.
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show that the suffering which was intended, or resulted 
was severe. However, this is the only common ground which 
the two remaining qualifiers share. In the torture and 
inhuman section the "qualifier" is "intent" to cause 
suffering of a certain severity. For "degrading" conduct, 
what is important is not "intent" but the "result" of the 
treatment or punishment. These qualifiers, it can be 
seen, are fundamentally different in their approach. The 
former requires an inquiry into the intent of the State 
in order to ascertain the purpose of the conduct. The 
latter requires an investigation into the effect of the 
conduct. Considered together, there can be no objection 
to this dual approach. It appears advantageous to have a 
separate qualifier to catch that form of conduct which, 
for whatever reason, may not qualify for consideration in 
the other category. However, the position looks less 
satisfactory when the further observations of the
Commission are considered.
In the Greek case the Commission stated that the 
principal factor which separates the three categories 
mentioned in the Article is severity:
"It is plain that there may be treatment to which all these descriptions apply, 
for all torture must be inhuman and degrading treatment, and inhuman treatment 
also degrading".28
This was followed by the Court in the Northern Ireland 
case 21 where it stated that the distinction between
torture, inhuman and degrading treatment derives
principally from a difference in the intensity of the 
suffering inflicted.22 Scholars of the Article have 
similarly accepted that this is a correct understanding
28 Supra note 55.
23 Supra note 66.
22 Ibid, at 41, para. 167.
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of the break-down of the prohibition. 2® What they 
identified was a sliding scale of severity. For this to 
operate in practice it would require that any qualifier 
would necessarily have to remain constant. However, this 
is not so on the facts. In the very same case it
developed one qualifier for the degrading treatment 
category which was distinct from a second which related 
to the remainder of the provision. As such, one must 
question which of the two approaches must be allowed to 
stand for they contradict and can not co-exist.
It may be possible to explain this anomaly in the
following way. Severity between degrading and inhuman 
treatment is to be considered on a parity. Conduct which 
may not qualify in this first category may be admitted 
into the second. What then may foe said to exist is three 
categories. The first concerns torture which qualifies 
all treatment intended to cause suffering of a particular 
severity, usually with an added purpose. The remaining 
two categories concern a level of severity equal to one 
another, but less than that to be found in the torture 
category. What distinguishes these two categories from 
one another is not severity, but the qualifier. For 
inhuman treatment it is "intent"; for degrading treatment 
it is the "result" of the conduct which may or may not
qualify it into the section.
However, there is no evidence in the travaux préparatoire 
to the Convention that this interpretation was intended, 
and the Commission and the Court have never made comments 
which may be considered as acknowledging its existence. 
They have both preferred to consider the terms of the 
provision to be linked and separated by a descending
See for example RODLEY: "So for torture to occur, a scale of criteria has to be climbed. 
First, the behaviour must be degrading treatment; second, it must be inhuman; and 
third, it must be an aggravated form of inhuman treatment, inflicted for certain 
purposes", at 73-74, (1987); VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, "...one may conclude that the 
difference between the three kinds of treatment and punishment prohibited in Article 3 
is mainly one of gradation in the suffering inflicted", at 227, (1990).
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scale of severity. This interpretation must, therefore, 
be rejected and considered unworthy of further mention.
This point relating to the imbuilt contradiction may be 
considered an academic one, because it is necessary only 
for the individual to prove that the conduct in question 
is prohibited by one of the categories for it to be 
considered a violation of Article 3. But this observation 
fails to take into account two important factors. The 
first is that consistency is important in the application 
of the prohibition, because, although a finding of a 
violation may be the only issue important to the 
applicant, whether the conduct amounts to torture, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment can be of 
considerable significance to the State. Far greater 
political consequences may be expected to attach to a 
finding that a State is guilty of practising torture as 
opposed to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
McGoldrick, in assessing the importance of the Human 
Rights Committee in distinguishing between the terms as 
used in Article 7 of the Civil and Political Covenant 
states :
"...the distinctions between the prohibitions are crucial in terms of 
reputation, international standing, the level of reparation to be afforded, and 
propaganda value".24
Secondly, if the prohibition is to be considered as 
consisting principally of a ladder of severe treatment to 
be outlawed, it follows that any qualifier, or 
qualifiers, must operate so as to admit the most extreme 
forms of suffering into the torture category, and the 
less severe into the inhuman category, and the less 
severe still, into the degrading categories.
The unsatisfactory nature of the present position 
relating to the "qualification" of conduct can also be 
considered unacceptable when the possible classification
24 McGOLDRICK, at 371, (1991).
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of certain types of conduct is examined. In the case of 
Cyprus V . Turkey,2® a breach of Article 3 was said to have 
taken place because the State did not prevent its 
soldiers from raping women in the territory occupied by 
Turkey. In such an example it may be argued that the 
victim is subjected to suffering in every case which 
amounts to at least degrading treatment. Under the 
present understanding of the prohibition however, it may 
not be possible to classify the conduct as tortuous or 
inhuman if it could be established that the perpetrators 
acted not to inflict harm or suffering but for reasons of 
their own sexual gratification. It would appear 
increasingly anomalous and unacceptable that conduct 
involving less physical or emotional suffering may be 
capable of qualification into the inhuman and tortuous 
categories, when on a strict application of the 
qualifiers recognized in the Greek case, the suffering 
experienced by the rape victim will always be required to 
be considered in the degrading component of the 
prohibition.
To conclude the discussion of the contradictory nature of 
Article 3 on the aspect of qualification, it is necessary 
to mention the case of Abdulaziz Cabales and Balkandali 
V. United Kingdom.2® it was here that the Court considered 
that there had been no violation of Article 3 because 
there was no "intent" on the part of the State to degrade 
the applicant.22 it may be argued that this case indicates 
that the Commission was attempting, beginning with the 
Greek case, and following its statements relating to 
severity, to develop a "qualifier" based throughout on 
"intent". It may be hypothesized that the Commission 
overlooked the fact that this would be impossible with 
the definition of degrading treatment or punishment it 
developed in the same case. If the approach in Abdulaziz 
is to be followed, it may be concluded that this
25 Report of 10 July 1976, Cyprus v. Turkey. 18 Yearbook H.R.82. 
25 Series A. 94, (1985).
22 Ibid, at 42.
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qualifier of intent applies constantly throughout. 
However, until such time as definite remarks are 
forthcoming to this effect, from either the Commission or 
the Court, which resolve this inherent contradiction, it 
is necessary to proceed on the basis that it still stands 
and that there are in effect two principal qualifiers for 
Article 3.
4.1.2.1 The Inconsistency in Use of Qualifiers.
If the Commission made a poor start by building into the 
definition of Article 3 an inhereht contradiction, it has 
continued to inject confusion by applying the 
"qualifiers" of "intent" and "result" inconsistently, or 
by exchanging one for the other and on occasion by 
abandoning them altogether.
Article 3 jurisprudence is replete with examples of 
decisions which have been taken without reference to the 
qualifiers identified first in the Greek case.
For example, a strict application of the "intent" 
"qualifier" by the Court in Soaring v.United Kingdom,?® 
would have made the decision impossible.?9 This is 
because, although it could be said that the likely result 
of Soering's return to the United States would have been 
that he would have suffered inhuman and degrading 
treatment, it could not be said that the U.K Intended 
this to happen. Technically, therefore, the Court was 
right to decide the case with reference to degrading, but 
not inhuman, treatment.
Similarly, in the judgment in the Northern Ireland case®® 
the Court found that the actions of the security forces 
at Ballykinler to be "discreditable and reprehensible".
2® Soering v. United Kingdom. Series A. 161, (1989).
See generally Breitenmoser and Wilms, (1990); Lillich, (1990); Warbrick, (1990).
The European Court decided that extradition of Soering to the United States to face "the 
death row phenomenon" would violate Article 3 as it would subject the applicant to 
inhuman and degrading treatment. See supra Chapt. 6, pp. 217-222.8“ Series A. 25, (1978).
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but not in violation of Article 3 because they "were the 
result of lack of judgment rather than an intention to 
hurt or degrade".®3 This lack of intent would, it is 
argued, clearly have excluded the conduct from the 
inhuman category of the prohibition, as currently 
understood, but not the degrading component of Article 3.
Likewise, in considering degrading treatment, in 
Application No. 2291/64®? the petitioner complained of 
having to wear handcuffs in the street. It was decided 
that this treatment was not degrading as there was no 
intent to degrade present. Again a strict application of 
the test developed in the Greek case would arguably have 
produced a different outcome, as the result of the 
treatment and not its purpose would have been the 
determinative factor. Similarly, in the Tyrer case®® the 
Commission spent much time examining the motive for the 
punishment and whether its deterrent value had been 
established.®4 A strict application of the test in the 
Greek case makes this unnecessary on the way to a 
decision concerning Article 3.
4.1.2.2 The Inherent Failing of the Present Qualifiers
The use of the qualifiers of "intent" and "result" can be 
criticized for more than inconsistency. A fundamental 
objection to their use is that they qualify conduct which 
does not merit the attention of the prohibition, whilst 
disqualifying some types of conduct that properly require 
the attention of Article 3.
If torture is to be defined by reference to intent, it 
would follow that any suffering, irrespective of its 
severity, which could not be said to be intentional would 
be incapable of being classed within this category of the 
prohibition, even though a possible or even likely result
®3 Ibid, para. 181.
®2 Coll. 24, at 20.
®3 Report of the Commission, Series B. 24, (1977-1978). ®4 Ibid, at 24-25,
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of the treatment is that severe pain would be experienced 
by the recipient. The death penalty, although intended as 
a means of terminating life, and usually, in many States, 
administered in the most painless form possible,®® 
nevertheless involves, a considerable amount of mental 
distress and physical pain. To exclude conduct such as 
capital punishment from the torture category because the 
suffering was not intentional but simply incidental or 
even accidental is, it is contended, unacceptable.®®
Likewise, the individual who inflicts pain on the 
recipient not for any specific purpose but for her/his 
own gratification is again incapable of being considered 
within this category. The person who inflicts suffering 
on a detainee as punishment for the victim’s political 
beliefs, or for his own sexual gratification may not 
consider that he or she is engaging in torture. The 
recipient however, is unlikely to be able to distinguish 
between this treatment and any inflicted with a definite 
purpose and would rightly contend, subject to a 
sufficient degree of suffering being present, that the 
two types of conduct should be classed in the same 
category. There is much to be said for the observation 
made by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice in the Northern Ireland 
case :
"torture is torture whatever its object may be or even if it has none, other
than to cause pain, provided it is inflicted by force".®?
To quote Bion of many centuries ago:
The history of capital in the United Kingdom at least, demonstrates a exhaustive search for 
the most painless form of execution. The Royal Commission on Executions considered 
that death by hanging at the time of report was preferable to all other forms of 
execution although it was difficult to determine the amount of physical suffering the 
victim is likely to experience in a given case. Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment 1949-53 (Cmd. 8932).
This approach has been criticized from a number of different sources, most notably Amnesty 
International which has contended, since including concern for torture as part of its 
mandate, that capital punishment is, in every case, tortuous.Separate Opinion, para. 33, Series A. 25, (1978).
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"children may stone frogs in sport but they do not die in sport but in 
earnest".®®
Precisely the same objections concerning the definition 
of torture may be made in relation to the Commission's 
definition of "inhuman" treatment. Again, predicated on 
an "intent" inquiry it is likely to exclude all conduct 
that, although unintentional, nevertheless may have 
resulted in severe suffering. Similarly, consideration of 
capital punishment is, in most cases, theoretically 
excluded from this category and relegated for 
consideration to the degrading component of Article 3.
More disconcerting than the fact that, as illustrated 
above, the inquiry into "intent" theoretically excludes 
that sort of treatment which may be considered to be the 
proper focus of Article 3, is the fact that it also 
includes within the category of inhuman treatment conduct 
that was clearly never intended to be the focus of 
Article 3. For example, a strict intent inquiry would not 
necessarily exclude from the application of the 
prohibition the surgeon acting for the benefit of her/his 
patient and with the patient's full consent. This is 
because it may not always be possible to state that the 
surgeon did not intend suffering to occur, albeit as part 
of long-term treatment which would eventually benefit the 
patient. Some medical treatment necessarily involves 
transient pain and suffering intended simply to flush out 
ailments likely to cause greater suffering.
A close examination of the qualifier to the degrading 
component of Article 3 further illustrates that it fails 
to include or exclude conduct many would consider to 
appropriate for the satisfactory operation of Article 3.
It will be recalled that in the Greek case®® the 
Commission considered that:
Origin of quote unknown. 
Yearbook XII, 186, (1969).
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"treatment or punishment of an individual may be said to be degrading if it 
grossly humiliates him before others or drives him to act against his will or 
conscience". 88
This definition provides two possibilities for 
qualification into the degrading category. The first is 
where the individual is able to prove that he or she was 
grossly humiliated before others. The second is where it 
can be shown that the individual acted against her/his 
will or conscience. The two exist in an "either/or " 
relationship: it is necessary to establish one but not
the other. Dealing with the second possibility, it 
appears inadvisable to concentrate the definition of 
treatment on the reaction of the victim to it. As Klayman 
points out, this is regrettable because:
"Under such a definition, a victim of degrading treatment who can endure 
greater indignities and abuse will not act contrary to his will or conscience 
despite the fact that the prohibited conduct has occurred".
The first element to the qualifier is ambiguous, and is 
open to two interpretations- The first is that others 
considered the victim's treatment grossly humiliating. 
The second, and more likely, is that to be grossly 
humiliating it must come to the attention of others.
Perhaps seizing on this ambiguity, the Commission just 
two years later in the East African Asians case®? chose to 
disregard this qualifier in favour of another. This is 
similar; here they said that treatment of a person was 
degrading if it:
"lowers him in rank, position, reputation or character, whether in his own eyes 
or in the eyes of other people".8®
Any ambiguity remaining was dispelled by the combination 
of a first entirely subjective, then an objective, test.
83 Klayman, at 492, (1978).
8? Yearbook, XIII, 928, (1970).8® Ibid, at 972.
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Again the test is "either/or"; it is not necessary to 
show both that the victim felt the treatment lowered him 
in rank and that others were of the same opinion.
The comments made in Campbell and Cosans v. United 
Kingdom ®^ must be seen as questioning whether this 
approach is too wide. Here the Court observed:
"first that a threat directed to an exceptionally insensitive person may have 
no significant effect on him but nevertheless be incontrovertibly degrading; 
and conversely, an exceptionally sensitive person might be deeply affected by a 
threat that could be described as degrading only by a distortion of the 
ordinary and the unusual meaning of the word".8®
In the subsequent case of McFeeley v United Kingdom,85 the 
Commission rejected the applicant's submission that 
having to wear prison uniform was degrading. This the 
Commission determined, however deeply and sincerely the 
applicants felt to the contrary suggesting that a more 
objective approach to the meaning of "degrading" was to 
be preferred.
Following this dicta, it would appear fair to conclude 
that an entirely subjective test is not to be used and 
that much of the qualifier in the East African Asians 
case must be considered as having been revised. The exact 
content of the qualifier for the degrading component of 
Article 3 remains unclear. In a more recent case, the 
qualifier was said to be those measures that "constitute 
an insult to the applicants’ human d i g n i t y " . 8?
This question of a satisfactory qualifier for Article 3 
is examined in detail in Chapter 5. For the present, it 
is sufficient to conclude that the definitions elaborated 
in the Greek case amount to qualifiers which are 
unsatisfactory and have not been consistently applied.
84 Series A. 48, (1982).
8® Ibid, para. 30.
85 Application No.8317/78, McFeeley v. United Kingdom 3.E.H.R.R. 161, paras. 45 and 51. 
Application No. 8930/80, X. Y and C. v. Belgium (unpublished).
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4.1.3 The Question of "Compatibility" for the Purposes ofArticle 3.
Once the questions of applicability of the prohibition 
and qualification of conduct have been addressed, it 
remains to be determined whether, even though the conduct 
has qualified as belonging to one or more of the 
categories in Article 3, it may be said not to violate 
the provision. This will be possible only if it is 
accepted that the ill treatment is "justifiable" or, in 
other words, that the conduct although amounting to 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, is 
justifiable for a particular reason.
The concept of justification, it will be recalled,8® was 
originally incorporated into the definition of inhuman 
treatment, and by implication also the definition of 
torture first put forward by the Commission in the Greek 
case. This development encountered strong criticism,88 and 
it fell to the Commission ten years later in the Northern 
Ireland case ®^® to correct what many considered to be its 
earlier mistake. To understand the importance of this 
case, and the manner in which the Commission chose to 
rectify its earlier position, it is necessary to examine 
the decision at length.
The case involved an inter-state application submitted by 
the Irish government on December 16 1971 alleging that
the United Kingdom had violated Articles 3, 5, 6, 14 and
15 of the Convention. It was alleged that the special 
powers of internment introduced as a result of the 
continuing increase in civil disorder, violence, and 
terrorism had deprived many persons of their liberty and
II Supra p. 132.
See for example Klayman who stated in 1978 "By introducing the notion of justifiability into 
the definition of torture, albeit through incorporation by reference, the Commission 
has opened the way for arguments about the circumstances under which interrogation is 
used. Respondent governments will be quick to cite the gravity of the situation, the 
possibility of harm to others, and the threat to the security of the state in 
justification of their acts of torture", Klayman, at 493, (1978),
Report of the Commission Series B. 23/1, (1976-78).
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that the practices of the British Army had resulted in a 
number of detainees being subjected to ill treatment.
After an extensive inquiry into the operation and 
consequences of conduct authorized by regulations 
pursuant to the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act 
1922,383 with the collection of numerous testimonies taken 
from witnesses at venues in Ireland, London and 
Strasbourg, the Commission, unable to secure a friendly 
settlement, drew up its report on January 25 1976.
Referring to sixteen illustrative practices selected by 
the Irish government as representative of the kind of 
violations it was alleging, it was concluded that the 
combined use of the so called five techniques^? amounted 
to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment in the cases of fourteen of the detainees and 
to inhuman and degrading treatment with regard to a 
number of other individuals.
The case was referred by the Commission to the European 
Court. Before the Court, the United Kingdom did not 
dispute the findings of the Commission relating to 
Article 3 and gave an unqualified assurance that the 
"five techniques" would not in any circumstances be re­
introduced as an aid to interrogation.
The Court, in examining the cases of detainees, held in 
unidentified centres during August and October of 1971, 
decided that the practices under review aroused fear, 
anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and 
debasing the detainees and possibly breaking their 
physical or moral resistance. By sixteen votes to one the 
Court held that the five techniques constituted inhuman 
and degrading treatment. It further held by thirteen 
votes to four that the use of the practices did not 
amount to torture since they did not occasion suffering
383 For the background to the special circumstances relating to this Act see Lowry, at 261,
(1976); O'Boyle, (1977).
The five techniques consisted of hooding, subjection to noise, wall-standing, deprivation 
of sleep, food and drink.
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of the particular intensity and cruelty implied by the 
word.
With regard to its consideration of treatment meted out 
in the Autumn of 1971 in Palace Barracks the Court 
unanimously held that those held in custody had been 
subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment but not to 
torture.
Although the United Kingdom did not seek to excuse or 
condone any of the acts of ill t r e a t m e n t , it graphically 
described the situation in Northern Ireland remarking 
that there was existing at the time:
"an undisputed emergency which was a matter of life and death, of limbs and 
sight destroyed, of deliberately shattered knee caps, of bombs and flying 
glass, of burning homes and of riot".^®^
In choosing to refer explicitly to such factors it had 
effectively put in issue the question of justification.
This issue of "justification" had already been considered 
in the official British inquiry into the allegations of 
ill treatment in Northern Ireland. The inquiry, led by 
Sir Edmund Compton,concluded that although there had 
been physical ill treatment by the security forces, no 
brutality had taken place. This they considered to amount 
to :
"an inhuman or savage form of cruelty, and that cruelty implies a disposition 
to inflict suffering, coupled with indifference to, or pleasure in the victim's
pain"^106
This restrictive definition of the type of person who is 
capable of brutality allowed the Security Forces easily 
to evade accusations of misconduct. It also enabled the
Series A. 25, at 339, (1978).
Ibid, at 355.
Report of the Enquiry into Allegations Against the Security Forces of Physical Brutality in
Id, at 23.Northern Ireland Arising out of Events on the 9th August 1971, Cmnd. No. 4823, (1971).
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committee to avoid stating that although disreputable, it 
considered that the conduct of the security forces was 
justified due to the exigencies of the situation.
The hostile reaction to the Compton Report^^ led to the 
government appointing a second committee to inquire into 
the interrogation practices of Northern Ireland. This 
investigation, leading to the Parker Report,preferred 
to explain its conclusion with reference not to an 
unreasonably restrictive definition of ill treatment, but 
to the concept of "justification".
The Committee stated:
"We think that such expressions as "humane" "inhuman" "humiliating" and 
"degrading" fall to be judged by such a [dispassionate observer] in the light 
of the circumstances in which the techniques were applied, for example, that 
the operation is taking place in the course of urban guerrilla warfare in which 
completely innocent lives are at risk: that there is a degree of urgency".
Lord Gardiner, in a minority but forceful report, 
disputed the majority's acceptance of justification. He 
did so in a most graphic manner, stating:
"Under this definition, which some of our witnesses thought came from the 
Inquisition, if an interrogator believed, to his great regret, that it was 
necessary for him to cut off the fingers of a detainee one by one to get the 
required information out of him for the sole purpose of saving life, this would 
not be cruel and, because not cruel not brutal".
It was with these reports already produced that the 
Commission approached the task of correcting its earlier 
dicta on "justification" in the Greek case.
Mr. Brendan Corish, leader of the opposition Labour Party in Ireland, described the Report 
as "horrifying and hypocrital". He stated that it was unbelievable that having 
described a terrifying range of tortures in specified cases the Report should attempt 
to whitewash these practices as mere "ill-treatment". The Times, 17 Nov. 1971, p. 2, 
col (e). See also The Times, 17 Nov. 1971, p. 1(a); 18 Nov. 1971, p. 5 (c);
Report of the Committee of Privy Counsellors appointed to consider Authorized Procedures for the Interrogation of Persons Suspected of Terrorism, Cmnd.4901, (1972).
Id, at 7.
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It did so by stating in unambiguous terms as follows:
"there can never be under the European Convention or under international law, a
justification for acts in breach of that provision".
In support of this position, the Commission cited Article 
15 of the European Convention and Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, in addition to the United Nations 
Declaration against Torture.
Article 15 of the Convention allows Member States to 
derogate "in time of war or other public emergency 
threatening the life of the nation"^^ from a majority of 
rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention. This 
provision does not apply to Article 3.^ ^^  It is clear, 
therefore, that the freedom contained in the provision is 
one that is to apply at all times and in every situation, 
even during periods of acute civil disorder.
The Court, following the example of the Commission, 
confirmed that the concept of justification did not 
properly belong in any definition of the terms used in 
Article 3.^  ^ Concerned that the Commission’s earlier 
statements might be interpreted as endorsing torture in 
certain circumstances, it is contended that they were 
correct to do so. However, it is submitted that the 
manner in which they chose to do this is to be regretted 
and that an opportunity to develop a satisfactory 
operation of Article 3 was lost. It will be recalled that 
the Commission in the Greek case had been criticized for 
implying that it was possible to justify not only inhuman 
and degrading treatment but also torture. This they had 
done by defining torture by reference to its definition
Series A. 25, 379, (1978).
11? “ ■Art. 15 para. 1 provides "In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of 
the nation any High Contracting party may take measures derogating from its 
obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of 
the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other 
obligations under international law". European Convention, supra note 1. ^ Art. 15 para. 2, id.
Supra note 17.
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of inhuman treatment, which included the phrase "which in 
the particular situation is unjustifiable".^^ The Court, 
therefore, took the opportunity of stating that there 
were no circumstances in which a breach of Article 3 
could be justified. A possibility also available to the 
Court was simply to detach the two definitions leaving 
the definition of inhuman treatment as it was, and to 
define torture separately. This would have allowed the 
protection from torture to be absolute, as was intended 
by the drafters of Article 3, It would also have 
permitted the Commission and the Court to consider the 
remainder of the prohibition in relation to a number of 
factors, such as the social value of the conduct, which 
would be vital to a proper review of the types of 
treatment and punishment likely to foe challenged under 
the "inhuman and degrading" components of Article 3.
This, it must be noted, the Court could have done without 
prejudicing the outcome of the decision in the Northern 
Ireland case. Instead of explaining the "five techniques" 
as being inhuman, and as such immediately contrary to 
Article 3, it would have been possible to state that the 
conduct was inhuman and then to address the issue of 
justification. Finding that the conduct led to severe 
suffering, the United Kingdom could have been under a 
strong burden to justify its actions. This burden, the 
Court may have considered, the United Kingdom would not 
discharge by referring to the state of emergency existing 
at the time. Alternatively, and this is the preferred 
solution, the Court might have considered that the five 
techniques amounted to torture and should, therefore, be 
immediately declared contrary to Article 3. The problem 
with the Court's approach, it is submitted, is that in 
rejecting completely the notion of justification for any 
conduct which may fall within the terms of Article 3, it 
foreclosed the possibility of allowing many forms of
Supra p. 132.
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treatment and punishment full and proper consideration. 
This rejection of any concept of justification in the 
interpretation of the prohibition has had the effect of 
placing the Court in a judicial straightjacket, making 
impossible a proper consideration of a number of the "new 
areas" identified earlier^^ to which the Article has now 
been applied.
At present, it is sufficient to note the effect which the 
complete rejection of justification has on the 
application of the prohibition. It becomes apparent that, 
as no concept of justification is accepted, then once it 
is determined that a given conduct qualifies as amounting 
to either torture or inhuman and degrading treatment, it 
will automatically follow that the conduct is 
incompatible with Article 3, because the state is 
prevented from submitting any defence to the application.
The effect of this is that the two separate tests of 
"qualification" and "compatibility" are merged into one. 
The test of qualification is also that of violation. This 
position invites inquiry into two areas. The first is to 
ascertain the effect that this merger has on the
qualification stage of the prohibition. The second is to 
inquire as to whether the rejection of the compatibility 
stage of Article 3 allows for a proper consideration of 
the types of conduct to which the prohibition now
applies. These points will be investigated in Chapters 5 
and 6.
Conclusion
For the present it is sufficient to note that the current
application of the prohibition is confused. It is
erratically applied and unsatisfactorily reasoned. To 
apply Warbrick's comment on the reasoning in the Soering 
case to the interpretation of Article 3 generally it
This point will be developed further in Chapt. 5, infra, pp. 186-194. Supra Chapt. 3, p. Ill,
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suggests nothing more than a series of preferred outcomes 
with individual rationalizations for each decision. 
Little indication is given to either the individual or 
the State as to whether a given form of treatment or 
punishment is likely to be compatible with Article 3. The 
time for a radical reappraisal of the understanding and 
application of the prohibition of torture and ill- 
treatment is now due.
Warbrick, at 1079, (1990).
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5. DETERMINING WHAT CONDUCT QUALIFIES FOR REVIEW UNDER ARTICLE 3 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION.
Introduction to Chapter
The variety of cases brought before the Commission 
regarding Article 3 of the European Convention is 
extensive. As noted in Chapter 3,^  this may be explained 
because it is applicable to all forms of treatment or 
punishment which result in suffering of a certain 
severity, irrespective of the status of the person 
responsible for the conduct, the capacity in which the 
individual is acting and whether his or her actions are 
considered compatible with, or even required by, domestic 
law.
This unlimited application of the norm demands that a 
satisfactory mechanism is devised to separate 
applications into two categories. Into the first must be 
placed all treatment or punishment which, although 
involving severity sufficient to raise an issue with 
Article 3, must be dismissed from further consideration 
because it is clearly not conduct which requires review 
for compatibility with a provision prohibiting torture 
and i11-treatment. Into this second category must be 
placed all that conduct which does require further 
consideration for compatibility with Article 3. Corporal 
punishment, the Commission has considered, is one type of 
conduct that falls into the second category.% Treatment of 
immigrants seeking to settle in the United Kingdom is a 
second.3 Refusal to acknowledge a change in sex, the 
Commission has accepted, is a third.^
Bearing in mind the unlimited applicability of Article 3, 
this process of conduct selection must have the following 
characteristics, It must be able to determine in which of 
the two classes a given conduct belongs and it must also
 ^Supra Chapt. 1, pp. 45-46.
 ^Tyrer v. United Kingdom Series A. 26, (1978). Infra, Chapt. 6, pp. 209-216.
: East African Asians v United Kingdom. Yearbook XIII, 928, (1970), infra, Chapt.6, 222-227. 
Dec. Adm. Com. Application No. 6699/74, 15 Dec 1977. D S R 11 p. 16 (23-25).
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give both the State and the individual an indication as 
to whether any particular form of conduct is likely to 
qualify for further review under the terms of Article 3. 
It is contended that the current approach of the 
Commission and Court does not satisfy these criteria. It 
is the purpose of this Chapter to investigate why this is 
the position, and also to establish, and for succeeding 
chapters to substantiate, how this problem of 
"qualification" may be satisfactorily resolved.
As noted earlier,% it will be recalled that the Commission 
has decided that to "gualify" conduct into the torture
and inhuman component of the prohibition of torture and 
ill-treatment, there must be an "intent" to cause the
suffering on the part of the State. For treatment or
punishment to qualify as degrading, the Commission has 
concluded that it is not the intent of the State which is 
important, but the "result" of the conduct. In addition 
to what, for the purposes of this Chapter and research, 
is referred to as the "qualifiers" of "intent" and
"result" mentioned above, it was stated in the East
African Asians c a s e .^  that the suffering experienced by 
the recipient must be of a certain severity. This 
severity requirement will be referred to, for reasons
which will be explained shortly, as the "disqualifier^', A 
study of these two factors, which between them determine 
which conduct requires review with the prohibition of
torture and ill-treatment, allows an indication as to why 
the Commission has failed to provide the consistency 
required for the purposes of Article 3. The concept of 
severity will be discussed first. Because, it is also 
necessary to understand the role and assessment of
severity for the purposes of Chapter 6 of this thesis, it 
is proposed that it should be examined in detail in this 
Chapter,
 ^Supra Chapt.4, pp.130-133, 
" Supra note 3.
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5.1 The Concept of Severity of Sufferina: its Dual Role.
5.1.1 Severity of Suffering : its "Disqualification"Function.
In the Tvrer case.? it was said that, for treatment to 
come within Article 3, a certain level of severity of 
suffering must be present. As noted earlier,® the effect 
of this finding is to add a further requirement to the 
provision. It reads into the prohibition a condition not 
stipulated in the text and might in effect be read to 
amend Article 3 as follows:
"No-one shall be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment leading to suffering of a minimum 
severity^ '.
Although this interpretation lacks support from a literal 
reading of the Article, it may be defended by reference 
to the travaux préparatoire, and from a functional point 
of view. It is evident from an inspection of the travaux 
préparatoire that the drafters of the norm had the most 
serious of violations in mind.^ Cock's prolific examples 
of torture mentioned have already been stated in Chapter 
1.1® The travaux préparatoire to the European Convention 
suggest that the norm was intended to be applied only in 
those cases which involve severe and not moderate 
suffering. Similarly, its introduction may be defended 
from a functional perspective. There are a number of 
applications submitted every year to the Commission for 
which, although they may be said to have come from 
applicants adversely affected by the actions of another, 
there is clearly no case for consideration under Article 
3. For example, in Application No. 6619/74^ the 
Commission was asked to find that the state in preventing
 ^Supra note 2, at para.30.
® Supra, Chapt.4, p. 133.
® Supra, Chapt,1, pp. 47-48,
j? “ ■Dec. Adm. 10 Dec 1975, (unpublished).
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the applicant from using the title "Honary Doctor of 
Divinity" had subjected him to degrading treatment. In 
Application No.7630/76,^  the petitioner alleged that it 
was inhuman to have to do a job which he was 
overqualified to do. In Application No.7729/76,^  the 
Commission decided that the applicant had not been 
subjected to degrading treatment when a Member of the 
United Kingdom Government made public his case by openly 
discussing in Parliament the plans to deport him. These 
applications clearly required to be disposed of in a 
quick and summary fashion, allowing the Commission the 
maximum amount of time to consider those cases raising 
real and serious issues under Article 3, This is done, it 
is accepted, most effectively by reference to the issue 
of severity,
An alternative method of disposing of applications, such 
as those mentioned above which fail to raise issues 
worthy of consideration under Article 3, might be to
accept that all conduct to which an individual may be
adversely affected is degrading, but to consider some 
treatment justifiable and some not. The complaint 
concerning the unsuitable employment might then be 
declared justifiable on, for example, grounds of economic 
interest. The unwanted publicity in Parliament might be 
defended in the interests of democracy. Such an 
alternative, however, is clearly not to be preferred 
because of the difficulty of constructing a satisfactory 
concept of "justification" which would, at such a level, 
be able satisfactorily to select and dispose of conduct 
which may, or may not, raise real issues with a provision 
outlawing torture and ill-treatment. The theory, lacking 
as it does any support by reference either directly to
treaty provisions or to the travaux préparatoire of the
European Convention, need not be discussed further.
12 D & R 7 p. 161.
13 D & R 7 p. 164.
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It is important to note at this stage that the first 
function of the severity requirement is entirely to 
dispose of cases which do not involve a sufficient degree 
of suffering on the part of the applicant to justify 
examination of the case under Article 3. This function, 
and indeed its second which will be discussed shortly,^ 
is not to be confused with an inquiry to determine 
whether the suffering is of a sufficient severity to 
qualify the conduct for review under the norm. It is 
important to emphasize that at all stages the severity 
requirement never has the capacity to "qualify" treatment 
for review under Article 3. This function is the preserve 
of the "qualifiers" recognized in the Greek case of 
"intent" and "result", which between them determine which 
conduct qualifies for review under Article 3. This point 
may be illustrated by recalling Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice's 
example mentioned in the Tyrer easel® the surgeon
amputating the soldier's leg on the battlefield without 
anesthetic; this indicates that even the most extreme
suffering inflicted on a person does not automatically 
qualify treatment into any one of the three categories in 
Article 3. What does, according to the present
understanding of the norm, is the "Intent" of the surgeon 
or the "result" of his treatment. The severity 
requirement, it follows, does not have the capacity to 
"qualify" a given conduct into one or more of the
categories mentioned in Article 3. It only has the 
capacity to disqualify treatment or punishment as raising 
no issue with Article 3. It is for this reason that, in 
this role, the severity requirement can properly be
referred to as the "disqualifier".
Infra p. 162 & p. 166. Supra note Î, at p. 20..
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5.1.2 Severity of Suffering: its "Classification"Function
As well as disqualifying conduct from further review, the 
concept of severity of suffering performs a second 
function. The Commission has stated that the principal 
component separating the categories in Article 3 is 
severity of suffering.^ "Severity" it follows, determines 
whether conduct is to be considered degrading, inhuman or 
tortuous. This function of "severity" in determining into 
which of the three categories the conduct must be said to 
fall will, for the purposes of future reference, be 
referred to as the classification function.
It is worth noting at this point that a violation of 
Article 3 will already have been determined. Assessing 
severity is important to enable the Commission to 
attribute a classification to the conduct which 
accurately reflects the seriousness of the breach of 
Article 3. It has nothing to do with the process of 
determining whether Article 3 has been violated in the 
first place. Again, it can be seen that this is a 
function reserved entirely for the qualifiers of "intent" 
and "result".
The above examination of the dual tasks of "severity" are 
essential to a satisfactory understanding and operation 
of Article 3. It is important, therefore, to devise an 
acceptable means of assessing severity so that its dual 
functions of "disqualification" and "classification" may 
be performed as consistently as possible and it is to 
this problem of assessing the severity of suffering that 
it is now necessary to turn.
Supra Chapt. 4, at p. 135.
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5.2 The Assessment of Severity of Suffering.
Measuring severity of suffering is a difficult process.
It is one which is clearly not at present, nor indeed is 
it likely to be in the future, scientific. For the
purposes of this research, the problems in assessing 
severity of suffering will be examined by studying, first 
suffering caused by the infliction of physical pain, and 
then psychological or emotional suffering. It will be 
noted, however, that even this apparently simple and 
innocuous division may not be acceptable to many
physiologists.^
5.2.1 The Assessment of Pain.
Physiologists are unable to measure the level of pain a 
person is experiencing at a given moment. There is to
date no accepted method of assessing accurately pain 
thresholds.^ Fuse and Fujita explain current efforts to 
assess pain as follows :
"As pain is a subjective experience, there is no precise method to quantitate 
it objectively. There are two approaches; the first is the use of laboratory 
techniques to measure the patient's reaction to experimental pain, such as 
sensory decision theory analysis. This method is a psychophysical procedure to 
distinguish between a person's criteria for reporting pain and the sensory 
experiences induced by noxious stimuli. The second is the use of tools to 
assess pain by the patient's description. Many kinds of rating scales, 
including visual analogue scales, have been used to evaluate the intensity of 
clinical pain, but they can not assess the quality of pain,.."^®
It may be considered that the lack of progress in the 
field of pain measurement may be attributed to an 
unwi11ingness rather than an inability to remove existing 
obstacles preventing progress in determining accurately 
pain thresholds. The abuses which the accurate charting 
of pain may be put to are readily apparent. It would be
Infra p. 161.
Turk & Rudy, 27, (1990), 
Fuse & Fujita, 286, (1992)
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invaluable to the torturer to know the amount of pain his 
or her subject was feeling at any given moment in the 
uncertain process of inflicting enough pain to be 
unbearable, but at the same time not fatal. However, 
further advances in this area would undoubtedly be of use 
for many legitimate medical uses. Accurate assessment of 
pain is considered important in the treatment of cancer^ 
and for dealing with post-accident trauma, in addition to 
the management of pain in nursing care
The process of assessing severity of suffering is further 
complicated because, even if pain can be measured, an 
individual's immunity or resistance to it is variable 
from person to person. It may vary as between sex, race, 
age, culture and even ideology. The ancient Cappadocians 
who lived as outlaws, were said to have practiced torture 
on each other to loosen their muscles and increase their 
tolerance to pain.22 in East Africa, men and women undergo 
an operation, in which the scalp and the underlying 
muscles are cut in order to expose a large area of skull. 
Although no anaesthetics or pain-relieving drugs are used 
the patient shows no apparent signs of discomfort.2® Faith 
in a cause or belief can result in a person ' s fear of 
pain being reduced. Suffering, and even death, may be 
viewed not as the dreaded consequence of a particular 
action, but as stages on the way to victory and 
martyrdom. Similarly, ability to sustain morale under 
torture is variable between individuals. Some individuals 
may be more successful in seeking refuge from the reality 
of their situation than others.24 perhaps one of the most 
remarkable examples of cultural determinants in pain 
perceptions is given by Melzack and Wall.25 They describe
2® Ibid, 290.
Christoph, 11, (1991). In respect of nursing care Christoph states; "....given the 
deleterious effects pain may have for the critically ill or injured patient, pain assessment must be given a high priority to develop effective management plans", id.22 RUTHVSN, at 68, (1978).
23 MELZACK & WALL, 17, (1988).
24 See generally on this point AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, at 44, (1975).25 Supra note 23.
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a ritual still practised in a particular part of India as 
follows :
"The ceremony derives from an ancient practice in which a member of a social 
group is chosen to represent the power of the gods....What is remarkable about 
the ritual is that steel hooks, which are attached by strong ropes to the top 
of a special cart, are shoved under his skin and muscles on both sides of the 
back— .at the climax of the ceremony in each village, he swings free, hanging 
only from the hooks embedded in his back, to bless the children and crops. 
Astonishingly, there is no evidence that the man is in pain during the ritual; 
rather, he appears to be in a "state of exhaltation".^®
Added to the physical pain resulting from torture must be 
its mental effects. Two identical physical acts may 
produce entirely different stress responses. The 
emotional effects of sexual intercourse depend entirely 
upon the scenario in which it takes place. In the absence 
of consent, the nature of the act becomes entirely 
different and is likely to be accompanied by severe 
stress and emotional after-effects. Similarly, the needle 
that pierces the skin to inject a drug into the blood 
stream is likely to result in little stress if it is 
perceived by the patient to be for his or her benefit. 
The same cannot be said if the drug is administered in a 
situation which could be described as pharmacological 
torture .22 These observations may be summarized by the 
comment that inherent in any suffering resulting from 
torture is the hate or animosity which is conveyed inter- 
personally through the conduct, and it is often this that 
in the long term is the most damaging to the victim. This 
suffering, however, is the most difficult to quantify and
f  Ibid, at 16-17.
A report by AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, (1985), mentions with regard to the practice of 
pharmacological torture in the U.S.S.R in the 1970's: "The drugs most commonly used on 
dissenters are the powerful tranquilizers (commonly referred to as neuroleptic drugs) 
aminazin, haloperidol and triftazin; insulin and siilphazin. Among other drugs which 
have been applied to prisoners of conscience and other inmates are tizertsin, sanapax, 
etaperazin, phrenolon, trisedil, mazheptil, seduksin and motiden-depo. These drugs 
have been administered by various means, including injections, solutions for drinking and tablets", at 197.
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there has yet to develop a satisfactory method of 
accurately assessing it.28
Amnesty International2® questions whether it is even 
possible for the purposes of assessing severity of 
treatment to discuss its effects in the terms of the 
"physical" and the "psychological":
"The first difficulty, particularly that of discussing experiences of pain, 
arises front the traditional and convenient habit of considering "body" and the 
"mind" as discrete entities. This theoretical separation has been, by and 
large, axiomatic in cultures with religious and philosophical roots as diverse 
as the Judaeo-Christian and the Hindu. But, however appropriate this concept of 
a mind-faody dichotomy may appear to be in the development of moral and 
behavioural norms, it poses severe obstacles to a proper understanding of 
certain human phenomena such as pain. In spite of the research which yet needs
to be done in this field, it is nevertheless significant  that contemporary
pain studies, as well as research into psycho-somatic illnesses and stress, 
point to increasing acceptance of a synthetic (i.e.unified) concept of the 
body/mind relationship. It has become unacceptable to insist upon a division 
between "physical" and "mental" experiences of pain. This development prevents 
one from cataloguing torture methods and efforts according to discrete 
categories of the physical and psychological".®®
If this is correct, it follows that any attempt to 
departmentalise likely effects of torture into the 
physical and the psychological are inadvisable; and that 
treatment may only be assessed with regard to its effect 
taken as a whole. Research, it may be concluded, has been 
unable to assist the Commission's task of determining 
when a given threshold of suffering has been reached. It 
has, however, been able to suggest that an obvious 
starting point in the process of assessing the physical 
and then the psychological affects of treatment is 
misguided.
2® Supra note 19.
2® AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, (1975).
3® Id, at 39-40.
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This brief excursion into the problem of assessing 
severity of suffering allows us to draw a conclusion 
which may have been anticipated at the commencement of 
the exercise. That is, in the absence of scientific data 
which may provide indications of the likely suffering of 
an individual in a given situation the assessment of 
severity of suffering for the purposes of Article 3 is an 
entirely subjective one. At present, when performed by 
members of the Commission and the Court, it is restricted 
only by the deliberations of colleagues, previous case 
law and public criticism of their eventual decision.
Left not to the art of science, but of language, the 
Commission, it may be concluded, is required to perform 
an important task in an area in which the scientist is 
largely unable to assist in providing an indication as to 
what should be considered common ground and a mutual 
starting point in the uncertain process of assessing 
severity of suffering. Personal, subjective opinions 
circulate unrestrained except by contemporary opinion and 
the need to develop consistent jurisprudence with regard 
to the severity requirement. It is against this 
background that we proceed to evaluate the Commission's 
attempts to date to identify severity thresholds 
important for the purposes of Article 3.
5.2.2 The Assessment of Severity of Suffering for its "Disqualification Function".
In the East African Asians case.^  although the Commission 
stated that there must be a minimum level of severity 
before Article 3 applies, it gave no indication as to 
when the level of severity may be said to have been 
reached. In the subsequent Northern Ireland case.®® it was 
said that severity is not synonymous with discomfort or 
with disagreeable treatment. It indicated that it is 
something more than this, but it was unable to provide
®3 Supra note 3.
®2 Series A. 25, (1978).
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indications as to what this may be. The Court did, 
however, provide an indication, not as to when a given 
severity threshold may be considered to have been 
satisfied, but as to what factors may be taken into 
account when assessing severity. It stated:
"ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within 
the scope of Article 3, The assessment of this minimum is, in the nature of 
things, relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the 
duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, 
the sex, the age and state of health of the victim,etc".®®
In the absence of a formula indicating where this 
severity threshold may be located, it is necessary to 
attempt to plot its co-ordinates by reference to cases 
which have been considered to fall marginally on one side 
of the severity line or the other. These cases may be 
identified because what was in dispute was whether the 
conduct could be said not to be tortuous or inhuman but 
degrading, and because in many of them there were a 
number in either the Commission or the Court who 
disagreed with the majority, considering that the conduct 
was properly placed on the other side of the severity 
threshold.
In the Tyrer case.®4 the Court considered that subjecting 
the applicant to corporal punishment amounted to 
degrading but not inhuman punishment, Tyrer, a 15 year 
old school boy, was subjected to 3 strokes of the birch 
on his bare posterior. The Court decided that it was 
degrading "because the very nature of judicial corporal 
punishment is that it involves one human being inflicting 
physical violence on another human being", and due to the 
fact that "he was treated as an object in the power of 
the authorities [constituting] an assault on precisely 
that which is one of the main purposes of Article 3 to 
protect, namely a person’s dignity and physical
3® Id, at 65.
34 Supra note 2.
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integrity" .35 Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, in his dissent, 
considered that the punishment did "not involve the level 
of degradation required to constitute a breach of Article 
3... ".3® In the Northern Ireland case®2 he explained that 
he considered that the terms "inhuman" and "degrading" 
should be confined to the sorts of ill-treatment member 
States of the Council of Europe would have had in mind 
midway though the twentieth century, in the aftermath of 
war and atrocity.®® in the case of Campbell and Cosans v 
United Kingdom,®® the Commission accepted that it was 
possible to consider that subjecting a person to the 
imminent threat of torture could amount to degrading 
treatment. 4® The mere threat of corporal punishment was 
not, however, of sufficient severity to be considered 
degrading treatment. In Warwick v United Kingdom.41 the 
Commission accepted that the caning of a 16 year old 
school girl amounted to degrading treatment. In this case 
the applicant was struck on her hand three times by her 
headmaster in the presence of another male teacher. The 
Committee of Ministers, however, was unable to reach the 
two-thirds majority required to endorse the decision.4® in 
the more recent case of Costello-Roberts v United 
Kingdom,43 the Commission did not feel that subjecting a 7 
year old school boy to three "whacks" with a gym shoe 
amounted to degrading treatment.44 However, in Y v. United 
Kingdom, 45 where the applicant was caned for poor 
standards of discipline, the Commission considered that 
he had been subjected to degrading treatment. He had been 
hit twice causing "four wheals to appear on his buttocks, 
with swelling and bruising, [and] considerable pain for
35 Id, at p. 16, and Chapt. 6, at pp. 212-217. 
35 2 E.H.R.R. (1978) 1, at 20.
32 2 E.H.R.R. (1978) 25.
3® Ibid, at 117.
3® Series B. 42, (1980-83).
4® Id, at 43-44.
4} Application No. 9471/81 Report of 18 July 1986, para. 88.
4® Resolution DH(89) 5 of 2 March 1989.
43 Application No.13134/87 Adopted 8 October 1991. Series A. 247-C, (1992).4 Id, p. 52.
Application No.14229/88. Report of the Commission 8 Oct 1991. Series A. 247-A, (1992).
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some time after the act itself".45 jn McFeeley v. United 
Kingdom,42 the Commission did not appear to consider that 
subjecting the prisoner to a "strip" and "body" search 
amounted to sufficient severity of suffering for the 
purposes of Article 3. This was despite the fact that a 
body search sometimes involved inspection of the 
prisoner's rectum, albeit with the use of a mirror to 
avoid physical contact. In the case of Reed v United 
Kingdom, 48 the applicant complained that having to live 
for three weeks in a prison cell, infested by cock 
roaches, and otherwise uncomfortable, amounted to 
degrading treatment or punishment. The Commission, 
referring to the special circumstances surrounding his 
application, including the shortage of standard cells due 
to the disruption caused by major repair work to the 
prison, concluded that no violation had been established. 
In Application No. 9105/80.4® the Commission stated that 
the applicant's separation from her parents, brothers and 
sisters at her tender age was likely to cause her pain 
and anxiety, but was not sufficient to raise an issue 
under Article 3. Similarly, in Application No.6564/74, 
the Commission did not consider that having to share 
underwear and toilet articles with other prisoners 
amounted to degrading punishment, stating that the 
"alleged hardships are obviously not of such a grave 
nature that they could be said to constitute inhuman or 
degrading punishment within the meaning of [Article 3 ]".
45 Id, at 12.
42 Application No.8317/78, 15 May 1980. D & R 20 p. 44 (85-86). See also Application No.8697/79, 
9 December 1981 (unpublished); Application No.8983/80, 9 December 1981 (unpublished). 
4“ Application No. 7630/76, 6 December 1979. D S R 19 p. 113, (137).4® 6 July 1981 (unpublished).
5® 21 May 1975. D & R 2 p. 105.
51 Id.
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5.2.3 Assessment of Severity of Suffering for its"Classification Function".
With regard to the second function of severity, that of
classification, an examination of the Northern Ireland
case,52 ts useful. The Commission considered that the so 
called "five techniques" amounted to torture. This was 
despite the fact that they were of a type of treatment
quite removed from the unsophisticated and brutal 
practices traditionally considered to amount to torture. 
The case was then brought before the Court, The United 
Kingdom did not dispute the findings of the Commission in 
relation to its classification of the practices of the
British Army as amounting to torture.
The "five techniques" it will be recalled included: 
enforced wall standing,^ hooding®®, noise®®, sleep
deprivation®® and a diet of bread and water.®®
In attempting to marginalise the room for error in this 
process of determining on which side of the
"torture/inhuman" line these techniques must be said to 
rest, it is pertinent to refer to research regarding 
techniques of sensory deprivation (SD), which were 
central to the purpose of the five techniques. Shallice
in his study of the SD effects of the practices under
®2 Report of 26 January 1976, Series B 23/1 (1976-1978).®3 Id, at 411.
This, according to the detainees, consisted of facing a wall with hands placed high above the 
head on the wall with legs apart being forced with battons to maintain this posture 
until collapse and then being restored to the posture. Records showed that this 
continued often for four to six hours at a time. Series B. 23(1) 1976-78, at 267.
This involved the wearing of a navy or black coloured bag of tightly woven or hessian cloth 
at all times except during interrogation, id.
It was alleged that between periods of interrogation detainees were held in rooms where there 
was continuous noise which was loud and deafening and resembled the escaping vapours 
of compressed air, the roar of steam, the whirling of helicopter blades or a drill,„ W-It was stated that the detainees were deprived of sleep for two or three days or were allowed 
very little sleep throughout their detention, id.
The petitioner alleged that they had been provided with bread and water or on occasion 
deprived of food and drink altogether for two or three days, id.
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scrutiny in the Northern Ireland case,®® referred to the 
fo1lowing experiment :
"In an experiment in England, fully described in the Lancet of 12 September 
1959, 20 men and woman volunteer members of a hospital staff, aged between 20 
and 55, were each placed in a "silent room" standardized up to a mean sound 
pressure level of 80 decibels, and the further sensory deprivation consisted of 
having to wear translucent goggles which cut out patterned vision, and padded 
fur gauntlets. On the other hand they had four normal meals a day when they 
were visited by colleagues on the hospital staff and could take off the 
goggles, and they had "dunlopillo" mattresses on which they could sleep or 
rest, or they could walk about. They were promised an amount of paid time off
equal to that spent in the room and were asked to stay there as long as they
could.
Six remained for 48, 51, 75, 82 and 92 hours, but 14 of the 20 gave up less 
than 48 hours (two of them after only 5 hours), the usual causes being 
unbearable anxiety, tension or attacks of panic. Dreams were invariable in
those who slept for any length of time and in a quarter of the 20 included
nightmares of which drowning, suffocation, killing people, etc. were features.
These were the results, although they were volunteers in their own hospitals 
who knew that there was no reason for any panic and who were not submitted to 
any wall-standing or deprived of any food or sleep".®®
Shallice relates this experiment to the treatment of the 
detainees in the Northern Ireland case as follows:
"If we turn to people undergoing SD in a non-experimental situation, where the 
situation would be phenomenologically very different, the stressful nature of 
SD becomes even more apparent...In the Ulster situation the internees had a 
thick black bag over their heads, were subject to a loud masking noise, had to 
remain in a fatiguing and painful fixed position while dressed in a boiler 
suit...Sleep was prevented and food was inadequate. Thus cognitive functioning 
would be impaired. Pain would be present both from beatings and from the use of 
the "stoika" position at the wall. Finally anxiety must have been at a high 
level for the internees even before sensory deprivation began, especially as no 
one knew...that they were to be arrested and subjected to the depersonalisation
59 Shallice, (1973).
5® Id, at 385.
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and disorientation of the arrest and initial imprisonment process. Thus one
would expect the positive feedback process to operate starting from an
initially high level of stress...with cognitive functioning impaired so that 
rational defences would be impossible".
Despite experiments such as these, which provide a
reasonable indication of the likely levels of stress and 
pain which individuals in a particular situation are 
likely to have suffered, it is still possible, in the 
absence of the most horrific and unsophisticated 
techniques traditionally considered to amount to torture, 
for disagreement to exist as to whether conduct may be 
classified as belonging to one of the categories
mentioned in Article 3 as opposed to another. This was 
indeed illustrated by the Court in the Northern Ireland 
case, which, disagreeing with the views of the 
Commission, decided that the conduct was inhuman but did 
not amount to torture. Despite research such as that of
Shallice's which suggests that SD techniques as applied
in the Northern Ireland case are properly classified as 
tortuous. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice was still within his 
rights of judicial interpretation to state that the 
treatment was inhuman and that torture should be reserved 
for conduct that "involves a wholly different order of 
suffering" .®2
Although it is far from satisfactory to allow judges to 
classify conduct in accordance with a concept for which 
there is no satisfactory means of measurement, for the 
present it does not appear possible to do better. If 
judges' perception of what amounts to torture, inhuman or 
degrading conduct is considered to be unsatisfactory, it 
is only the views of their fellow judges or public 
criticism of their chosen categorization which may 
persuade them to review their approach in future Article
62 “ •'if the five techniques are to be regarded as involving torture, how does one characterize 
e.g having one's finger-nails torn out, being slowly impaled on a stake through the 
rectum, or roasted ver an electric grid?" Sep Op. supra note 32 at para. 35, p. 138.
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3 cases. A study, at least of the corporal punishment 
cases, suggests that the Court's interpretation of that 
conduct with regard to Article 3, has not been out of 
touch with the mood in Europe regarding physical 
chastisement of school children. Similarly, at present we 
must be satisfied that the majority of judges at the 
European Court of Human Rights have felt able to decide 
that corporal punishment for a criminal offence must be 
considered degrading, ®3 that facing the "death row 
phenomenon" can be inhuman^ and that falanga®® is 
tortuous.
Having examined thus far in this Chapter the question of 
severity of suffering and established that it has no role 
in "qualifying" conduct for review for compatibility with 
Article 3, it remains to justify the observation made 
earlier®® in this thesis that the present "qualifiers" of 
"intent" and "result" are not satisfactory. Before this 
task is carried out, it is necessary to examine the range 
of conduct which has been challenged as incompatible with 
Article 3. This will provide an indication of the variety 
of treatment and punishment and range of applications to 
which the "qualifiers" must be expected to satisfactorily 
operate.
5.3 The Variety and Range of Conduct Challenged as Incompatible With Article 3.
It was in the Greek case.®® that the Commission first 
attempted to define the terms accommodated in Article 3. 
This was a case involving the very type of conduct and 
severity of suffering that the drafters of the Article 
had in mind. However, it was clear from early
®3 Tyrer supra note 2. Infra Chapt. 6 at pp. 210-217.
®4 Soering v United Kingdom Series A. 191, (1989).
This was described by the Commission in the Greek case as: " the beating of the feet with
a wooden or metal stick or bar which, if skilfully done, breaks no bones, makes no
skin lesions and leaves no permanent and recognisable marks but causes intense painand swelling of the feet." The Greek case. Yearbook XII, (1969), at 499.®® Supra Chapt.4, 139-143.
®® Id.
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applications to the Commission alleging a violation of 
Article 3, that the prohibition of torture and ill- 
treatment in the Convention was to be invoked in cases 
involving conduct significantly less serious than that 
attributed to the Greek government and of a type 
altogether different from the traditional concepts of 
torture clearly in the minds of the drafters of the
provision.
Early applications alleging a violation of Article 3 were 
considered to raise no real issues with the provision and 
it is clear that the Commission felt able to dispose of 
such cases with little accompanying explanation. For 
example, the first Article 3 complaint decided by the
Commission was Application No. 26/55.®® The applicant 
alleged that the Federal Republic of Germany had violated 
his rights under Article's 2, 3, 8, 13 and 17 of the
Convention. The Commission declared that he had submitted 
no evidence in support of his allegations and the 
application was declared manifestly ill-founded. In 
Application No. 2 8/5 5.®® the applicant complained, inter 
alia, that Article 3 had been violated because of his
improper treatment in a mental asylum. The petition was 
declared inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic 
remedies. In Application No.462/59,®® the petitioner 
alleged that being subjected to a "hard bed" regime 
amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. The 
Commission considered that the application did not 
indicate that Article 3 had been violated. Similarly in 
Application No.1753/63.®! the applicant complained that 
detention in an isolation cell, together with inadequate 
medical treatment, amounted to a violation of Article 3. 
The Commission in that case decided that the applicant 
had failed to submit evidence substantiating his 
allegations, in addition to the question of non-
®® (Unpublished),
®® (Unpublished).
®® Yearbook II (1958-59) p. 382. 
®4 Yearbook VIII, p. 174, (186).
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exhaustion of domestic remedies. In Application 
No.3448/67, the petitioner, a prisoner, claimed that his 
treatment at the hands of prison officers amounted to 
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. He 
complained that he was brutally beaten by prisoner 
officers after refusing to leave his cell. To prevent him 
yelling, a towel was placed over his face causing him to 
lose consciousness. He was then placed in an isolation 
cell 2 metres by 3 and ordered to put on light clothes 
despite the cold. The cell contained no furniture and he 
was forced to eat like an animal on the floor. His hand 
during this time was bleeding heavily from an injury, and 
he was unable to stand because of a pain in his foot. The 
following day he was released from his isolation cell, 
and informed that he would be charged with assault and 
violent resistance if he lodged a complaint. Remarkably, 
the Commission considered that in the circumstances of 
the case, the force used against the applicant was not 
excessive, and was not, therefore, contrary to Article 3.
It is interesting to note that, even before the Greek 
case, the Commission was required to consider cases in 
which the State had not at the time of the application 
physically harmed the applicant or even subjected him to 
any treatment which might be said to violate Article 3. 
What was in dispute was the intended or future action of 
the State with regard to the individual. In 1959, the 
Commission recognized that Article 3 may have 
significance for a state's treatment of foreigners in 
entering or leaving a country. It stated:
"Whereas under general international law a State has the right, in virtue of 
its sovereignty, to control the entry and exit of foreigners into and out of 
its territory; and whereas it is true that a right or freedom to enter the 
territory of States, members of the Council of Europe, is not, as such, 
included among the rights and freedoms guaranteed in Section 1 of the 
Convention; whereas, however, a State which signs and ratifies the European
72 Application No. 3448/67 17 May 1969 Coll. 30 p. 56 (62-68).
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Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms must be understood as
agreeing to restrict the free exercise of its rights under general
international law, including its right to control the entry and exit of
foreigners, to the extent and within the limits of the obligations which it has
accepted under that Convention".
74These dicta were followed in Application No.984/61, 
which concerned the expulsion of the petitioner from 
Belgium. Here the Commission stated:
"the deportation of a foreigner to a particular country might in exceptional 
circumstances give rise to the question whether there had been "inhuman 
treatment" within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention; whereas similar 
considerations might apply to cases where a person is extradited to a 
particular country in which, due to the very nature of the regime of that 
country or to a particular situation in that country, basic human rights, such
as are guaranteed by the Convention, might be either grossly violated or
entirely suppressed".
These cases marked a line of jurisprudence which were to 
allow the individual the right to challenge the actions 
of a member state of the Council of Europe in cases of 
the individual's extradition, expulsion, deportation or 
repatriation from a State, or transfer to or refusal to 
enter a State. What has effectively been constructed out 
of Article 3 is a right to asylum,and it is in fact 
this aspect of the provision which has given rise to more 
petitions than any other, and indeed to one of the
Convention's most important cases, that of Soerina v 
United Kingdom.^
Asylum cases, however, are not the only examples of 
applications far removed from the type of application 
envisaged by the drafters of Article 3, Application
No.2248/64,^  required the Commission to consider whether
Application No. 434/58, 30 June 1959.Yearbook II p. 354 (372)..
 ^ Application No. 984/61, 29 May 1961 Coll.6 p. 39 (40). 
Einarsen, at 61, (1990).
Supra note 64.
Yearbook X, p. 170, (174); Coll.22 p. 23 (26)
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deficient social security contributions amounted to a 
violation of Article 3. In 1967 the Commission was seized 
by the first of many complaints relating to what may be 
referred to as the "sex change" cases. In Application 
No.2567/65 the Commission stated:
"Whereas, in regard to the applicant's complaint of inhuman treatment in that 
he has not been permitted to undergo an operation to change his sex, an 
examination of the case as it has been submitted does not disclose any 
appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set forth in the 
Convention and in particular in Article 3 in view of the fact that the 
applicant has been transferred to a special prison where he is under the care 
of medical specialists who have carefully considered his case".
In Application No.2 5 6 8 /6 5 . the Commission was required 
to consider whether the refusal to allow the applicant to 
continue to practice as a lawyer after more than twenty 
years as a member of the Belgium Bar amounted to inhuman 
and degrading treatment. In Application No.3141/67, the 
applicant submitted, inter alia, that in being fined 20 
DM for failing to observe the highway code his rights 
under Article 3 had been violated.
Although created with the most severe forms of treatment 
or punishment in mind, it is clear that even before the 
elaboration of the terms used in Article 3, the 
Commission was required to consider the provision 
prohibiting torture and ill-treatment with regard to a 
variety of conduct which was different to that its 
drafters may have had in mind and which involved a 
severity of suffering very much less than that suggested 
by the comments of Cocks.^
Cases subsequent to the Greek case illustrate how the 
potential applicability of the prohibition of torture and
'j} 31 Hay 1967, (unpublished).
2  Coll. Dec. 26 pp. 10-17, 1968.
Application No.3141/67, 30 September 1968 Coll. 27 p. 117, (118) 8.
See supra Chapt.l, 47-49.
B. PHILLIPS 1994, CHAPTER FIVE 17 4
ill-treatment, made possible by the wording chosen for 
the provision, has been realized.^ An examination of 
Article 3 jurisprudence suggests that it may be divided, 
for discussion purposes, into the following categories:
1, Extradition, deportation, expulsion, refusal of entry, 
repatriation, transfer to another country for trial;
2, Treatment of detainees by prison or police officers;
3, Cases relating to discrimination;
4, Medical treatment of persons;
5, Duration of punishment or detention;
6, Miscellaneous.
5.3.1 Category One: Extradition, repatriation, etc.... 83
As noted earlier, the Commission first recognized the 
possible application of Article 3 to cases involving a 
State's treatment of foreigners in entering or leaving a 
country in 1959 in Application No.434/58.^ Since that 
date, the Commission has considered Article 3 with regard 
to cases of extradition, deportation, expulsion, refusal 
of admission in a State, repatriation, and transfer of an 
individual from one State to another. For example, in 
Application No. 2143/64 the Commission considered
whether extradition of the applicant to Yugoslavia to 
face a jail sentence raised an issue with Article 3. In 
Application No.6583/74.^  the Commission was required to 
consider whether the applicant's expulsion to Libya would 
result in a violation of Article 3. In Application 
No. 6315/7 the applicant complained that his transfer 
from Germany to France would result in him being 
subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 because, he 
contended, France would then deport him to Algeria, In
Supra Chapt 3. pp. 96-104..
This category is interesting because it sometimes requires at least a superficial review of 
the human rights standards in the receiving country. To date applicants have tried to 
use the Strasbourg machinery to resist being returned in a number of different cases. Yearbook II, (1958-59), 354. 
f  Yearbook VII, (1964) pp.314-330,
18 July 1974, (unpublished).
30 September 1974. Yearbook XVII, p. 480.
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Application No.7011/75."" the repatriation of children 
from Denmark to South Vietnam was considered by the 
Commission in light of Article 3. In Application 
No. 8008/77 the Commission was required to consider 
whether the State's refusal to allow the applicant to 
enter the country amounted to inhuman and degrading 
treatment or punishment.
At this point it must be noted for later in this thesis^ 
that these cases often require the Commission to examine 
the standard of human rights protection in the receiving 
country. In Soerina v. United Kingdom.^  for example, the 
Commission and the Court engaged in a full examination of 
conditions on death row in the State of Virginia and the 
Court accepted amicus curia briefs with regard to the 
same matter from, inter alia, Amnesty International.^
5.3.1.2 Category Two : Treatment of Detainees by Police or Prisoner Officers.
In the Greek case the Commission was required to consider 
the most horrific forms of treatment of detainees, such 
as "falanga",^^ insertion of pins under the nails, the 
burning of detainees with cigarettes and the kicking of 
the male genital organs. In the Northern Ireland case the 
Court was required to consider the so called "five 
techniques" which were used against detainees which the 
Court declared inhuman and degrading.^ However, over a 
period of time, applications relating to treatment of 
prisoners and detainees have developed to the extent that 
Article 3 has been used to challenge, in addition to 
severe ill-treatment of detainees, day-to-day prison 
conditions, prison regulations and measures relating to
3 October 1975. Yearbook XIX, p. 416, (450-454).17 March 1981, (unpublished).
Infra Chapt. 6.
Supra note 64.
Amnesty International, Comments Submitted to the European Court of Human Rights on the Soering Case. (April 12, 1989).Supra note 67.
Supra note 52 and 56.
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discipline. For example, in Application No. 2749/66,^  the 
applicant complained that his solitary confinement for 10 
months for 20 hours a day constituted a violation of 
Article 3. In Application No.7408/76,^ the applicant 
complained that the penalty of 7 days arrest, "sleeping 
hard" and restriction of food to 700 g . of bread per day 
amounted to a violation of Article 3. In Application 
No.2567/65,^  the Commission considered that matters 
arising in the course of the applicant's detention, such 
as the removal of postage stamps, detention in a 
punishment cell, sleeping hard and being prevented from 
writing to the editor of a newspaper, did not amount to a 
violation of Article 3. In Application No.4937/71,^  the 
Commission considered that Article 3 had not been 
infringed where the applicant complained that the 
authorities had made it difficult for his family to visit 
him in prison. In a not dissimilar case. Application 
No. 5712/72, the Commission rejected the submission of 
the applicant that being kept 3,000 miles away from his 
home and family in the Bahamas, amounted to a violation 
of Article 3. In the Zeidler-Kornmann case.^  ^ the 
applicant complained that being roughly handled and 
placed in a straight jacket amounted to inhuman and 
degrading treatment. The Commission, however, accepted 
that these measures had been progressively applied 
becuase of the applicant's deteriorating behaviour and
that there had been no violation of Article 3.^*^  ^ In
Application No.1753/63. the petitioner alleged that he 
was forced to share a cell with prisoners suspected of 
suffering from tuberculosis, and that during a hunger 
strike, he was forcibly fed with food containing an
overdose of salt. He also complained that he was kept for
16 December 1966. Yearbook X, p. 382, (382).
11 July 1977, D & R l O p ,  221, (221-222) .
31 May 1957, (unpublished).
24 March 1972, (unpublished).
” 18 July 1974 Coll.46 p. 112 (116).
Op. Com. 18 Jan. 1968, para. 64-65, p. 93.
 ^ 15 February 1965. Yearbook VIII p. 174, (186)
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a considerably length of time confined in a dark cell, 
and that these factors, collectively, amounted to a
violation of Article 3. The Commission concluded that at 
that particular stage of the proceedings it was not in 
possession of sufficient facts to reach a decision on the 
issues raised under Article 3 of the Convention.in 
Application N o . 3 2 2 6 /6 7 ,^ 4 the Commission rejected the 
submission of the applicant that being handcuffed upon 
removal from prison amounted to a violation of Article 3. 
In Application No. 7219/75,^ 5 the applicant's claim that 
being stripped naked upon reception into prison was 
treatment that should be considered degrading was
rejected by the Commission.,
On a number of occasions Article 3 has been invoked to
test the adequacy of medical treatment afforded a 
detainee. For example, in Application N o . 8 2 2 4 /7 8 , the 
Commission was required to consider whether the State's 
medical treatment afforded a prisoner, aged 74, suffering 
from diabetes and cardio-vascular disorders, raised 
issues with Article 3. The Commission considered that as 
the applicant was receiving appropriate medical attention 
there had been no violation of Article 3.^ '^ In Application 
No.6 8 4 0 /7 4 ,^8 the applicant complained that the 
administration of a drug during his imprisonment resulted 
in him feeling restless and irritable. The Commission
concluded that the application should be declared 
admissible so that the allegations made could be 
investigated further.The Commission has been required 
to consider whether, due to the poor health of the 
detainee, any detention at all was compatible with 
Article 3. This was the case in Application No.6181/73.^ 0
Ibid; at p. 187.
13 December 1968, (unpublished).
16 December 1976, (unpublished).
18 p. 100.
Ibid, at p. 122-24.
12 May 1977 Yearbook XXI, p. 250, (278).Ibid, at p. 282.
5 October 1974. Yearbook XVII, p. 430 (446-452).
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where the Commission was required to consider whether 
detention of the applicant who was almost completely 
blind, amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment or 
punishment. The Commission considered that in the 
circumstances of the case Article 3 had not been 
violated.
Finally, the Commission has been required to consider 
whether disappointment following a legitimate expectation 
on the part of a prisoner amounted to a violation of 
Article 3. For example, in Application N o . 7 9 9 4 /7 7 , the 
Commission was required to consider whether expectation 
of release followed by subsequent disappointment, would 
render continued detention inhuman. The Commission 
declared "disappointed hopes of being released do not 
constitute, for a prisoner... inhuman treatment where he 
can be reasonably expected to assess realistically the 
chances of his being released".Similarly, in 
Application N o . 9 0 8 9 /8 0 .^ 4 the Commission was required to 
decide whether refusal for parole could amount to inhuman 
and degrading treatment of the applicant. It concluded 
that Article 3 had not be violated.
5.3.1.3 Category Three: Discrimination.
It was in the East African Asians case^^  ^ that another 
possible use of Article 3 became apparent. Noting the 
inherent limitations of Article 14 of the Convention 
which prohibits discrimination only with regard to other 
rights provided in Part 1 of the Convention, the 
Commission acknowledged that "discrimination based on 
race could, in certain circumstances, of itself amount to 
degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3". It 
continued:
Ibid, at p, 452.
6 May 1978. D S R 14 p. 238, (241-242).
II] Ibid, at p. 288.||: 9 December 1980, (unpublished).
Application No.4403/70, 10 October 1970. Yearbook XIII, p. 928, (994).
B. PHILLIPS 1994, CHAPTER FIVE 179
"....the Commission considers that it is generally recognized that a special
importance should be attached to discrimination based on race, and that
publicly to single out a group of persons for differential treatment on the 
basis of race might, in special circumstances, constitute a special form of 
affront to human dignity".
In Application No.5 3 0 2 /7 1 , the applicants, both citizens 
of the United Kingdom but resident in Goa, claimed that
in being denied the right to enter the country of which
they were citizens they were subjected to mental torture 
and to inhuman and degrading treatment. The Commission 
rejected their application, refusing to accept that their 
particular treatment was inhuman or degrading. In the 
case of Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali.^  ^ the 
Commission seems to have implied that "sexual and other 
forms of discrimination" may be degrading to the degree 
that it raises an issue with Article 3.^ ®^ This, it is 
contended, is an acceptable development of Article 3 
jurisprudence relating to discrimination, for there 
appears to be no valid reason why any of the categories 
of people mentioned in Article 14 should enjoy a level of 
protection greater or lower than any of the others. 
Further, it is contended that the classes mentioned in 
Article 14 should not be considered exhaustive for 
Article 3 cases. In Application No.14455/88.^ 9 treatment 
of gypsies by local authorities was a question properly 
raised, it is submitted, in relation to Article 3.
5.3.1.4 Category Four: Medical Treatment.
It is clear that although there have only been a few 
cases to date involving medical treatment of individuals 
this is a category of applications which might prove of 
considerable significance in the area of medical law and 
of patient consent. For example, in Application
IJ® Coll. 44, p. 29, (47) (1973).
II' Series A. 94, (1985), pp. 56-57. 
1^ ® VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, 240, (1990). 
D & R 40, p. 34.
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No.8070/77,^ ® the applicant complained that he and his 
wife had not been told about any possible after-effects 
of an operation on the latter, and that this raised an 
issue with the "inhuman and degrading component of 
Article 3". In Application No.8518/79.^ 1 the Commission 
was required to consider whether compulsory medical 
treatment against the wishes of the applicant amounted to 
a violation of Article 3. It was concluded that even if 
the medication was administered under constraint the 
treatment was not inappropriate in light of the malady of 
which the applicant was suffering and that Article 3 had 
not been v i o l a t e d . Application No.6870/75,^ ® the 
Commission was asked to consider whether treatment given 
to a mentally ill person violated Article 3. It 
considered that the application should be admitted for 
further examination.
5.3.1.5 Duration of Punishment and Sentence.
It has long been settled in the United States of America 
that disproportionately heavy sentences can have 
implications for the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution, which prohibits "cruel and unusual" 
punishment, A similar approach with regard to Article 3 
has yet to be fully developed by the Commission or the 
Court. However, in Application N o . 5 4 7 1 / 7 2 . ^ 4  the 
Commission accepted that "an exceptionally harsh 
punishment for a trivial offence might raise a question 
under Article 3 .  In the circumstances of that case, 
where the applicant had been sentenced to five years' 
imprisonment for robbery, it was not accepted that an 
issue fell to be considered in respect of Article 3. In 
Application No.7994/77.^ ® the Commission questioned 
whether it was compatible with Article 3 to detain a
9 October 1978 (unpublished).
14 March 1980. D 8 R 20 p. 193, (194). 
I; Id at p. 194.
1“  D & R 10 p. 37, (55-67).
II; 9 February 1973 Coll. 43 p. 160, (160),
6 May 1978. D S R 14 p. 238, (240-241).
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person in prison for life without hope of release. The 
Commission stated:
"...issues may arise under Article 3 in relation to any lawful sentence of 
imprisonment as regards the manner of its execution and its length.In the 
latter context, the treatment of persons serving long term prison sentences and 
particularly life sentences has given rise to increasing concern. The General 
Report on the Treatment of Long-Term Prisoners prepared by the Sub-Committee 
No. XXV of the European Committee on Crime Problems in 1975 considered that "It 
is inhuman to imprison a person for life without any hope of release"(para.77 
of the Report). Furthermore, Resolution (76) 2 on the Treatment of Long-Term 
Prisoners adopted by the Ministers' Deputies of the Council of Europe on 17 
February 1976, recommended to Governments of Member States, inter alia, to 
"adapt to life sentences the same principles as apply to long-term sentences 
and to ensure that a review of sentences with a view to determining whether or
not a conditional release can be granted should take place, if not before,
after eight to fourteen years of detention and be repeated at regular 
intervals".
Although at present it is clear that this question of 
length of sentence has yet to be fully considered in 
Strasbourg, it may be expected that any mechanism 
qualifying conduct for further review is likely to be 
called upon to address this question in the future.
5.3.1.6 Category Six: Miscellaneous,
The diversity of applications within which the qualifier
adopted by the Commission has to work can only be fully 
appreciated when cases are mentioned that cannot be 
classed in any of the groups above.
For example, in Application No.9427/78,^ ® the applicant
alleged that the courts in the Netherlands, in refusing 
him access to his child, were subjecting him to a 
punishment which was degrading. The Commission, noting 
that the actions of the authorties were in complete 
conformity with Article 8 of the Convention did not
Hendriks Case, D 8 R 29, p. 5.
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consider that Article 3 had been b r e a c h e d . I n  
Application No.2248/64.^ ® it was inadequate social 
security benefits which had to be assessed for 
compatibility with Article 3. The Commission concluded 
that there was no case to answer under this provision. In 
Application N o . 2 5 6 8 /6 5 . it was the refusal of permission 
for the applicant to carry on his professional practice 
as a lawyer which required the Commission's attention 
with regard to Article 3. Similarly, in Application 
No. 7299/75. the applicant complained that the act of 
striking him off the register of the Medical Council and 
thereby banning him from practicing medicine was 
degrading within the meaning of Article 3. This 
application was declared admissible for further 
consideration on the merits. Likewise, in Application 
No. 8185/78, it was alleged that the sanction of 
permanent retirement of the applicant amounted to 
degrading treatment. In Application No,6619/74.^ 2 the 
applicant complained that the Austrian authorities' 
refusal to permit him to use the title of "Honorary 
Doctor of Divinity" amounted to degrading treatment. In 
Application No.7729/71.^ ® the Commission rejected the 
applicant's complaint that being subjected to public 
defamation without possibility of redress amounted to 
degrading tr e a t m ent.The petitioner in Application 
No.6699/74,^ 5 complained that although she had undergone a 
sex change, the German authorities had refused to 
recognize her change in name and that this amounted to a 
breach of Article 3, This application was admitted for 
consideration on the merits.^® In Application
Id.
II® 6 February 1967. Yearbook X p. 170, (174). Supra note 79.
4 December 1979. D & R 18 p. 5, (29-30). 
Ill 6 March 1980, (unpublished).
I I 10 December 1975, (unpublished).
17 December 1976. D 8 R 7 p. 164, (172). Id, at p. 176.
15 December 1977 D & R l l p .  16, (23-25). 
Ibid, at p. 25.
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No. 8817779, the petitioner complained that the denial to 
him of identity papers amounted to degrading treatment. 
The Commission concluded, however, that this treatment 
raised no issue with Article 3. In Application 
No. 11201/84, the petitioner complained that an 
arbitration decision depriving him of 12 million dollars 
amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. Again, the 
Commission considered that this did not amount to 
treatment which could be considered inhuman or degrading. 
In Application No.12728/87,^ ® the trauma of being forced 
to face what the applicant considered to be a dangerous 
journey by motor vehicle, was alleged to amount to 
inhuman treatment. This application was declared 
inadmissible. In Application No.15601/89,^ ® the applicant 
considered that the requirement of compulsory 
participation in a stressful court hearing amounted to 
inhuman and degrading treatment but this complaint was 
declared manifestly ill-founded.
This examination of Article 3 jurisprudence serves to 
illustrate that not only is the Article frequently in 
dispute, but that it has been invoked for a variety of 
reasons, many of which are very different to the type of 
case that the drafters of Article 3 would have considered 
raised an issue with a provision prohibiting torture and 
ill-treatment. What must also be realized is that the 
categories examined are not exhaustive. In the same way 
that in the late Fifties few contracting states would 
have considered that corporal punishment in schools would 
have presented problems for a member State with regard to 
Article 3, it cannot be said that there are not other 
forms of conduct which may soon be challenged for 
compatibility with Article 3, The death penalty was 
originally provided for by Article 2 of the Convention. 
However, in light of the recent decision in Soering v
III 10 October 1980, (unpublished), 
(unpublished).
(unpublished).
(unpublished).
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United Kingdom. a n d  the increasing number of 
ratifications of Protocol N o , i t s  compatibility with 
Article 3 of the Convention must be open to increasing 
doubt and further applications contesting its 
compatibility with Article 3 must be expected,^®
It is pertinent at this point to recall that the 
interpretation of Article 3 is important not only to 
States Parties to the Convention, but also because it 
provides useful jurisprudence to other international 
tribunals charged with the duty of overseeing the 
enforcement of, Inter alia, provisions outlawing torture 
and ill-treatment. Applications invoking Article 7 of the 
International Civil and Political Covenant could quite 
possibly be required to receive an even wider range of 
cases than those submitted to date to the European 
Commission, Remembering that the States which may ratify 
the First Optional Protocol to the Civil and Political 
Covenant are not restricted to those members of the 
Council of E u r o p e , 4^ applications under Article 7 
challenging practices as diverse as non-consensual 
sterilization,^® compulsory abortion,^® and female 
circumcision,cannot be considered impossible.
^^ 1 Supra note 64.
 ^ As June 1993 there were 20 contracting states to Protocol Ho. 6, Information Sheet No. 32, (1994).
Judge J.De Meyer, concurring in the Soering decision, argued that the death penalty violated 
human rights law. Article 2 of the European Convention he stated does not "reflect the 
contemporary situation, and is now overridden by the development of legal conscience 
and practice", supra note 64, at 51-52. With regard to extradition and the death 
penalty Quigley & Shank state; "It may only be a matter of time before the European 
states and the European Court of Human Rights take the position that extradition is 
improper where prosecuting officials in the requesting state are seeking the death penalty", at 267, (1989).
Supra Chapt. 2, at pp. 76-79..
Such a petition is not unlikely in member States of the Council of Europe. The problem of 
non consensual sterilization is particularly problematical in cases concerning the 
mentally ill. See for example the English cases of Re B (a minor)(wardship: 
sterilization) [1987] 2 All ER 20; and Re F (Mental Patient;sterilization)[1989] 2 WLR 
1025 (CA) 1063 (H.L.) where the courts were required to decide whether it was lawful 
to sterilize a mentally handicapped woman of 17 (Re B) or of 36 years of age (Re F).
There are reports that in China’s cities, a strict one-child policy means compulsory 
abortion in the event of a second pregnancy: Grace, C., "Who believes in a woman’s 
right to choose", "The Guardian", 11 August, p. 15, (1992).
^  Infra note 158.
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What is apparent from this brief survey of Article 3 
jurisprudence to date, and of possible areas in which it 
may be invoked in the future, is that there is clearly a 
need to develop a satisfactory "qualifier" which is able 
to select conduct from an infinitely large subject area, 
which is considered to require further review for 
compatibility with the provision prohibition torture and 
ill-treatment, and to dispose of that conduct which does 
not. It must, in this process of conduct selection, allow 
both the State and the individual a reasonable indication 
as to whether a given conduct is likely to qualify for 
review with Article 3. The present approach to 
"qualification", it is submitted, fails to do this. It is 
contended that this is so for two reasons.
The first is that it qualifies and disqualifies 
inappropriate conduct. This point will be demonstrated 
shortly by examining a number of different forms of 
conduct.
The second is that the "qualifier" is combined with the 
compatibility section of the prohibition of torture and 
ill-treatment. It was noted earlier^® that the effect of 
rejecting "justification" as having any proper place in 
the application of Article 3 effectively closes the 
compatibility section of the norm. The result of this, it 
will be demonstrated, is that since the two sections of 
the norm are forced to merge, the "qualifier" is also 
required to perform the function of determining whether 
the conduct in question violates the norm. It will be 
shown that in performing this added function, so as not 
to arrive at decisions which are not manifestly absurd, 
the concept of "qualification" has been loosely applied 
and, on occasion, it has been abandoned altogether. 
Complete inconsistency in the application of the 
"qualifier", it is submitted, is the result.
Infra pp. 188-192.
Supra Chapt. 4, at pp. 150-51.
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The most alarming deficiency with regard to the points 
raised above, however, is that the system does not 
effectively allow proper consideration of the many areas 
to which the Article 3 now applies. This point will be 
examined in detail in Chapter 6.^ ®® At present it is 
necessary to return to the first two points made above. 
These claims are substantial and the remainder of this 
Chapter is devoted to substantiating them both.
5.4 The Inadequacy of Concentrating on "Intent" and Result" for reasons of Qualification.
In Chapter 4 it was first argued that the present 
approach relating to "qualification" is unsuitable for 
the task of selecting conduct for further review under 
Article 3.^ ®^  This section of the Chapter seeks to justify 
this observation by way of illustration. It is proposed 
that a number of different types of treatment or 
punishment will be examined, all of which are assumed to 
be of a sufficient level of severity to satisfy the 
severity requirement for Article 3. It will be 
demonstrated that a strict application of the "intent 
qualifier" disposes of conduct which requires review for 
compatibility with the norm. Furthermore, and more 
alarmingly, it qualifies conduct which does not merit 
qualification under the norm. This is particularly 
disconcerting because it will be recalled from Chapter 4, 
that, once a given conduct has qualified for review, 
because the compatibility section of the norm is 
foreclosed, in theory at least a finding of a violation 
must follow.
To illustrate the operation of the "qualifier", it is 
proposed that 7 different types of treatment will be 
considered. They are: the infliction of suffering to
secure a confession or evidence; capital punishment; 
corporal punishment; compulsory abortion; heart surgery;
|®J Infra Chapt. 6, pp. 203-241. 
®^^  Supra, Chapt, 4, pp. 140-144.
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female circumcision; and rape. These have been chosen 
because they represent three distinct classes of 
application. The first consists of cases which have 
already been taken to the Commission, such as corporal 
punishment. The second consists of examples which clearly 
require to be disqualified from further consideration 
under Article 3, such as heart surgery. The third 
consists of examples of conduct which may possibly at a 
later date be required to be assessed for compatibility 
with a provision outlawing torture and ill-treatment, 
either regionally at the Council of Europe, or at a 
universal level at the United Nations, This third 
category includes compulsory abortion and female 
circumcision. It may be argued that, bearing in mind that 
these practices are alleged to have taken place in 
countries which offer no prospect of accepting 
international supervision of their human rights 
standards, it is unnecessary to take into account such 
conduct. However, it must be remembered that it is 
important to determine what qualifies as torture and ill- 
treatment not only from the point of view of facilitating 
international enforcement machinery, but also for reasons 
outside of this process. It is true that international 
mechanisms are just one method of forcing countries to 
improve their human rights standards. The work of NGO'S 
is considered vital in this sphere. A satisfactory means 
of determining what amounts to torture and ill-treatment 
and therefore, unacceptable behaviour, is essential to 
their work.
For the purposes of these examples it will be assumed 
that the severity requirement has in every case been 
satisfied.
5.4.1 Conduct No. 1 Suffering Inflicted to Extract Information or a Confession,
With regard to this conduct, it can be seen that as the 
suffering is deliberately inflicted, under the present
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understanding of the norm, the conduct will qualify for 
consideration under Article 3, and it need not be 
discussed further.
5.4.2 Conduct No.2 Capital Punishment.
With regard to this conduct the matter is far less clear. 
This is because it is difficult to attribute to the state 
the element of intent to cause the degree of suffering
which is likely to result from awaiting execution, in 
addition to any suffering which may occur during the 
execution itself. A study of the many states worldwide 
which carry out executions'^ demonstrates that it is often 
justified on retributive grounds, reflected in the 
commonly quoted biblical aphorism of "an eye for an eye". 
Inherent in this philosophy is a desire to match the 
taking of one life for another. That is its main purpose 
and the raison d'etre of the punishment. Any suffering
involved in awaiting the punishment and the execution
itself is incidental and on occasion also accidental. 
Classifying it as "intent", therefore, is a difficult 
process. A study of capital punishment before abolition 
in the United Kingdom illustrates this point. The history 
of the punishment in the United Kingdom demonstrates a 
concerted effort to find and perfect the most efficient 
and painless form of execution. In the Royal Commission 
Report on Capital Punishment^® research was conducted to 
determine whether a technique had been perfected which 
provided an immediate and painless execution. That the
Royal Commmission was unable to answer this question in 
the affirmative may have been a factor in introducing the 
moratorium on capital punishment which eventually led to 
its abolition 1969.®-®^  In any event, it was clear from the 
Report that the purpose of execution was to dispose of 
life, not to torture the person sentenced to death.
®-®^ UNSDRI, The Death Penalty - a bibliographical research, 539, (1988). See generally HOOD,(1989).
 3 (Cid. - - - -
POTTER, at 203, (1993).
®®® 1949-5 m 8932).
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The unsatisfactory nature of "intent" as a "qualifier" 
when considering capital punishment can be seen when it 
is realized that the State that is able to demonstrate 
that the infliction of severe suffering was not intended 
as part of the penalty of execution is likely to be 
outwith the application of the norm, even though the 
result of the penalty may be that considerable suffering 
is inflicted on the applicant. Similarly, the State which 
is found to intend suffering as being part of the
sentence of execution can expect that its programme of 
executions would qualify for consideration under the 
norm. The result to the individual is of course in every 
case the same. It is submitted that it is absurd that the 
State's operation of the death penalty may or may not
qualify for review depending upon whether the pain 
inflicted was deliberate, incidental or even accidental.
5.4.3 Conduct 3: Corporal Punishment.
This punishment would seem to qualify without difficulty 
under the "inhuman" component of the norm as it is
accepted that its purpose is to inflict suffering on the 
individual. Whether the practice would qualify as 
degrading would depend upon the "result" of the
punishment. As noted earlier,®®® the Commission has
considered that this depends on the facts of each case. 
It has decided in a number of cases that the corporal
punishment in question was degrading although its
decision in the Costello-Roberts case®®® is a clear 
indication that the Commission does not consider that
corporal punishment "per se" is contrary to Article 3.
5.4.4 Conduct 4: Compulsory Abortion,
The practice of compulsory abortion is reported to have 
taken place in some parts of China and Tibet, as part of
®®® Supra Chapt. 4, at p. 143. 
®®® Series A. 247, (1992),
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China's strict policy regarding birth control,®®® This 
practice perhaps demonstrates better than any other the 
unsuitability of "intent" as a "qualifier" for Article 3. 
This is because a strict application of "intent" in this 
case makes qualification of the practice of compulsory 
abortion into the torture or inhuman categories of the 
norm unlikely. If the conduct were to be reviewed for 
compatibility with the present torture and ill-treatment 
norm, it would be possible to establish that severe 
suffering is likely to result from such treatment, but 
proving that it was intended would be more problematical, 
A State may choose to defend the practice by reference to 
the intention of the authorities, which it may contend is 
to control an escalating birth rate. This, clearly, 
should not exonerate the State from liability for such a 
practice. Its effect is the same, because it can be used 
as evidence of the intent of the state which may not be
to inflict suffering, but to combat the problem of over­
population. "Intent", as the "qualifier" here, is shown 
to be very unsatisfactory indeed,
5.4.5 Conduct 5: Heart Surgery,
This treatment has been chosen for consideration for two 
reasons: first, because it is evidently of benefit to the 
patient, because without it there is a very real 
possibility that the patient's suffering is likely to be 
severe and indeed that the patient may even die; 
secondly, because, although for the benefit of the
patient, the treatment in its early stages and later in 
its post operative stages can lead to the patient
experiencing considerable discomfort and pain. It is a 
good example of medical practices which recognize that 
for the relief of long-term suffering it is often 
necessary to induce or allow transient suffering to occur 
at a preliminary phase. It is difficult to exclude the 
argument that the treatment involves the deliberate
®®® Supra note 146.
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infliction of pain. A strict application of the "intent" 
"qualifier", it may be observed, is in danger of 
qualifying the conduct for review even though it is for 
the benefit of the patient and that the suffering 
intended by the surgeon is likely to be far less severe 
and for a shorter period than if the treatment is not 
administered.
5.4.6 Conduct Six: Female Circumcision.
The World Health Organization estimates that 90 million 
females have been subjected to genital mutilation.®®® At 
present, genital mutilation is practised in more than 25 
countries in Africa as well as in parts of Asia and the
Middle E a s t .
In cases involving such conduct it is difficult to state 
that there is an "intent" to cause suffering. Indeed, in 
some cultures the treatment would be administered in the 
belief that it was for the social good of the recipient. 
Again the "intent" approach of the Commission and the 
Court fails to qualify a type of practice which urgently 
requires scrutiny for its compatibility with a provision 
prohibiting torture and ill-treatment. It is accepted 
that under the present understanding of the norm it may 
qualify as degrading, but it must be questioned whether 
such classification would be adequate to reflect the 
level of suffering which may be experienced in many 
cases.
5.4.7 Conduct Seven : Rape.
This practice requires to be discussed in a manner 
different to that with regard to the above examples. This 
is because, although a State may enact a practice of 
compulsory abortion and capital punishment which has
®®® See generally Slack (1988); Walker, (1993), For research on the subject see Passmore, (1986).
Slack, ibid at 444.
PHILLIPS 1994, CHAPTER FIVE 192
consequences for the norm under discussion, the same 
cannot be said with regard to rape. This conduct requires 
to be examined, not in the State's capacity of compelling 
its performance, but in its failing to outlaw it and 
punish those who commit it, A State, for example, which 
allows the crime continually to go unpunished or indeed 
refuses to concede that it is a crime at all, should
properly, it is submitted, find itself accountable for 
refusing to protect its citizens from treatment which may 
amount to torture or to inhuman or degrading conduct. In 
this context, the investigation into "intent" would
require to be slightly different in comparison to that 
above. To bring the omission of the State successfully 
inside the norm with regard to the "intent" qualifier it 
would need to be established that the State intended to 
subject women in its society to suffering, in
deliberately failing to acknowledge that rape is a crime 
and to deter it by punishing offenders. This is a 
difficult exercise. Attributing "intent" in such a manner 
would require close inspection and thorough understanding 
of the culture pertaining to the State in question to
examine the purpose for its actions or inactions,
A further problem is encountered when attempting to 
classify rape for the purposes of Article 3. In the case 
of Cyprus V. Turkey®®® the Commission considered that 
Turkish soldiers, in committing rape whilst in control of 
a certain part of Cyprus, had engaged in inhuman and 
degrading treatment. However, a strict application of the 
"qualifiers" currently operated by the Commission and 
Court makes this finding difficult to justify. That is 
because of the difficulty in attributing an intent on the 
part of the perpetrators to inflict suffering. It 
undoubtedly would have been the "result" of their conduct 
but this is sufficient only to classify it as degrading 
and not inhuman. Again the current approach regarding 
qualification is shown to be inadequate.
4. E.H.H.R. 482.
PHILLIPS 1994, CHAPTER FIVE 193
5.5, Improving the Present Approach to Qualification Based on "Intent" and "Result".
It may be considered that the approach of the Commission 
need only be amended slightly for it to operate in an 
acceptable way. If the example of capital punishment is 
considered, the immediate response to the deficiency 
highlighted is to amend the "intent" approach slightly, 
so that it may be possible to qualify capital punishment 
in particular circumstances. This might be done for 
example, by adding to "intent" a more objective element 
such as "or was it reasonably likely that such suffering 
would result?" The effect of this additional element 
would be to qualify capital punishment if the Commission 
was satisfied that the method of execution was reasonably 
likely to cause the applicant suffering of a severity 
that it must be regarded as either degrading, inhuman or 
amounting to torture. Likewise, corporal punishment, 
compulsory abortion, female circumcision and rape could 
all expect, after a similar inquiry, to be qualified into 
one or more of the component parts of Article 3, upon a 
finding of sufficient severity. The problem, however, is 
that this additional element would make the exclusion of 
the surgeon's legitimate activity even less unlikely. 
This is because it is difficult to say that it is not 
reasonably likely that the suffering experienced by the 
patient was going to result from the conduct of the 
surgeon. There is a danger, that, subject to adequate 
severity of suffering, his or her conduct may be 
considered not only degrading but also inhuman or even 
tortuous, Not only does this amended approach risk 
qualifying some types of the surgeon's conduct but also 
that of dentist, the physio-therapist and many others in 
professions which involve the infliction of pain on 
another person.
It can be seen that what this amendment amounts to is not 
a qualifier at all, but a systematic acceptance of almost
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all suffering of a certain severity,®®® This leads us to 
recall the comment of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice when he said 
that Article 3 is not a clause which outlaws all 
treatment of a certain severity, but only that of a 
certain type. Such an amendment, it must be concluded, is 
to be rejected in failing to discriminate adequately for 
the purposes of a satisfactory operation of Article 3,
It is submitted that it is preferable to adopt a 
qualifier based on consent of the recipient to the 
treatment or punishment. If this were to be done, the 
problems discussed above in respect of the qualification 
of conduct such as compulsory abortion, female circumcion 
and capital punishment would arise less frequently. To 
demonstrate this statement it will be necessary to 
reconsider the categories discussed above in light of the 
qualifier proposed.
5.6 The Qualification of Conduct Based on Consent.
When considering the first of the categories considered 
above, namely suffering inflicted in order to extract 
information or a confession, it can be seen that an 
approach based on consent will qualify the conduct in 
question in the absence of the consent of the recipient. 
Of course in such an example it is difficult to think of 
one scenario where the individual is likely to consent to 
such treatment. One example may be where both parties 
have agreed that it is desirable to recover certain 
information which it may only be possible to extact by 
administering a truth drug such as sodium pentathon. It 
will be recalled that sir Gerald Fitzmaurice in the 
Northern Ireland case®®^ questioned whether the purpose of 
the treatment was important in determining whether 
Article 3 had been violated because, he said, the pain
The one area that it might not include would be the example of the causing of suffering of a 
person that was accidental and completely unforeseen. An example being perhaps the car 
crash victim who suffers a broken leg due to the driving of another motorist.®®2 Series A.25, (1978).
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experienced, in many cases is likely to be the same,®®® In 
concentrating on consent to determine what conduct 
qualifies as torture or ill-treatment, it is clear that 
his concerns are incorporated into the operation of the 
Article. It is the state of mind of the recipient of the 
treatment or punishment and not the party responsible for 
it which is important when considering the matter of 
qualification of treatment or punishment. However, the 
inquiry into the purpose of the conduct must not be 
disregarded completely. This is because it may be 
relevant to the severity of the suffering of the
individual. It may be considered, for example, that the 
animosity conveyed from perpetrator to the recipient in 
the process of attempting to extract information is
likely to increment stress levels of victims. Recalling 
the treatment under review in the Northern Ireland case, 
it may be concluded that the inquiry into the purpose of 
the "five techniques" would only be relevant in so far as 
it may aid the tribunal in determining the severity of 
the suffering experienced.
When considering corporal and capital punishment it is 
reasonable to expect that a tribunal would presume that 
there is an absence of consent on the part of the 
individual who has, or will be, subjected to the
punishment. However, certain circumstances can be
anticipated where this presumption might be rebutted. For 
example, where the person sentenced to death has since 
waived her/his rights of appeal and a petition has been 
presented by another person on her/his behalf. In such a 
situation it might be anticipated that the State would 
contend that the condemned person has in effect consented 
to the proposed punishment. Similarly, in respect of 
corporal punishment there might arise a situation in 
which the applicant was given a choice between corporal 
punishment and, for example, a prison sentence. Where the 
individual chose the former punishment the State might
®®® Id, Sep Opin, para.33, a.19.
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argue that the applicant had effectively consented to the 
punishment.
In both of the above cases the alleged consent of the 
individual would require close scrutiny. It would be 
necessary to resolve whether the consent given should be 
invalidated due to incapacity of the indivdual concerned, 
or any duress or threat to which s/he may have been 
subjected. In the example concerning capital punishment 
above, it would be expected that close attention would be 
paid to the conditions under which the individual was
kept and the effect this might have had on his/her will 
to contest the punishment in proceedings likely to 
prolong detention in such conditions. Similarly, where 
the applicant is allowed to choose between corporal 
punishment and a sentence of imprisonment the tribunal 
would be expected to examine carefully any argument to 
the effect that there was no valid consent. This argument 
would be particularly difficult to dismiss where the
alternative of a prison sentence was inordinately long.
Similar scruntiny would be necessary when considering the 
remaining categories of conduct mentioned in section
5.4.1 above. On each occasion the tribunal would be 
required to determine whether the consent should be
rendered invalid on the grounds of incapacity, duress or 
threat.
It will be recalled from section 5,6.1 that with the 
present approach to qualification difficulties are 
encountered in qualifying for review capital punishment, 
compulsory abortion and female circumcion and also in 
disqualifying from review at this stage, heart surgery. 
Assuming that consent is not given or is found to be
invalid the practice of compulsory abortion female 
circumscion would qualify for review- On the otherhand, 
open heart surgery would not qualify for further 
consideration in circumstances where the patient had been
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fully informed of the risks and consequences of such 
treatment.
While it is not proposed that a qualifier based on 
consent is without difficulties of its own, it is 
suggested that it does discriminate more efffectively 
between conduct requiring further review and other 
treatment or punishment which does not.
5.7 The Consequences of Rejecting the Concept of Justification for Conduct that may Fall Within the Terms of Article 3.
The present situation regarding the qualification of 
conduct is also unsatisfactory because, as noted in 
Chapter 4, the two stages of "qualification" and 
"compatibility" are effectively merged into one. This is 
because the Commission and the Court do not accept that 
there can be any justification for treatment said to be 
degrading, inhuman or tortuous. Once found to qualify 
into any one of these three categories, a violation must 
follow. The "qualification" stage, in essence, is also 
the point at which a violation will, or will not, be 
found. The Commission, it is submitted, in using the 
inadequate "qualifiers" of "intent and "result" has been 
forced on occasion to apply them loosely or abandon them 
altogether so as not to qualify conduct which clearly 
raises no issue with Article 3 and it is not able to 
dispose of by contending that for a given reason the 
conduct was justifiable. The result, it is contended, is 
complete inconsistency in the application of the 
qualifier, allowing little reliable indication of the 
conduct likely to qualify for consideration under the 
norm.
These observations may be illustrated by examining the 
following cases. They are: Soering v United K i n g d o m ,
Supra note 64. See for a discussion of the case Chapt, 6, pp. 217-223.
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McFeelev v United Kingdom, Application Ho. 3448/67 , a nd
Reed v United Kingdom.
In the Soering case the "intent" and "result" qualifiers, 
it is submitted, were effectively abandoned. A study of 
both the Commission and the Court's decisions does not 
indicate any attempt to determine whether the United 
Kingdom could be said to have intended that the applicant 
be subjected to inhuman treatment upon his return to the 
State of Virginia, U.S.A. The eventual finding that the 
U.K would be guilty of subjecting Soering to inhuman and 
degrading treatment or punishment if it permitted his 
return is another example of the erratic application of 
the "qualifiers". This is because it is only with the 
greatest of difficulty that it is possible to attribute a 
finding of intent to cause the suffering on the part of 
the United Kingdom. "Reasonable likelihood" of such 
suffering resulting would qualify the conduct as inhuman 
treatment, but it is clear from the jurisprudence of the 
Court that the "qualifier" is not this wide. It is 
restricted to "intent" only. The Court was correct, 
however, to find that the applicant would be subjected to 
degrading treatment, because this, from the facts, would 
have been a possible "result" of the United Kingdom's 
action.
It is important to examine the remaining three cases by 
first remembering that the Commission has declared that 
there can be no justification for treatment contrary to 
Article 3. It cannot be said, therefore, that for reasons 
of prison security a person can be tortured to reveal 
details of an escape plan. Further, the Commission is 
unable to declare that it is acceptable for a person to 
live in inhuman conditions because there was no money 
available to provide him or her with adequate detention 
facilities. Likewise, it is not possible to say that
McFeeley et al. v. U.K. 3 E.H.R.R. 161. 
Coll. 30, p. 56.
M ? D & R  25 p. 5, (1982).
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torture is justified because of the applicant’s own 
behaviour.
In McFeeley v. United Kingdom, the applicant complained 
that in being given a personal body search, which 
sometimes involved the inspection of his rectum with a 
mirror, he had been subjected to inhuman and degrading 
treatment or punishment. In the case of Reed v U.K the 
petitioner complained that the poor conditions of his 
cell, which contained cockroaches, amounted to degrading 
treatment. In Application N o . 3 4 4 8 /6 7 .^8 drawing blood from 
the applicant and subjecting him to a severe beating, 
was, he claimed, a violation of Article 3, In seeking to 
dispose of these cases, as identified earlier^^ the 
Commission could have choosen to refer to insufficient 
severity or utilize its principal "qualifiers" of 
"intent" and "result". Considering the latter first, it 
can be seen that although it may be difficult to qualify 
the treatment in the above cases under the "intent" 
category, it is likely that the conduct may qualify as 
degrading, because the "result" of living in a cell 
inhabited with cockroaches, or of having one's rectum 
inspected, or of being subjected to a severe beating, is 
that it is possible that the victim is likely to feel 
degraded. It follows therefore, that if no violation is 
to be declared, the cases cannot be disposed of by the 
Commission's "qualifier" of "intent" and "result".
In the McFeeley case the "qualifier" was abandoned 
altogether. The decision focused on the need for such 
treatment in "light of prison security." This, when 
carefully analysed, effectively amounts to a finding that 
the treatment qualifies as degrading conduct, but was, in 
the circumstances, justifiable.
Similarly, in Reed v United Kingdom, the Commission chose 
to dispose of the Article 3 point with reference to the
7 May 1969 (unpublished).
Supra pp. 154-156.
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exceptional circumstances of the case.^^ This included the 
repairs to the prison which were taking place at the time 
of the alleged violation, requiring prisoners to be 
accommodated in cells of a temporary nature, and because 
of the heavy numbers of inmates which H.M,'s.Prison 
Winchester was required at the time to hold due to 
rioting in H.M's Prison Hull. This reasoning, again 
resembles a decision to the effect that the applicant had 
been subjected to degrading treatment, but that in the 
circumstances it was considered justifiable. In 
Application Ho.3448/67, it is submitted, the treatment 
afforded the prisoner clearly amounted to at least 
degrading treatment, but conduct which in the 
circumstances the Commission considered was 
"justifiable". It is another illustration of the 
Commission's abandonment of the "qualifier" and resort to 
the concept of "justification" to dispose of an 
application. It is contended, however, that in the
circumstances there was no alternative. From the facts, 
it is clear that the applicant was subjected to conduct 
which could be described as degrading and, in addition, 
possibly inhuman. The qualifiers, it follows, would have 
admitted the conduct for consideration if properly
applied as it is likely that the "result" of the 
treatment was that the applicant felt degraded. The 
"disqualifier" would not have assisted the Commission in 
disposing of the application. This is because the
treatment in the case was undoubtedly severe. In ordinary 
circumstances it is clear, following decisions such as 
that in Tyrer^^  and W a r w i c k , that the severity 
requirement would most likely have been satisfied- The 
applicant's own behaviour is of course an issue. His 
conduct, however, is not related to the assessment of the 
severity of his suffering, but instead to whether the 
treatment given to him could in the circumstances be said
Supra note 167, at p. 9, 
Supra note 2.
Supra note 4L
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to be "justifiable". The case, therefore, could only be 
disposed of by invoking "justification" issues, and not 
by the use of the severity disqualifier. If the 
Commission had chosen to apply the severity disqualifier 
in the case, it would lead to the alarming conclusion 
that, before a person is entitled to the protection of 
Article 3, they must be subjected to treatment of a 
severity greater than that displayed in Application 
No.3448/672,
It is submitted that the decision in the McFeeley case 
was correct. It would be unacceptable if prison 
authorities were prevented from using the security 
measures in dispute in Me Feeley, as it was clearly 
required for reasons of prison security. Likewise, in 
Application No.3448/67 it would be unjust to consider 
that the prison officers had been guilty of a violation 
of Article 3 without considering the applicant's own 
difficult behaviour. Aspects such as prison security, 
accommodation problems at a prison and the prisoner's own 
conduct have no relevance to the question of 
qualification. They are properly considered, it is 
contended, at the stage of compatibility.
It will be shown in Chapter 6 that it would have been 
better to approach the decisions by reference to 
"justification" issues such as the security concerns in 
the McFeeley case, the difficult circumstances in Reed, 
and the applicants own behaviour in Application 
No.3448/67.^3
Conclusion.
For present purposes it is sufficient to conclude that 
the effect of merging the two stages of qualification and 
compatibility is that the former becomes indeterminate 
and inconsistent. It is clear that a consistent
An inspection of the decisions in each do in fact demonstrate that it was these issues that 
had persuaded the Commission that there had been no violation.
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application of the qualification component is only 
possible when it is separated from the third element of 
the norm, that of compatibility. It is equally clear that 
the "qualifiers" of "intent" and "result" adopted at 
present fail to perform satisfactorily the task required 
of them.
The remaining Chapter seeks to propose a more suitable 
qualifier for the prohibition of torture and ill- 
treatment. It also attempts to establish the importance 
of recognizing the category of "compatibility" and not 
merely because it will allow for a satisfactory operation 
of the "qualifier". It will be shown that without 
recognition of the "compatibility stage" by the 
acceptance of the concept of "justification", it is 
impossible to address satisfactorily the many areas to 
which the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment is now 
being utilized.
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6- THE CONCEPT OF JUSTIFICATION AND ARTICLE 3 .
Introduction to Chapter.
The purpose of this Chapter is twofold: first, to
demonstrate that the present interpretation of Article 3 
is unable to provide adequate review of the types of 
treatment or punishment which the European Court is now 
being asked to consider; secondly, to propose a method of 
review which would perform this function satisfactorily.
The Chapter seeks to justify this first position by
studying the Court's assessment of judicial corporal 
punishment in the Tyrer case. To assist in determining 
whether this was satisfatory or not it will be necessary 
to examine early in this Chapter the modern criteria for 
assessing punishment as well as the review of corporal 
punishment carried out by the Advisory Council on the 
Treatment of Offenders, which was asked to consider the 
practice in 1960 with a view to its réintroduction.^ To 
support the conclusion that the failings demonstrated in 
the Tvrer case  ^are not particular to corporal punishment, 
a review of other forms of treatment or punishment is
undertaken. This is done by studying the extradition case 
of Soering v. U.K,3 the prisoner treatment cases of 
McFeely v U.K.^ and Reed v. U.K.^ the racial
discrimination applications in the East African Asians 
case  ^ and, finally, the practice of compulsory 
vaccination-
It is argued that the deficiencies inherent in the 
present understanding of Article 3 are not present in the 
method of review proposed in this Chapter which is to be 
preferred for a number of reasons. The first is that it 
offers a satisfactory review of the "new areas" to which
3- Infra pp. 207-210 8 note 20. 
3 Infra note 34 & 37.
3 Series A. 161, (1989).
 ^3 E.H.R.R 161.
 ^Application No. 7630/76, D & R 25, (1980) pp. 5-18. ® Yearbook XIII, (1970) 928, and 3 E.H.R.R 76.
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Article 3 is now being applied. The second is that, 
unlike at present, it makes possible the exclusion of 
conduct without, in many cases, precluding its return. 
The third is that it comprises a mechanism which 
recognises that the Convention is no longer operating in 
territory where it has always been considered that there 
are "right" or "wrong" answers, but in an area requiring 
"preferred solutions" or "more appropriate state 
behaviour". These conclusions will be discussed in detail 
later in this Chapter. To begin, it is necessary to 
examine briefly the methods of assessing punishment and 
the development of penal policy.
6. The Assessment and Purposes of Punishment.
Standard works on the moral foundation and aims of 
punishment identify three main principles.^ These are: 
deterrence, retribution and rehabilitation.
The first two of these have become established 
cornerstones of penal philosophy throughout the ages.® 
Punishment in it simplest form appears to be a response 
to the need of individuals to avenge the wrong committed 
by others whilst making it clear that criminal behaviour 
can never lead to worthwhile profit or gain.^
Rehabilitation on the other hand is considered to be 
incidental to the purposes of retribution and 
deterrence.3-® Its origins, although attributed by Bean^ to 
the time of the Second World War, are considered by 
others to go back further, to the turn of the 20th 
century. 32 The focus on rehabilitation as a fundamental 
objective of penal policy, which represented a drift away 
from the emphasis on the deterrent and retributive
7 ntPMKT A N D  peters, (1959); BEAN, (1981),
® HUDSON, at 1, (1987).
33 BEAN, (1976).12 nnmuMRM pggO, and GARLAND, at 7, (1990),
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elements of punishment, resulted from the belief that the 
State not only had the power, but also the duty to 
intervene and assist those individuals who would 
otherwise be destined for a life of crime and 
de 1 inque ncy. 33
The order of importance and priority afforded these 
objectives of punishment has, however, over the course of 
time often changed. By the later 1960s the penal system 
of the United Kingdom contained many examples of 
sentencing policy with rehabilitation of the offender as 
its primary purpose. Little more than 20 years later the 
emphasis in criminal justice moved away from considering 
the needs of the individual offender and concentrated 
instead on the seriousness of the offence he or she had 
committed. In England and Wales, with the entry into 
force of the Criminal Justice Act 1993,^ it seems that 
the position has altered again. This statute, which 
amends earlier sentencing legislation, gives the 
sentencing court greater power to consider the criminal 
history of the offender before determining the most 
appropriate punishment.
An examination of penal policy in member States of the 
Council of Europe demonstrates that even between 
countries considered to be relatively politically and 
culturally homogenous a consensus concerning the purpose 
of punishment is unlikely to be achieved. Following the 
Eighth Criminological Colloquium of the Council of Europe 
1987 the Select Committee of Experts on Sentencing was 
established to, inter alia, examine "the drawing up of 
general sentencing principles which would enable the 
development of a coherent and consistent sentencing 
policy in Europe with the co-operation of the 
judiciary" .35 This led to Recommendation No R (92) 17
33 Supra note 8, at 7.
M  S.55(5) of the Criminal Justice Act 1993.
port "Consistency in Sentencing" 
adopted by the Committee of Ministers 19th Oct 1992.
35 See Re Strasbourg, (1992), Recommendation No. R(92) 17
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concerning consistency in sentencing.^ The recommendation 
recognizes the various rationales for sentencing, such as 
deterrence, rehabilitation and resocialization,
individualization, retribution and "just deserts" and 
incapacitation.^ However, it was doubted that there could 
be a consistent approach to sentencing across the 
membership of the Council of Europe. Although Appendix 
A.5 mentions that the rationales for sentencing should be 
reviewed from time to time^ ® the Appendix does not state 
that one rationale is preferrable or should be given 
priority over another.^
This brief excursion into the purposes of punishment and 
penal policy provides an indication of the factors which 
require consideration when assessing the efficacy of a 
given punishment. It also suggests, it is submitted, that 
developments in penology have not been in a constant 
direction. They have not been characterized by the trial 
and complete rejection of certain principles of 
punishment in favour of others, but by the frequent 
emphasis on one in preference to, but not complete 
exclusion of, others. Until such time as a consistent 
approach to punishment is developed over time and one 
which is common to all States in the Council of Europe it 
is submitted, that if a given form of punishment is
Adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 19 October 1992 and 
prepared by an expert committee under the authority of the European Committee on crime 
Problems (CDPC). Resolutions concerning various aspects of criminal or penal policy 
include: Res (66) 18 on collaboration in criminological research; Res (66) 25 on the 
short-term treatment of young offenders of less than 21 years; Res (73) 17 on short­
term treatment of adult offenders; Res (73) 24 on group and community work with the 
offenders; Res (73) 25 on methods of forecasting trends in criminality; Res (76) 2 on 
the treatment of long term prisoners; Res (76) 10 on certain alternative penal 
measures to imprisonment; Rec.R. (82) 17 on the custody and treatment of dangerous 
prisoners; Rec. R (83) 7 on participation of the public in crime policy; Rec. R (84) 
10 on the record and the rehabilitation of convicted persons; Rec.R (87) 1 relating to 
European inter-state cooperation in the penal field; Rec.R (87) 20 on social reactions 
to juvenile delinquency. Publications List In the Field of Crime Problems. Council of Europe A listpub, (1992).17 Id.
3® Ibid, at 6, 
3^  Id.
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rejected by the European Court of Human Rights it is 
better considered shelved and not completely disgarded.
Before examining the review of judicial corporal 
punishment by the European Court in the Tvrer case, it is 
useful to add to the above observations a study of the 
Advisory Council's review of the practice in 1960.
6.1 The Review of Corporal Punishment by the Advisory Council on the Treatment of Offenders.
In January 1960 the Advisory Council on the Treatment of 
Offenders was asked to consider whether there were 
grounds for re-introducing any form of corporal 
punishment as a judicial penalty for any categories of 
offences or of offenders.^ Its members considered the 
punishment in the light of a number of factors. First, 
although it is unclear as to what weight was attached to 
the following observation, its Report^! noted that 74% of 
the population considered that corporal punishment should 
be the penalty for some offences.^ Considerable time was 
spent assessing the arguments for corporal punishment as 
a deterrent. It was noted that those who supported the 
re-introduction of judicial corporal punishment did so by 
referring to the increase in offences of violence against 
the person since the abolition of the punishment. The 
Advisory Council also observed, however, that this did 
not take into account the fact that such crimes had been 
rising prior to abolition and that there was no 
discernible increment in this rise after 1948, when the 
practice was officially outlawed. It concluded, with 
regard to the deterrent aspect of judicial corporal 
punishment, that it was not an especially effective 
deterrent immediately before its abolition, and that its
CORPORAL PUNISHMENT: REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS at 16. 
(Cmnd.i213), 1960. This is commonly referred to as the "Barry Report"33 Id.33 Ibid, at 7.
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abolition "did not result in an increase in the offences 
for which it was previously imposed".3®
The Council also considered in detail the question of the 
reforming propensities of the punishment. It stated that 
there was considerable medical support for the view that 
the offender would not profit from a beating and that 
s/he might commit further offences in consequence of 
having been beaten.34 it was noted that medical witnesses 
were agreed that, if an offender already had a 
substantial element of resentment in her/his make-up, 
judicial corporal punishment would be likely to make it
worse. It considered that the offender would be inclined 
to bitterness, and therefore more and not less likely to 
behave in an anti-social manner. It studied the finding 
of the Cadogan Committee^ which, several years earlier, 
had examined the question of judicial corporal
punishment. This Committee concluded that judicial
corporal punishment could only be justified on the basis 
of its value as a deterrent and that the deterrent
argument was not made out from a careful analysis of 
crime statistics relating to particular offences
committed between 1908 and 1930 ,3® order to make a
comparable analysis, the Council asked the Home Office 
Research Unit to study crime figures for the period 1941 
to 1948. The Council concluded:
"The subsequent studies have produced similar results to those of the study 
made by the Cadogan Committee, and have confirmed that Committee's conclusion 
that there was little difference between the subsequent records of men who were
flogged and those who were not flogged: in fact the subsequent records of those
flogged were slightly worse".33
23 Ibid, at 15.
253^  Ibid, at 12.Report of the Departmental Committee on Corporal Punishment (the "Cadogan Report"! 
Parliamentary Papers 1937-38, Vol.9.3® Supra note 20, at 3.
33 Ibid, at 16,
B, PHILLIPS, 1994 CHAPTER SIX 209
It noted that the Criminal Justice Act 1948, which 
abolished judicial corporal punishment, introduced 
principles of constructive punishment designed to have 
the effect of reforming individuals. However, it was 
considered that corporal punishment was likely to destroy 
any constructive work that may be achieved with the
offender. The Council stated:
"It is incompatible with the effects of probation or any form of custodial 
training. Such constructive methods depend largely for their success on the 
establishment of a proper relationship between the offender and those in 
authority,...and this is unlikely to be achieved if the treatment begins with a 
beating".3®
The Council then examined the practical considerations of 
reintroducing judicial corporal punishment. One 
consideration of particular concern was the possible 
disparity in the use of any punishment. Some courts, it 
concluded, would award a particular punishment
frequently, others not at all. It feared that the
inevitable public comment on these disparities would be
detrimental to the administration of justice, which 
constituted another factor militating against the 
réintroduction of judicial corporal punishment.^ The
Council also expressed concern at the fact that, before 
the court could decide on the suitability of the 
punishment for the particular offender, various social 
and medical reports would be required. This would involve 
probation officers and psychiatrists, many of whom 
regarded judicial corporal punishment as wrong in 
principle and would be reluctant to facilitate its use.3® 
Delay in administering the punishment was, however, the 
Council's most serious practical objection to corporal 
punishment ,33 it noted that there were many who considered 
that, if corporal punishment were to be effective at all,
3® Ibid, at 17. 3® Ibid, at 20. 3® Id.33 Ibid, at 22.
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it had to be promptly administered.^ This, the Council 
observed, would not always be possible owing to the delay 
pending appeal against the punishment and the wait for 
psychiatric reports, etc.3®
6.2 The Review of Corporal Punishment in the Tyrer Case by the Commission and Court.
6.2.1 The Commission in the Tyrer Case
The facts of the Tyrer case®^ may be stated briefly as 
follows. Anthony Tyrer, a 15 year old school boy on the 
Isle of Man, 35 was reported to his school master by a 
prefect for taking beer into the school .3® Tyrer later set 
upon the prefect, along with others, and was duly 
convicted for assault occasioning actual bodily harm. He 
was sentenced to be birched, which involved three strokes 
across his bare posterior which in the event caused his 
skin to be "raised but not cut... "33 and to be "sore for 
about a week and a half afterwards".®®
The practice of the authorities at the time was to carry 
out the punishment only after a medical examination and 
in the presence of a doctor and at least one parent.it 
would be administered by a police constable with two 
other constables holding the recipient down.^ A senior 
officer would also be in attendance.^
33 Ibid, at 20.
33 Ibid, at 19-26.
34 Report of the Commission, Eur. Court. H.R., Series B. 24.
35 The Isle of Man is not a part of the United Kingdom, but has since 1765, been a British
territory. By Convention, although Westminister Parliament has competence to legislate 
for the Island, this function is abdicated in favour of the Tynwald Government of the 
Isle of Man, Tynwald claims to be the oldest continuous Parliament in Europe. Oral 
Submission of Corrin, J Attorney-General of the Isle of Man, Tyrer Case, European 
Court, id, at 64-65,
3® It is perhaps interesting to know that the consequences of this action was that Tyrer was 
also caned by the Headmaster - an action, as later cases were to demonstrate which
itself had implications for the Convention,33 Series A. 26, at 7, (1978).3® Id.
43 Id.
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The matter of the application in Strasbourg attracted 
considerable local interest, with a petition being
collected with some 31,000 signatures, (approximately 
two-thirds of the voting population of the Isle of Man) 
calling for the retention of corporal punishment.^ The 
practice on the Island also attracted attention in the 
United Kingdom, and resuled in considerable political 
debate and press coverage.4®
Unable to reach a friendly settlement under the terms of 
Art. 28(1)(b) of the Convention, the Commission 
considered its opinion. It concluded that Tyrer had been 
subjected to "an assault on human dignity" which
constituted degrading treatment or punishment contrary to 
Article 3.44 The opinion of the Commission is significant 
not only because of the eventual decision, which is 
considered to be persuasive before the Court, but because 
it chose to abandon completely its earlier approach to 
the determination of the meaning of Article 3, as begun 
in the Greek case. It will be recalled that it was in
this decision that the Commission began by defining the
terms torture and inhuman treatment and then proceeded to 
consider what type of conduct fell into which of the 
categories in the Article. This approach was continued, 
albeit by revising the aspect of "justification", in the 
Northern Ireland case. The Commission in the Tyrer 
decision declared that the case under review differed 
from the previous Greek and Irish cases, which involved 
allegations of atrocious i l l - t r e a t m e n t,4® and proceeded to 
explain its conclusion without any reference to its 
earlier jurisprudence.
Commission member Kellberg, acting as Principal Delegate 
to the Commission, summarized the Commission's reasoning
43 Supra note 34, at 75.
See for example an article in the "The Times" entitled "Britain's embarrassing appearance at 
European Court of Human Rights - Propaganda chance the Russians are not expected to 
miss", at p. 2, January 15, 1978.
44 Supra note 34, at 29.
45 Ibid, at 23.
PHILLIPS, 1994 CHAPTER SIX 212
before the Court in the following manner.4® To begin with, 
the Commission doubted the value of the punishment under 
consideration as a deterrent to juvenile offenders' 
future misconduct.43 it also took into account the general 
circumstances surrounding the punishment, i.e. it being 
administered long after the offence, by strangers, and 
accompanied by a "kind of ritualism" .4® Finally, Kellberg 
stated that the Commission had also taken into account 
the fact that corporal punishment as a criminal 
punishment had been abolished in most member States of 
the Council of Europe, and in Great Britain.4®
6.2.2 The Court in the Tvrer Case.
The Court, while endorsing the Commission's opinion that 
the punishment was degrading, was, however, quick to 
stress the existence of a number of factors it considered 
suasive. These included the fact that the violence 
against the individual was "institutionalised", i.e 
"permitted by law", "carried out by the police 
authorities", the "official procedure attending the 
punishment", the "psychological effects of the 
punishment" and that it was "administered over Tyrer's 
bare posterior".®® It may have been a deliberate tactic of 
the Court to concentrate on these factors in an attempt 
to placate those who were still, in large numbers, in 
favour of corporal punishment of one form or a n o t h e r . in 
doing so it allowed the possibility of the judgment being 
interpreted as a finding to the effect that the 
punishment inflicted on Tyrer was, in that given case.
4® Ibid, at 53-59.
43 Ibid, at 82-83.4® Ibid, at 58.
4® Id.
® Supra note 37, at 14-17.
53 For example in relation to corporal punishment in schools in 1974 Terry Casey, the then 
General Secretary of the National Union of Schoolmasters/Union of Women Teachers, was 
quoted as saying that "the swish of the cane" was "one of the essential sounds of 
education." "Corporal Punishment in schools - the law", C.L.Centre Information Sheet 
p. 1. Similarly, in 1978 the National Association of Heads and Matrons of Assessment 
maintained that corporal punishment was necessary as a deterrent for hard core 
offenders under 14 years of age. (TES) Feb 10, at 99.
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contrary to Article 3, but that judicial corporal 
punishment was not, per se, contrary to the Convention. 
However, the better conclusion is that the judgment did 
amount to a finding that the punishment is per se 
contrary to Article 3, because, as Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice 
correctly pointed out, these "special circumstances" did 
not stand up to close scrutiny.
Responding to the "institutionalised" observation, he 
stated:
"To be "institutionalised" is, in an ordered society, inseparable from any 
punishment for crime, since non institutionalised punishment, except such as 
the lav; tolerates, must be illegal. Therefore, it does not follow (and it is 
not explained) why institutionalised violence must necessarily be degrading, if 
non-institutionalised is not, or be more degrading than the latter. Indeed, it 
is not at all clear what form of non-institutionalised violence the Court had 
in mind which, by comparison, would not be regarded as degrading to the
recipient". 53
With regard to the Court's reference to the "official 
aura of the procedure". Sir Gerald was as equally 
dismissive :
"Next the alleged effect of the institutionalisation is said to be "compounded" 
by the "whole aura of official procedure attending the punishment" - (but how 
could the procedure not be official if there was institutionalisation? - the 
one is, or entails, the other) - and also compounded "by the fact that those 
inflicting [the punishment] were total strangers to the offender". As to this 
last objection, leaving aside the question whether, in the restricted community 
of Castletown, Isle of Man, the police officers concerned were "total 
strangers" to the boy, I for my part fail to see how it can be any more 
degrading to be beaten by strangers than non strangers. Many would, I believe, 
think it less so".5®
52 Sep Op. of Judge Fitzmaurice supra 37, at 27.53 Ibid, at 27-28.
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He concluded:
"This brings me..to the conclusion...which constitutes one of the basic causes 
of my dissent over the Judgment-namely that it is the fact of corporal 
punishment as such, irrespective of the circumstances, which in the Court's 
view is degrading-so that no circumstances could make it otherwise".
A similar understanding of the case is accepted by 
Mlyniec:
"Its holding ...must be read to ban as degrading per se all corporal punishment 
inflicted by the state as punishment for a crime. No other conclusion can be 
reached given the fact that procedural safeguards were in effect, and also 
given the fact the actual physical injury in this case, while significant, was 
neither long lasting nor permanently disfiguring".
The judgment was criticized, inter alia, by Professor 
Zellick who complained that the Court had reached a 
conclusion, but without giving any reason why the 
infliction of violence is degrading, as the term is to be 
understood in Article 3.®® However, the problem Zellick 
rightly identifies of satisfactorily determining when the 
treatment or punishment must be considered tortuous, 
inhuman or degrading has already been examined,®3 por the 
purposes of this Chapter it is necessary to be concerned 
with the fact that the Court in the Tyrer case failed to 
address a number of issues pertinent to the proper 
consideration of corporal punishment. It has already been 
noted®® that a satisfactory assessment of any punishment 
necessarily requires thought to be given to its deterrent 
rehabilitative and retributive qualities. None of these 
issues were addressed by the Court, despite the fact that 
parties to the hearing made numerous submissions which, 
when carefully analysed, clearly amounted to arguments 
relating to the rehabilitative, retributive or deterrent
54 Ibid, at 29.
55 Mlyniec, at 52, (1985).
5® Zellick, at 667, (1978).
53 Supra Chapt. 4, at pp. 130-150 8 Chapt. 5, at 166-169. 5® Supra pp. 203-205.
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functions of corporal punishment. Counsel Blom-Cooper, 
representing the United Kingdom directly mentioned in his 
submission the possibility that the Court should not 
consider the punishment degrading "perhaps on the ground 
that its proved effectiveness was sufficient to justify 
its use" .5® Corrin, the Isle of Man Attorney-General, 
argued in his submission to the Court that corporal 
punishment had redeeming social factors.®® He stated that 
the Tynwald government of the Isle of Man believed the 
punishment to be a deterrent:
"in the sense that some people - either are in fact deterred from even
coming to the Isle of Man or, if they do come to the Isle of Man, once they 
come to live or come on holiday, are deterred from committing acts of violence, 
because they are all aware that this penalty, although rarely used, is on the 
statute book and can be used in the necessary case".®3
He then sought to support this submission with 
statistical evidence that corporal punishment was in fact 
an effective deterrent on the Island against crimes of 
violence.®3 He then commented on the rehabilitative 
aspects of the punishment, referring to a letter he cited 
as typical from a former recipient of the punishment on 
the Island who had written to him to express his support 
for the practice. The author of the letter had stated 
that the punishment had helped him appreciate the 
difference between right from wrong and deterred him from 
further mischief. Observing that he may have been 
destined for a life of crime he concluded his letter by 
stating that he was now a successful businessman.®®
Other factors that the Attorney General of the Isle of 
Man chose to submit to the Court included local support 
for judicial birching. He also mentioned that outside 
help was not available to the Isle of Man as it was to
5® Supra note 34, at 63.
®® Ibid, at 74.
®3 Ibid.
®3 Ibid, at 77.
®3 Ibid, at 75.
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other British Isles. Quoting the example of the Island's 
main resort, Douglas, having a complement of just 40 
policeman in the event of civil disorder, he maintained 
that it would not be possible to control hundreds of 
rioters 64
It is clear that the Court of Human Rights paid scant 
attention to these issues, if any at all. It addressed 
the deterrent related submission of the Attorney-General 
by pointing out "that a punishment does not lose its 
degrading character just because it is believed to be, or 
actually is, an effective deterrent or aid to crime 
control",®® and that it "is never permissible to have 
recourse to punishments which are contrary to Article 3, 
whatever their deterrent effect may be".®®
This summary dismissal of the deterrent value of corporal 
punishment is to be contrasted to that discussed above®3 
in the Barry Report, in which the Council considered in 
exhaustive detail whether the deterrent case for corporal 
punishment had been made. The Council also considered 
whether the punishment was useful for reformative
purposes before concluding that the case for
réintroduction of judicial corporal punishment had not 
been made.®®
The failing of the Court in the Tyrer case was, it is 
submitted, to accept the potential scope of Article 3 
noted earlier in this thesis,®® without at the same time 
reviewing its understanding of the provision as
permitting no justification for conduct considered
tortuous, inhuman or degrading. It had indicated that it 
accepted the Article's relevance to types of conduct far 
removed from that which the drafters of the provision may
®4 Id.
Supra note 34, at 15.
6 “ •Supra note 20.
f  Id.® Supra Chapt. 3, at pp. 104-110.
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have had in mind, but had chosen to apply the same 
understanding of it as allowing for no concept of 
justification in the consideration process. In so doing, 
the Court placed itself inside a judicial straight- 
jacket, preventing it from considering factors which were 
clearly relevant to a proper review of the conduct to be 
judged by it.
It is contended that this interpretation of the Article 
leads to an inadequate review of not only corporal 
punishment, but also many others forms of treatment or 
punishment which have since had to be considered by the 
Commission and the Court. Furthermore, it also precludes 
satisfactory review of other conduct which might, at a 
future date, raise issues which will need to be examined 
in Strasbourg. To support this observation it will be 
necessary to examine the extradition case of Soering v . 
U . K ,30 the cases of McFeelev v. U.k33 and Reed v . U . 1(33 
concerning the treatment of prisoners, the racial 
discrimination allegation raised in the East African 
Asians case33 and the practice of compulsory vaccination.
6.3 Review of Extradition Under Article 3 of the Convention.
There have been many applications questioning the 
extradition or deportation of an individual from a member 
State of the Council of Europe to a third state. Only a 
few, however, have been s u c c e s s f u l  .34 The burden placed on 
individuals in cases of extradition of proving that they 
are likely to face treatment contrary to Article 3 is a 
difficult one to discharge. However, the main cause for 
concern, is not the difficulty or otherwise of 
establishing that extradition in certain circumstances is
3® Series A. 161, (1989).
33 Application No. 8317/78, McFeeley et al v. United Kingdom, 3 E.H.R.R.161.
33 Application No. 7630/76, D & R 7 p. 161.
33 Application No.4403/70, 3 E.H.R.R. 76.
34 A recent exception, albeit under Article 8 of the Convention is Lamaiundaz v. United Kingdom
Case No. 48/1992/393/471), The Times Law Report August 11 1993, at 32.
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likely to violate Article 3, but in the consideration the 
Commission and Court give to such applications. This 
point can be supported by an examination of the leading 
extradition decision from the European Court which is 
Soering v. United K i n g d o m .3®
The facts and importance of the Soering case from the 
point of view of international law of human rights have 
already been d i s c u s s e d . 3® it will suffice to summarize and 
emphasize the facts of the case important to the present 
discussion.
Soering was arrested in the United Kingdom and 
proceedings were commenced to extradite him to the United 
States of America to face two charges of capital murder. 
Claiming that upon his return and conviction he would 
have to face both the "death row phenomenon" and the 
possibility of execution, he argued, inter alia, that the 
U.K. would be responsible if it agreed to his return, for 
subjecting him to treatment contrary to Article 3. The 
Court, disagreeing with the Commission, and by unanimous 
decision, concluded that the decision of the United 
Kingdom to extradite Soering to the United States would 
give rise to a breach of Article 3.33 ihe Court determined 
thus :
"having regard to the very long period of time spent on death row in such 
extreme conditions, with the ever present and mounting anguish of awaiting 
execution of the death penalty, and to the personal circumstances of the 
applicant..".3®
It is interesting to note that the Court's judgment spoke 
in terms of taking into account "all the circumstances of 
the case" and of striking a fair balance between the 
demands of the general interest of the community [in 
combatting crime] and the requirements of the protection
35 Series A. 161, (1989)
3® Supra Chapt. 3 at pp. 101-103. See also Lillich, (1989). 
33 Supra note 75.3® Ibid, at 44.
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of the individual's fundamental rights" J® The Court, it 
may be concluded, used terminology which indicates that 
it is not possible to consider Article 3 as offering 
complete protection from all forms of ill-treatment. 
Lillich, it is submitted, is right to comment;
"How one can balance an individual's rights under Article 3, which are 
nonderogable, against the community's interest in effective law enforcement 
awaits further clarification by the Court". ®®
It may be that this is a reflection of the frustration of 
the Court in being prevented from addressing matters 
which it considers important along its course to a 
satisfactory decision or, just as likely, it is an 
indication that, in fact although not expressly admitted, 
the Court does take into account factors which are 
clearly outside the strict interpretation required of it 
by the understanding of the Article to date.
It is this interpretation, if faithful to the present 
understanding of the norm, which would, it is argued, 
exclude a number of considerations important to the 
proper development of extradition law. These shall now be 
briefly examined.
First, the Court was clearly prevented from considering 
whether a finding in favour of the applicant would have 
the effect of creating a haven in Europe for fugitives. 
As a critic of the judgment has stated:
"[e]very prisoner awaiting extradition to the USA [on a capital murder charge] 
is going to have to take his case all the way up the ladder to see if the
European Court of Human Rights will make the same decision in his case If
extradition were refused by the Court in such a case, the prospect opens up of 
the UK filling up with wanted American murderers".®3
3® Ibid, at 35.
®® Lillich, at 144, (1991).
®3 ROBERTSON, at 232, (1990).
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Although it must be questioned whether the numbers 
resisting extradition are ever likely to be that large 
and that the question of a safe haven for fugitives in 
the Council of Europe is likely to arise, it is clear 
that the Court, under the present understanding of the 
Article, is prevented from taking such a possibility, 
both at present and in the future, into account when 
determining whether an application under Article 3 is to 
succeed.
Secondly, the Court was prevented from considering any of 
the implications refusal to extradite might have for the 
United Kingdom. The decision to extradite Soering was 
undoubtedly an issue involving more than simply the 
extradition of an individual who may suffer ill-treatment 
upon his return to the receiving state. The case became 
of crucial importance to relations between the United 
Kingdom and the United States in respect of extradition
matters, with the former State keen to resolve the matter
without damaging prospects of the latter extraditing 
important IRA suspects to London for trial. Undoubtedly 
the eventual decision of the Court did much to damage 
this sensitive relationship. As Robertson states;
’in political and diplomatic terms, [Soering] is a disaster for the U.K. In 
recent years considerable effort has been expended to obtain the extradition to 
the UK from the USA of wanted IRA suspects. The issue of their extradition has 
aroused considerable publicity in the U.S. and our diplomats have had to fight
against the weight of the Irish-American lobby The reaction of the average
American to this decision can well be imagined. If we are not going to 
extradite their murderers, why should they extradite ours?"®^
Thirdly, the Court was also prevented from considering
whether compatibility of the interpretation of what are 
regarded to be very similar anti-torture and ill-
treatment provisions®^ is a factor which should have a 
bearing on the final outcome of its decision. In its
®3 Id.
®3 Soering Commission Report, para 142.
B. PHILLIPS, 1994 CHAPTER SIX 221
decision the Commission noted that the Virginia Supreme 
Court had "rejected the submission that electrocution 
would cause the "needless imposition of pain before death 
and emotional suffering while awaiting execution of 
sentence" and would therefore constitute "cruel or 
unusual" punishment contrary to the Eighth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution (Stamper v . 
Commonwealth.)". The Commission noted that "in the light 
of the similarity between Article 3 of the Convention and 
the Eighth Amendment, the Commission must attach 
substantial weight to the above finding of the Virginia 
Supreme Court".^ However, an interpretation by the Court 
true to its understanding of the norm prevents it from 
considering not only this factor, but also that the 
Virginia Supreme Court may be better placed to determine 
the conditions on death row and, therefore, whether they 
should be outlawed as being contrary to modern norms on 
acceptable treatment or punishment.^
Fourthly, the importance of a possible alternative venue 
for the trial and conviction of Soering could not be 
properly evaluated by the Court under the present 
understanding of Article 3. Frowein, in his dissenting 
opinion^ on behalf of the Commission, considered that the 
decision to extradite to the United States would violate 
Article 3 for the very reason that an alternative venue 
for the applicant, in the form of Germany, was possible. 
Although the submission of the United Kingdom must be 
correct that the German extradition request was 
irrelevant to the issue of an Article 3 violation, since 
"the question of whether there is a breach of Article 3 
should involve exclusively an objective assessment of the 
gravity of the treatment complained of...",^ it is 
submitted that a route somewhere between the two is
Id.
This is a consideration which may be described as the "margin of appreciation" afforded by 
the Strasbourg court to another in the United States.Supra note 75, at 32.
Ibid, para.147.
B. PHILLIPS, 1994 CHAPTER SIX 222
preferable. This is because, although Germany's
extradition request is irrelevant to the issue of the
severity of the treatment, it is relevant to the 
reasonableness of the United Kingdom's decision and 
whether its intended actions were reasonable in all the 
circumstances. Again, however, this consideration was 
excluded by the present understanding of Article 3.
6.4 Review of Treatment of Prisoners Under Article 3 of the Convention.
The cases of McFeeley v . United Kingdom, and Reed v. U.K. 
were discussed in Chapter 5.®^  It will be recalled that in 
the former case prison procedures were in dispute, the 
applicant claiming, inter alia, that body searches 
amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. In Reed v.
U.K. it was alleged, inter alia, that substandard prison­
cell conditions amounted to a violation of Article 3.
A proper consideration of the McFeeley case. it is 
submitted, required the following factors to be taken 
into account. First, the reasons why the security 
procedures were in place which would include reference to 
the security category of the applicant, recent examples, 
if any, of major security breaches, and the personal 
history of the applicant in respect of his own 
incarceration; secondly, a detailed examination of any 
safeguards which may have been in place to ensure that 
reasonable procedures laid down were in fact followed. 
None of these factors, it is noted, could be considered 
adequately under the present interpretation of Article 3 
by concentrating on the consequences of the treatment in 
order to discover whether it was sufficiently severe to 
be considered degrading.
Similar observations may be made with regard to the case 
of Reed V. United Kingdom. The applicant's circumstances: 
having to live in a cold and uncomfortable cell
Chapt.5 at p. 165, & note
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containing cockroaches undoubtedly raised an issue under 
Article 3. However, the fact that he was kept in such 
accommodation whilst repairs were being carried out in 
another section of the prison, it is contended, is a 
factor which the Commission should be allowed to give 
some consideration. Likewise, it was submitted by the U.K 
that many of the problems at the prison in question were 
caused by overcrowding, due to the fact that a number of 
prisoners had to be transferred there from a second 
prison, where there had been riots. These are all factors 
which require examination, but which is impossible under 
the current approach to Article 3.
6.5 Review of Discrimination Under Article 3 of the Convention.
The possible application of Article 3 in discrimination 
cases became apparent in the East African Asians case,^  
and it is to this decision that it is necessary to turn 
to assess whether the current understanding of the 
Article provides satisfactory review for applicants 
alleging racial discrimination.
The background to the case is as follows: as the decline 
of the British Empire accelerated after the Second World 
War British subjects from former British colonies sort 
refuge in the United Kingdom. As a response to the large 
numbers of people in the U.K. who were concerned by the 
influx of many immigrants. Parliament passed a series of 
strict immigration laws intended to restrict the numbers 
of immigrants entering the country. The plaintiffs, a 
group of Asians living in East Africa, were Citizens of 
the United Kingdom and Colonies, but had been denied 
entry into the U.K. because of a recent change in 
immigration legislation. The effect of the new 
immigration law^  ^ was, effectively, to discriminate 
between those British Passport holders who could
Yearbook XIII, (1970) 928.
Commonwealth Immigrants Act, 1962, 10 7 11 Eliz. 2, ch. 21.
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establish British descent and those, principally the East 
African Asians, who could not. The problem faced by the 
applicants in trying to contest the U.K. action in 
Strasbourg was that the main provision in the Convention 
relevant to their plight was the Fourth Protocol, which 
has not been ratified by the U.K.^
Even more problematic was the fact that Article 14 of the 
Convention, prohibiting discrimination, is not an 
autonomous provision, but operative only in relation to 
another substantive Article of the Convention.^ In the 
absence of Protocol Four, Article 14 was of no 
assistance. The applicants decided, therefore, to 
petition under Article 3 of the Convention, claiming that 
their treatment at the hands of the government of the 
United Kingdom amounted to degrading treatment.
The Commission embarked on a thorough investigation into 
the reasons for the legislation. It found that it was 
directed at a particular racial minority, i.e. the East 
African Asians, who were being targeted directly for 
denial of entry into the United Kingdom. These 
objectives, the Commission considered, had clear racial 
motives. Comments made by the Secretary of State and the 
Home Secretary were cited in support of this conclusion.^ 
The Commission also noted that further elements of
British immigration legislation existed which gave
preference to white persons in East Africa.^ The 
Commission concluded that the racial discrimination faced 
by the applicants, together with the special
circumstances of their case, amounted to degrading
This provides: No one shall be deprived of the right to enter the territory of the State of 
which he is a national. Fourth Protocol of the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Sept. 16, 1963, art 3920, Europ. T.S. No,46.
See generally VAN DIJK S VAN HOOF, 532, (1990).
The Commission concluded that the legislation had racial motives from the following statement 
made in Parliament by the Home Secretary: "...the origin of the Bill lies...in a 
considered judgment of the best way to achieve the idea of a multi-racial society," supra note 89, para. 200.
Ibid, at 83-84.
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treatment contrary to Article 3.^ 5 significantly, however, 
the Commission stated that racial discrimination on its 
own, without the "special circumstances" mentioned, would 
be sufficient to violate Article 3.9G
It is submitted that on the facts of the East African 
Asians case both the decision and the Commission's 
reasoning were acceptable. The applicants' had not only 
been subjected to differential treatment, but the result 
of the United Kingdom's action was in effect to render 
them stateless. For a time they neither had a right of 
abode in their homeland or a right of entry into the 
country of which they were, according to their passports, 
nationals.^ On these facts, concentrating on the 
applicants feelings to determine a violation in such 
extreme conditions was, it is accepted, at least one 
satisfactory way of determining whether Article 3 had 
been violated.
However, if one were to change the facts of the East 
African Asians case slightly, the unsuitability of the 
present understanding of Article 3 is readily apparent: 
if the United Kingdom had been motivated to pass the 
legislation due to racial tension and unrest in its own 
country, the measures taken against the applicants would 
not have appeared so unreasonable. The action might have 
been compared to that presently being taken by the 
government of the Federal Republic of Germany to control 
immigration following considerable domestic unrest caused 
by right-wing extremists.^ Of course, such state action 
may not of itself be sufficient to justify its policy 
relating to entry into a country, but it does amount, it 
is submitted, to a factor which merits appraisal by the 
Commission in a full and proper consideration of the
Ibid, at 85.
Ibid, at 81-82.
Cf here the U.S. case of Weems v. United States 217 U.S. 349 (1910). 
See here THES May 8, 11a, June 8, iOh (1992).
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facts in a given case. The present approach, it is noted, 
excludes such possibilities.
If Article 3 is to develop into a provision through which 
acts of discrimination may be reviewed, it can be seen 
that the present understanding of it is not conducive to 
proper consideration of any such applications. An 
examination of legislation, both at the domestic and 
international level, indicates that provision is made for 
examining the circumstances and reasons for differential 
treatment between races, the sexes, and ethnic groups. 
For example, the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1956 
defines "racial discrimination" as:
"any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, 
descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of 
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal
footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic,
social, cultural or any other field of public life".
Similarly, the Convention of the Elimination of all forms 
of Discrimination Against Women defines in Article 1
discrimination against women as :
"any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has 
the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or 
exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality 
of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, 
economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field".
In European Union law. Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome 
1957, which provides for equal pay for equal work between 
men and woman, has been interpreted to exclude indirect 
discrimination which cannot be justified. Any difference
in treatment must correspond to a "genuine need of the 
enterprise, be suitable for the objective pursued by the 
enterprise and necessary for that p u r p o s e " . There is
99 1249 UNTS 13.
9^9 STEINER, at 256, (1992). See also Directives 75/117, 75/207, 79/7 85/378, 86/513.
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considerable jurisprudence, both nationally and at the 
level of the European Union, addressing the question of 
when indirect discrimination may be considered
justifiable .^91
Accepting that Article 3 has potential as a forum for the 
consideration of racial discrimination cases, it is not
unreasonable to expect that it might also have an
application for other groups, including those categories 
also mentioned in Article 1 4 ,  which are sex, colour, 
language, religion, political, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, birth or 
other s t a t u s . 9^2 Although the East African Asians case may 
be considered as special on its facts and, therefore. 
Article 3 is unlikely to develop into a provision 
allowing general review of discrimination matters, it is 
clear that the present understanding of the norm does not 
suggest that it has the potential of developing into a
satisfactory means of reviewing cases of discrimination.
6.6 Consideration of Compulsory Vaccination Under Article 3 of the Convention.
Examples of compulsory vaccination programmes can be 
found in the United S t a t e s ,  9^3 many third world
c o u n t r i e s , ^94 and also in a number of Council of Europe
countries such as S p a i n ^ 9 5  italy^ 99 and G e r m a n y . 9^7
It will be recalled that it was Eleanor Roosevelt who 
expressed concern that the draft article at the United 
Nations prohibiting torture and ill-treatment might prove
Jenkins v. Klnasaate (Clothing Productions) Ltd [1981] ICR 715 (EAT); Bilka-kaufhaus GmbH v 
Weber von Harz (case 170/84) [1986] ECR 1607.
|92 Report of 12 May 1983, Abdulaziz. Cabales and Balkandali. A. 94 (1985), at 56-57.
J99 dudgeon & CUTTING, at 59, (1991). See generally Jackson, (1969).
J94 d ic k, 51, (1985). See generally Daniel, (1982); Walsh, (1983).
9^9 See generally Barranco, (1990).
|99 See generally Tanzi et al, (1990).
mMMT?g3  ^ at 343, (1989). In 1840 the English Parliament passed a law recommending
vaccination and making variolation illegal. Between 1853 and 1890 certain vaccinations
were made compulsory, but objections to the involuntary nature of these programmes led
to compulsory immunizations being discontinued in 1946, DUDGEON & CUTTING, at 59, (1991).
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problematic for the United States and its compulsory 
vaccination programmes. ^98
The practice of compulsory immunization in the United 
States dates back to the early 19th century, when 
legislation was adopted in the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts requiring smallpox vaccination of the
general p o p u l a t i o n .  ^ 99 Opposition to such laws quickly 
followed on the grounds that it violated the individual's 
inalienable right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
h a p p i n e s s " . 9^ However, the constitutionality of the
Massachusetts compulsory vaccination law was upheld in 
1905 when the U.S. Supreme Court decided that a State did 
have the power to pass and enforce compulsory smallpox 
vaccinations.In 1922, the Supreme Court addressed the 
issue of compulsory immunization again when asked to 
consider the constitutionality of a city ordinance 
requiring smallpox vaccination as a prerequisite for
attendance at school. The Court, basing its decision on 
its earlier precedent, upheld the o r d i n a n c e . Although 
both cases related to the legality of compulsory smallpox 
vaccinations, it was generally accepted that the 
decisions applied, mutatis mutandis, to all compulsory 
vaccination programmes-
The court decisions were taken against a background of 
increasing use of compulsory immunization programmes. By 
1915, 15 States together with the District of Columbia,
had laws requiring smallpox vaccination as a prerequisite 
for school attendance.Furthermore, 21 other States had 
laws or regulations which enabled local jurisdiction to 
enforce compulsory vaccination regulations under certain 
c o n d i t i o n s . 4^ a study by Fowler of smallpox vaccination
" Supra Chapt. 1, at p. 51 
j-99 Tobey, (1947 ).
1^ 9 Jackson, at 787, (1969).
Jacobson v. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S.11, 25 S.Ct.358,49b,Ed. 643, Ann 
Cas,765 (1905).
II; Zucht V. King. 260 U.S. 174 43 S.Ct. 24, 67L. (1922).
Hanlon, at 552, (1968).
Id.
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laws indicated that in the 1940s only six States, 
Arkansas, Florida, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada and 
Oklahoma, did not have some statute which made express 
reference to compulsory immunization against s m a l l p o x .  
During the time of the drafting work of the United 
Nations’ provisions outlawing torture and ill-treatment, 
the enactment of amendments to compulsory immunization 
programmes were relatively static.However, the 
development of certain vaccines, such as the 
poliomyelitis virus vaccine in the late 1950s, the live 
virus oral poliomyelitis vaccine in 1962, and the live 
virus measles vaccine in 1963, renewed interest in 
compulsory immunization programmes as a method of 
preventing the outbreak and spread of preventable 
diseases.Today, the majority of States have a 
compulsory vaccination system, but with an accompanying 
conscience clause to allow for refusal on religious or 
other grounds. 9^
To date, it does not appear that the practice of 
compulsory vaccination, either as performed in the United 
States or in Europe, has been challenged before a supra­
national human rights tribunal on the grounds that it is 
"inhuman" or "degrading". However, bearing in mind that 
the practice exists in a number of member States of the 
Council of Europe, it does not appear an unreasonable 
exercise to speculate as to how the Commission might 
approach any application claiming that compulsory 
vaccination amounted to degrading treatment if it were to 
come before it.
The first and probably most difficult hurdle to overcome 
would be the matter of the severity r e q u i r e m e n t .  
However, as has already been noted, it appears that the 
Commission and the Court have been prepared to relax
Fowler, (1941).
Jackson, at 788 (1959).
Ill4^8 dudgeon & CUTTING, at 59, (1991). 
^^ 9 Supra Chapt.5, at pp. 162-165.
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gradually what was once a rigid standard to be satisfied 
regarding severity of suffering. The recent decision of 
Costello V. Roberts O^ indicates that at least 3 members of 
the Commission were prepared to accept that the 
slippering of a schoolboy, which left no physical signs 
of injury, could satisfy the severity requirement of 
Article 3. Accepting that this approach to the severity 
standard is likely to continue, it is not unreasonable to 
conclude that the Commission would not be able to dismiss 
the application summarily on the severity issue.
If compulsory vaccination were to satisfy the severity 
requirement, it is clear that the practice would not 
receive satisfactory analysis within the present 
understanding of Article 3. Such an analysis would only 
allow examination of whether the result of the practice 
was to cause the applicant to feel degraded. Such a 
subjective approach would, if strictly applied, preclude 
a number of considerations pertinent to a fair evaluation 
of the practice. It is submitted that a decision would 
only be perceived as just if it took into account whether 
the action was reasonable in all the circumstances. This 
would include consideration of whether there was a real 
risk of contracting the disease the immunization 
programme was introduced to combat. The Commission would 
need to consider particularly whether there was an 
epidemic at the time which might have required serious 
remedial m e a s u r e s . A  historical survey of compulsory 
vaccination programmes in the United States^^ indicates 
that they have been introduced as a response to a 
pressing social need. The practice was far more common in 
the States east of the Mississippi River facing immediate 
danger of disease introduced by immigrants.jn addition 
States with large concentrated populations and many
1^ 9 Series A. 247-C, (1992)171 »"A virus that can "out of the blue" kill more people in 18 months than all the deaths from 
battle casualties in two world wars is one to be reckoned with", DUDGEON & CUTTING, at 
23, (1991).Supra p. 228.
Jackson, (1969).
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people living under poor socio-economic conditions showed 
a greater inclination to adopt compulsory, as opposed to 
voluntary, immunization p r o g r a m m e s . 4^
It is interesting to compare the review of compulsory 
vaccination advocated above, and currently impossible 
under the present interpretation of Article 3, with that 
afforded compulsory medical procedures under German law. 
A study of German jurisprudence demonstrates that it is 
possible to give proper consideration to compulsory
medical procedures by carefully considering the
individual's right to physical integrity against a 
general interest requirement. To illustrate this
contention a brief excursion into jurisprudence from the 
courts of the Federal Republic of Germany is necessary.
In the "Spinal Tap case",^  ^  ^district court judge ordered 
the applicant to undergo a medical test requiring. Inter 
alia, the withdrawal of body fluid for the purpose of 
determining his mental condition following his refusal to 
pay a fine imposed after failing to answer a Board of 
Trade questionnaire. He challenged the order as violative 
of his right, inter alia, of personal inviolability under 
Article 2(2) of the Constitution. The Court stated:
"When ruling on cases involving the compulsory extraction of body fluids, the 
judge must - as in all cases involving government encroachment on the sphere of 
freedom - observe the principle of proportionality relative to ends and means.
While the public interest in solving crimes - an interest based on the 
especially important principle of legality - ordinarily justifies even 
encroachments on the freedom of the accused, this general interest suffices 
less the more severe the infringement of freedom".
The Court then considered the seriousness of the offence 
in respect of the procedure to which he was required to 
submit.
125 16 B VerfGE 194, (1963). Id.
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It concluded:
"All in all, the matter is a minor offence that might only lead to a light 
sentence, possibly even an acquittal on account of its insignificance. By 
comparison, the extraction of fluid is not an insignificant physical procedure.
There is no justification for submitting the accused to such a surgical 
procedure against his will".^ '^^
A similar decision was taken in the
"Pneumoencephalography case"^^^ in which the court 
invalidated a court order to puncture a vertebral canal 
for the purpose of ascertaining criminal responsibility 
for a crime. In the "Heinrich P. case", however, the 
Constitutional Court decided that, in the circumstances, 
an order requiring the applicant to submit to a blood 
test to determine parentage was reasonable and not 
contrary to the individual's right to inviolability of
her/his p e r s o n .
The above decisions indicate that German courts recognize 
that the practice of compelling individuals to submit to 
compulsory medical procedures may be condoned in 
situations where the "principle of proportionality
relative to ends and means has been observed". This
necessarily requires an examination of the circumstances 
in which the individual was required to submit to the 
procedure. A balancing of interests arises, but the court 
has acknowledged that the more severe the infringement, 
the less compelling the general interest consideration. 
It is this assessment of the competing interests of the 
individual and the general public interest in matters 
relating to vaccinations and other medical procedures 
involving violation of the individual's physical 
integrity, which, it is submitted, requires to be
incorporated into the application of Article 3 of the
Convention. It is one however, that under the present
Quoted from KOMMERS, at 345, (1989), 2^9 17 BVerfGE 108 (1963).^^ 9 5 BVerfGE 13 (1956).
PHILLIPS, 1994 CHAPTER SIX 233
understanding of the provision as rejecting the concept 
of justification, the Commission and Court are prevented 
from developing.
The above analysis of the Commission’s and the Court's 
efforts in reviewing certain conduct for the purposes of 
compatibility with Article 3 of the Convention suggests, 
that their understanding of the provision is unsuitable 
for a proper review of the cases now before it. This is a 
conclusion which is particularly apparent the more the 
Commission and Court are required to consider conduct far 
removed from the sorts of treatment or punishment the 
drafters of Article 3 had in mind.
It is submitted, that a more satisfactory method of 
reviewing the "new areas" to which Article 3 is now being 
utilised is required. A proposal for this shall now be 
discussed.
6.7 Accommodating the Concept of Justification into the Consideration of Article 3 Cases.
It is submitted that in the many areas to which Article 3 
is potentially relevant, review must, to be satisfactory, 
accommodate consideration of a number of factors 
currently excluded by the present understanding of 
Article 3. It is clear from the Tyrer decision that, as a 
vehicle for review of punishment, the present 
understanding of Article 3 is unsatisfactory. The Court, 
in that case, was unable to address the many points 
submitted to it by the Attorney General of the Isle Man, 
such as the retribution qualities of the punishment, or 
the confidence the local population had in the punishment 
as a deterrent. It is equally clear that, when compared 
to the thorough consideration given to the practice in 
the Barry Report, the punishment did not receive a review 
which could be considered satisfactory. When it is 
recalled that it was in the Tyrer case that the practice 
of judicial corporal punishment was effectively
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d e n o u n c e d , 9^ the Court must be criticised for producing a 
judgment which did not address the retributive, deterrent 
and rehabilitative effects of the punishment. Earlier in 
this Chapter it was noted that penologists agree that any 
assessment of punishment to be satisfactory must consider 
all of these elements and in d e p t h . N o n e  of them 
received adequate consideration by the European Court of 
Human Rights.
It is submitted that these matters could be addressed if 
the Court were permitted to consider whether a punishment 
which may be inhuman or degrading may also be justified 
for reasons of, for example, "the prevention of disorder 
or crime". This would allow the State the opportunity to 
justify the practice by referring to the proven deterrent 
value of corporal punishment or its retributive qualities 
as a further example. The burden would be on the State to 
make out the case for justification the standard of proof 
increasing in proportion to the severity of the 
treatment. There would, of course, be a threshold beyond 
which no treatment or punishment could be said to be 
justifiable.
Likewise, permitting the State to justify its treatment 
of prisoners on the grounds of, for example, "the 
interests of public safety" would allow full 
consideration of a number of issues essential to a proper 
review of cases concerning treatment of prisoners. If the 
reasoning of the Commission in the McFeeley case is 
recalled, it can be seen that the decision was eventually 
justified in the "light of prison security", - a term 
very similar to that proposed above.
Similarly, when considering extradition cases, allowing 
the State the opportunity to justify its action on the 
grounds of, for example, the "prevention of disorder or
||9 Supra Mylniec, 52, (1985) and p. 211-214. 
Supra p. 204-205.
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crime" or "the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others" would permit consideration of issues conducive to 
proper assessment of the case. This would allow the Court 
to address a State’s submission that it was becoming a 
haven for fugitives, although it would be expected that 
considerable evidence of this would have to be submitted 
to discharge the burden on the State in this regard. The 
applicant's own circumstances might also be relevant. The 
Court might wish to inquire whether the applicant 
deliberately sought refuge in the respondent State in 
order to avoid justice or whether his or her choice of 
destination was more accidental.
When considering the practice of compulsory vaccination, 
the advantage of allowing the State the opportunity to 
justify its actions would be that the Court could 
consider whether the treatment although degrading to the 
recipient was necessary, for example, for the "protection 
of health" due to an epidemic or the need to eradicate a 
life threatening disease.
It may be considered that the terms suggested above - 
which are "in the interests of public safety", "the 
prevention of disorder of crime", or "the protection of 
health", might be abused and that they are broad enough 
to encompass the justification of a range of evils. 
However, an examination of the interpretation of similar 
terms by the court in respect of Article 8 of the 
Convention, which protects. Inter alia, the right to 
respect for an individual’s private and family life, 
demonstrates that the terms have been narrowly 
interpreted. For example, in Silver v. United Kingdom^^  
the Court, in considering the scope of Article 8(2), 
stated that any limitation to the right should correspond 
to a "pressing social need" and be "proportionate to the 
aim pursued".
Series A. 61, at 37-38, (1983).
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In addition to the vigilance of the Court, it would be 
open to the individual to submit that the suffering 
experienced was of such a severity that no 
"justification" considerations may apply. Where this 
threshold would lie would be for the Commission and the 
Court to decide. In respect of the comments made in 
Chapter 5^^^ on the assessment of severity, it is argued, 
that the individual would be able to ascertain where this 
threshold lies, as the European Commission and Court 
consider Article 3 cases under this revised understanding 
of the torture and ill-treatment prohibition and it 
becomes possible to plot its co-ordinates.
It must be noted that it is not expected that the revised 
approach advocated would lead to a significant change in 
the direction of the Court's jurisprudence. It may even 
be that the direction the Court's decision would take 
would remain unchanged. What is important is that the way 
to the decision in each case would be perceived as more 
thorough, and fair. It is submitted that review by the 
Court would be considered more reasonable if it allows a 
greater number of submissions considered relevant by each 
party to be addressed even if they were to be 
resoundingly rejected by the Court, in contra-distinction 
to an approach which refuses to acknowledge their 
relevance at the outset.
In advocating what may appear to amount to a compromise 
on the protection afforded by the terms of Article 3, it 
is conceded that this represents a considerable departure 
from the accepted interpretation of the Article. It is 
also conceded, that the provision which includes the word 
"torture" may prove too emotive for any theory of 
interpretation to be considered acceptable which 
advocates that some conduct within the scope of the 
provision may not violate the Article on the grounds that 
it is justifiable. Professor Tarnolopolsky commented on
Supra pp. 168-169.
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the United. Nations' norm prohibiting torture and ill- 
treatment stating that reference to corporal punishment 
in schools "tended to trivialize the prohibition of 
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment". Similarly, it must also be said that mention 
of "torture" in the provision may make any theory 
advocating limited compromise of the absolution 
prohibition in the article impossible to accept.
The solution to this dilemma may lie in the proposal to 
direct conduct leading to all but the most severe forms 
of suffering for consideration under Article 8, which 
accommodates a regime similar to that proposed above. Its 
second paragraph permits justification in respect of:
"interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of 
the country, the prevention of disorder or crime,..the protection of health or 
morals... the protection of the rights and freedoms of o t h e r s " . 1^ 4
If the two recent corporal punishment cases of Y v . U . 
and Costello-Roberts v. U.K^^  ^ are examined it can be seen 
that the Commission has already embarked on a path which 
is not incompatible with this suggestion. In Y v. U.K, 
which involved an application challenging the use of 
corporal punishment in a private school in the United 
Kingdom, the Commission considered that the injury caused 
to the applicant was of sufficient severity to satisfy 
Article 3, and did not consider it necessary to consider 
the application under Article 8, as requested by the 
applicant. In the Costello case, which concerned the 
slippering of a schoolboy, the Commission refused to 
accept that the severity threshold had been satisfied. 
Rejecting the application under Article 3, it then 
continued to consider whether there were grounds for 
considering the case as a violation of Article 8.
^^ 4 UKTS 71 (1953)
Series A. 247-A, (1992). 
Series A. 247-C, (1992).
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The merit of the above proposal, may only be fully
appreciated however, when observations on the nature of 
recent Article 3 decisions are discussed.
6.8 The Need for the Interpretation of Article 3 toAccount for the Change in the Nature of the Prohibition of Torture and Ill-treatment.
The Court's consideration of the "new areas" discussed 
above must be criticized for more than its failure to 
take into account a number of factors pertinent to proper 
consideration of the conduct under review. It must also 
be criticized for rejecting conduct in a manner which
precludes its réintroduction.
In the early years of the Convention^? it was satisfactory 
and, indeed, desirable that the Court could dispose of 
the tortuous practices that were brought to the attention 
of the Commission in the Greek case, without allowing for
the possibility that the practices might have to be re­
assessed in the future with a view to their re- 
introduction. However, it is clear that this method of 
rejecting the types of conduct now frequently examined by 
the Commission for compatibility with Article 3 is no 
longer acceptable. It will be recalled from the
examination of penal policy at the European level that no 
one approach to sentencing may be considered superior to 
another, nor may it be considered that a consensus has 
been achieved on which approaches to punishment are to be 
considered as permanently rejected. Likewise, the 
historical survey of penal reform earlier in this Chapter 
suggests that there is constant reappraisal of penal
policy and rejection and then re-emphasis of certain 
sentencing principles. No one penal principle has emerged 
over time as paramount and preferable leading to the 
exclusion in full or part of all others. An acceptable 
rejection of any punishment by the European Court, it is 
submitted, must provide for the possibility that penology
See here supra p. 91.
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in the future may emphasize the importance of a principle 
previously neglected or disgarded. For example, if 
deterrence is substituted in favour of rehabilitation as 
the primary goal of sentencing, the European Court must 
be permitted to review punishment in accordance with this 
new priority. The method of review proposed in this 
Chapter, it is contended, would incorporate these 
requirements.
Advocating a mechanism which allows the Court to return 
to the consideration of conduct previously rejected as 
incompatible with the Convention is important for a 
further reason. This is because the Convention's 
application has extended to the point at which it is 
perhaps no longer correct to talk about the Court as 
being engaged in an exercise of recognizing "right" or 
"wrong" conduct of the State. The language of "preferred 
conduct" or "more appropriate behaviour" is likely to be 
as suitable in many cases. Therefore, decisions on 
compatibility of conduct with the Convention must be 
considered as recognizing change as much as progress. The 
mechanism proposed, it is contended, would allow for 
change to occur and the Court to consider whether it may 
follow a course previously rejected. Today, not all 
rights in the Convention may be considered to be of a 
"lobster pot nature" - from which, once entered into, 
there can be no r e t r e a t . T o  some degree, the moral 
sceptic must be accommodated in the interpretation 
process under the Convention. Whether corporal punishment 
or compulsory vaccination is capable of being declared 
incompatible with the European Convention is likely to 
depend as much on the Court recognizing a mood against 
the practices in member States of the Council of Europe 
and its judicial rejection being politically palatable, 
as the Court acknowledging a "natural" and "inalienable"
Mahoney, at 67, (1990) quoting Brubaker, S., Comment, 47 Maryland Law Review, at 165,
(1987)..
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right of the individual to be protected from such 
conduct.
Conclusion
To conclude, this Chapter has set out to prove that the 
types of conduct to which Article 3 is now applied and 
for which it might be used in the future, are currently 
unable to receive adequate consideration. What is 
proposed is that the concept of justification be 
incorporated into the consideration of the many new types 
of cases to which the Commission and Court have been 
required to assess. The grounds on which conduct within 
Article 3 must be considered justifiable are those 
already accommodated in Article 8 of the Convention. It 
may just be that for many it would be unacceptable for 
conduct said to be "inhuman or degrading" to be 
considered justifiable. Although normal usage of these 
terms has without doubt undermined their currency, they 
still inspire evocative images of cruelty. It is for this 
reason that removal of all but the most serious forms of 
conduct for consideration under Article 8 may be the 
preferred alternative. It is this proposal which would 
allow adequate consideration of the many new areas to 
which the Convention has now become applicable. It will 
also allow Article 3 to return to its raison d'etre, 
which is the outlawing of torture and severe ill- 
treatment .
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CONCLUSION
The history of the prohibition of torture and ill- 
treatment at an international level uncovers a number of 
facts which the scholar is likely to consider remarkable.
It is remarkable how a prohibition articulated at the 
United Nations, but reproduced in regional human rights 
treaties and many state constitutions, has remained 
largely undefined despite its ubiquity and, indeed, its 
importance. Equally surprising is that the interpretation 
of the prohibition has remained unchanged in almost half 
a century. This is despite the fact that in this time it 
has undergone a complete metamorphosis; created with the 
horrors of the Nazi concentration camps in mind, it may 
now be considered to be a standard against which all 
forms of conduct, leading to suffering of a certain 
suffering, may be tested.
The early part of thesis sought to explain the reasons 
why the definition of torture and ill-treatment has 
remain relatively undeveloped. Reference was made to the 
difficulties experienced during the drafting of the 
prohibition of torture and ill-treatment both at the 
United Nations and then at the Council of Europe, 
Following the examples of maltreatment at the hands of 
the Nazis during the Second World War, it was clear that 
the prohibition would be required to cover conduct wider 
than that traditionally associated with the medieval 
dungeon. However, concerned not to unduly restrict the 
prohibition by an overspecific definition of torture and 
ill-treatment, the phrase eventually accommodated in the 
Universal Declaration was:
"No one shall be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment".
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It is perhaps a measure of the difficulty of the task of 
articulating a satisfactory definition of torture and 
ill-treatment that it has since been left more or less 
unchanged in subsequent United Nations' human rights 
instruments and in regional treaties such as the European 
Convention.
Although this reticence to alter the articulation of the 
torture and ill-treatment prohibition is understandable, 
those charged with the task of applying it may have been 
forgiven for considering that its drafters had abdicated 
their duties by choosing to pass on to others the task of 
determining the scope and, content of the provision.
It may be argued that it is unnecessary to attempt to 
define further the meaning of the prohibition as first 
articulated in the Universal Declaration. There is some 
force in the view that although obscure phrases create 
uncertainty, they also provide great flexibility, 
providing tribunals the freedom to reach the desired 
conclusion in each particular case. However, it has been 
argued that this postion should be rejected for two 
reasons. First, many states have accepted that national 
constitutions or laws should foe interpreted in accordance 
with international human rights provisions, and, indeed, 
some have accepted that these rights should have direct 
application into domestic law. This demands, that the 
rights documented at a supra-national level are clear and 
that they are interpreted in a manner which produces 
consistent jurisprudence. Secondly, it was argued that 
the sanctions against a State considered to be in 
violation of standards documented in human rights 
instruments, can in certain circumstances be severe. This 
requires that rights expressed internationally are 
adequately defined, providing the State with a 
satisfactory indication of their content and the measures 
necessary to ensure that they are properly secured to 
individuals within the State * s jurisdiction.
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The task, however, of producing an acceptable definition 
of torture and ill-treatment is by no means a simple one. 
It was clear from the examination of the provision 
outlawing torture and ill-treatment in Chapter Four that, 
in choosing to include "treatment" in addition to
"punishment" in its terms the drafters had created a 
prohibition which was potentially all-encompassing. Any 
working definition of the prohibition of torture and ill- 
treatment to be acceptable required a mechanism which 
could select conduct from a potentially unlimited range 
of treatment and punishments for further scrutiny, to
ensure that it complied with standards in respect of the 
treatment of individuals.
This task fell first to the European Comission of Human 
Rights in the Greek case. The Commission considered that 
the method of "conduct selection" would be based on the 
"intent" of the State for the torture and inhuman
components of the prohibition and on the "result" of the 
conduct for the remainder of it. For conduct to be 
considered inhuman or tortuous it would need to be 
demonstrated that the State intended to subject an 
individual to suffering which reach a certain severity. 
For conduct to be degrading it would be necessary, the 
Commission concluded, to establish that suffering of a 
certain severity was the result of the State's conduct.
Chapter Four discussed the problems of having, in effect, 
two criteria for this process of "conduct selection" or
"qualification" of treatment and punishment. It also 
noted the difficulty the Commission had experienced in 
developing a satisfactory and consistent use of the 
"qualifiers" for the purposes of Article 3 and that the 
Commission, together with the European Court of Human 
Rights, has effectively abandoned this task preferring to 
give individual rationalizations for each decision. In so 
doing, it was concluded, neither the State nor the 
individual is provided with a satisfactory indication as 
to whether a given form of conduct is likely to be
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contrary to the norm prohibiting torture and ill- 
treatment .
This thesis sought to explain why the Commission and 
Court have been placed in this position with reference to 
two factors. First, it was argued that the qualifiers of 
"intent" and "result" adopted by the Commission and 
confirmed by the European Court of Human Rights are 
unsatisfactory. This is because a consistent application 
of the "qualifiers" would qualify some forms of conduct 
into the consideration process of the prohibition which 
clearly require to be outwith its focus, such as, heart 
surgery on a consenting patient. It would also,
disqualify from consideration conduct many would consider 
properly belongs within its ambit and in need of
continuous supervision, such as, capital punishment. 
Secondly, it was argued that because the Commission and 
Court have accepted that there can be no justification 
for conduct considered tortuous, inhuman or degrading, 
once the treatment or punishment "qualifies" for review, 
it follows that a finding of a violation is the 
inevitable consequence. This is due to the fact that the 
State is prevented from contending that the conduct is 
justifiable for a number of reasons, for example, on
grounds of public security or the prevention of crime. It
is because, therefore, a violation is determined at the 
stage of "qualification" under the present understanding 
of Article 3 that the "qualifier" has been applied 
loosely, and on occasion, abandoned altogether so as not 
to produce results which are plainly undesirable.
Chapter Six of this thesis proposed an alternative method 
of "qualification" based on the consent of the 
individual. The adoption of a consent-based definition of 
the freedom from torture and ill-treatment was supported 
from both a theoretical and a functional perspective.
The theoretical justification was developed in Chapter 3 
of this thesis. This was devoted to examining the
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contribution the interpretation of the European 
Convention has made to enhancing the status of the
individual as a subject of International Law. It was
noted that at the outset the approach to human rights in 
International Law was based on what was considered to be 
reasonable concessions to state sovereignty. Today, 
following the development of human rights jurisprudence, 
principally by the European Commission and Court of Human 
Rights, the emphasis is on the "sovereignty of the 
individual" and the importance of the effective 
enforcement of human rights standards. This change in 
emphasis allows, and to a point requires, a reappraisal 
of the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment focusing 
on the position of the State. It was argued that a
definition of torture and ill-treatment concentrating on 
the consent of the individual reflects this new direction 
in the enforcement of human rights standards.
This conclusion began by noting that the scholar would 
consider a number of observations concerning the 
prohibition of torture and ill-treatment remarkable. 
Equally as surprising as the ill-defined nature of the
torture and ill-treatment prohibition is that its 
interpretation has remained unchanged since its creation 
shortly after the Second World War. This is despite the 
fact that since that time the prohibition has undergone a 
complete metamorphosis. In its infancy it was properly 
regarded as a provision seeking to prevent a recurrence 
of the types of atrocities witnessed in the Nazi 
concentration camps and forms of torture which, until 
those atrocities, many had considered belonged in the 
past. Today, it may be properly regared as a standard 
against which all forms of treatment or punishment 
leading to suffering of a certain severity may be tested.
It was noted that the initial understanding of the 
prohibition as excluding any concept of justification for 
conduct considered tortuous inhuman or degrading was 
difficult to question when the norm's raison d ’etre was
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to safeguard against torture and the most severe forms of 
ill-treatment. Indeed, in the Greek case, in which the 
Commission first attempted to define the norm, some of 
the most barbaric forms of treatment fell to be 
considered. Clearly, no issue of justification could 
properly be put before the Commission in such a case. 
However, this thesis has argued that, as the prohibition 
of torture and ill-treatment began to foe applied to 
conduct far removed from that originally in the minds of 
the drafters of Article 5 of the Universal Declaration, 
the rejection of the concept of justification appeared 
increasingly in need of review. Summary disposal of 
submissions advocating justification for practises of 
fa.la.nga. were acceptable. However, when considering issues 
such as corporal punishment, prison conditions and the 
discipline of children, the rejection of the concept
prevented, it is submitted, the Commission and the Court 
from considering a number of issues properly put before 
them by the parties to the case.
The purpose of Chapter Six was to support this position 
by demonstrating that it is not possible to adequately 
consider the types of conduct which have recently been 
reviewed for compatibility with Article 3 without
considering a number of factors which fall under the 
general heading of "justification issues". This
observation is supported by a close examination of the
assessment of judicial corporal punishment in the Tyrer 
case and other areas previously examined by the
Commission, in addition to conduct which might in the
future be examined for compatibility with the prohibition 
of torture and ill-treatment, such as compulsory
vaccination. It is clear that the assessment of judicial 
corporal punishment afforded by the European Court of 
Human Rights under the current understanding of Article 3 
of the Convention was unsatisfactory when compared both 
to an earlier examination of the punishment in the Barry
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Report and modern methods of assessing the efficacy of 
punishment,
It is submitted that a satisfactory method of reviewing 
the types of conduct which is now required to be assessed 
for compatibilty with the prohibition of torture, inhuman 
or degrading conduct requires the following condition to 
be present. The interpretation of Article 3 must
accommodate a mechanism which would allow the State the
possibility of attempting to justify some conduct within 
the terms of the provision on certain grounds. These are 
grounds identical to those accommodated in paragraph 8(2) 
of the European Convention which concerns, inter alia, 
the right to respect for private life. To advocate the 
incorporation of the concept of justification within the 
interpretation process of Article 3 is to depart from the 
position of the Commission and the Court, which in common 
with other tribunals, national and international, have 
consistently stated that the concept has no rightful 
place in a provision prohibiting torture and ill-
treatment. It is submitted that this position can be 
rejected for two reasons. The first, a functional 
justification, which argues for a satisfactory assessment 
of the types of conduct now being reviewed for 
compatibility with the prohibition, has already been
mentioned. The second, is that the drafters of Article 3 
had only the most severe forms of torture and ill- 
treatment in mind when the concept of justification was 
rejected as having a rightful place in the application of 
the prohibition. Historically, it is clear that the 
rejection of the concept of jusitication is good only for 
the most severe forms of treatment and punishment 
prohibited by the phrase. This conclusion it may be 
noted, sits comfortably with the section of this thesis 
which advocates incorporation of the concept of 
justification into the application of the prohibition of 
torture and ill-treatment but only to a point which does 
not include severe forms of suffering.
B.PHILLIPS, 1994 CONCLUSION 248
Aware that to advocate an apparent compromise to the 
absolute nature of the provision prohibiting torture and 
ill-treatment is a radical departure from the present 
understanding of the norm reference is made to two 
factors which would restrict the operation of the concept 
of justification. The first is that the concept would 
operate only as far as a certain level of suffering. 
Beyond this threshold no concept of justification could 
be considered. The second is that the "justification 
clause" adopted in Article 8(2) has been interpreted in a 
most restricted sense and that this could be expected to 
continue in relation to the prohibition of torture and
ill-treatment.
Chapter Six concluded by conceding that this suggeston of 
incorporating a form of justification into the
consideration process of the prohibition of torture and
ill-treatment may prove for many unacceptable. This may 
be because the phrase, despite containing language which 
belongs to common usuage, still conjures up for many, 
vivid images of horrific and barbaric acts. It is 
accepted too, that it may not be satisfactory to 
incorporate any concept of justification into a 
prohibition which includes the word "torture". It is for 
this reason that it was argued that the preferred 
solution may be to direct all but the most extreme forms 
of conduct to rights concerned with the privacy of the 
individual and respect for the individual's physical
integrity such as Article 8 of the European Convention.
This would allow the prohibition of torture and ill- 
treatment to return to its original raison d'etre which 
is the prohibition of the most severe forms of 
maltreatment of an individual.
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